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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

NEOLIBERALIZING THE STREETS OF URBAN INDIA:
ENGAGEMENTS OF A FREE MARKET THINK TANK IN THE POLITICS OF
STREET HAWKING
This dissertation looks into the processes by which neoliberalism is mutating with
various local and global discourses in order to transform urban space for marginalized
street hawkers in the Global South, specifically Delhi, India. Following the current
engagements in geographic literature on neoliberalism that focus on the contextually
embedded character and the path-dependent process of the spread of free market ideas, I
make free market advocacy think tanks--a rather unknown and under-investigated
accomplice to this process--my main entry point. Corporate funded think tanks are often
found advocating a neoliberal doctrine of free markets, minimal government intervention,
and privatization. A self-professed civil society organization, the Center for Civil Society
(CCS) in Delhi is one of the first neoliberal, national and foreign corporation funded,
advocacy think tanks in India and one of its many agendas is to counter the popular belief
that neoliberalism is harmful for the urban poor such as street hawkers.
Various NGOs, social workers, scholars, academicians, and think tanks including
CCS came together to form the National Policy of Street Vendors, 2009 (NPSV), one of
the first policy proposals in modern India to tackle the problems of urban spaces of street
vending. Through my investigations I wish to highlight the neoliberal attitudes that are
concealed in this policy regarding street hawkers. By bringing these neoliberal
undertones to the forefront, this dissertation discusses how this so called “pro-hawking”
policy that is being pushed to be implemented in the majority of Indian cities is in fact
hostile to hawkers. I demonstrate this fact by explaining that NPSV and its proponents
view space as a capitalist commodity and are attempting to transform the rich social
spaces of Indian city streets into hollow container spaces of capitalist production and
consumption. In this way, this dissertation connects macro spaces of governance such as
city streets to the micro spaces of governmentality such as think tanks like CCS.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Introduction
This dissertation looks into the processes by which neoliberalism is mutating with
various local and global discourses in order to transform urban space for marginalized
street hawkers in the Global South, specifically Delhi, India. Following the current
engagements in geographic literature on neoliberalism that focus on the contextually
embedded character and the path-dependent process of the spread of free market ideas, I
make free market advocacy think tanks--a rather unknown and under-investigated
accomplice to this process--my main entry point. Corporate funded think tanks are often
found advocating a neoliberal doctrine of free markets, minimal government intervention,
and privatization. A self-professed civil society organization, the Center for Civil Society
(CCS) in Delhi is one of the first neoliberal, national and foreign corporation funded,
advocacy think tanks in India and one of its many agendas is to counter the popular belief
that neoliberalism is harmful for the urban poor such as street hawkers. Various NGOs,
social workers, scholars, academicians, and think tanks including CCS came together to
form the National Policy of Street Vendors, 2009 (NPSV), one of the first policy
proposals in modern India to tackle the problems of urban spaces of street vending.
Through my investigations I wish to highlight the neoliberal attitudes that are concealed
in this policy regarding street hawkers. By bringing these neoliberal undertones to the
forefront, this dissertation discusses how this so called “pro-hawking” policy that is being
pushed to be implemented in the majority of Indian cities is in fact hostile to hawkers. I
demonstrate this fact by explaining that NPSV and its proponents view space as a
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capitalist commodity and are attempting to transform the rich social spaces of Indian city
streets into hollow container spaces of capitalist production and consumption. In this
way, this dissertation connects macro spaces of governance such as city streets to the
micro spaces of governmentality such as think tanks like CCS.

Neoliberalism and Neoliberalization
Neo-liberalism is a strain of neo-classical economics that has concretized around
the ideas of political democracy, individual freedom, and the constructive potential of an
unfettered market. Its proponents preach the sermon of the market as the invisible hand
and hence they are often found in opposition to the protectionist welfare state. Working at
multiple scales neo-liberalism commands “good governance that involves ‘neoSchumpeterian’ economic policies that adhere to supply-side innovation and
competitiveness, decentralization, devolution, and attrition of political governance,
deregulation and privatization of industry, land and public services, and replacing welfare
with ‘workfare’ social practice” (Leitner et al 2007, 1). The idea of this “utopia of endless
exploitation” (Bourdieu 1998) is seeded in the works of 17th and 18th century English
and Scottish philosophers who patronized the merchants and entrepreneurs of the nascent
capitalist order while admonishing the medieval religious regimes and absolutist state.
The “rise of economic man” in the works of Locke, Hume, Smith, and Paine found
expression in the set of theories of Austrian philosopher Friedric von Hayek who is
considered the founding father of neoliberalism in modern times. The basic
understanding of Hayek’s economic theory is that individuals with an aim to maximize
self-interest can allocate resources better than the state. Homo economicus, the rational
human being who is the protagonist of his theory, exists before the backdrop of intense
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market competition. He influenced Milton Friedman and Gary Becker of the Chicago
School, which later became the hub of training students and propagating neoliberal ideas
in the US and abroad in the 1960s.
Neoliberal ideas gained widespread prominence during the 1970s and
1980s, as a response to the global economic recession originating within the Fordist mass
production industrial system and Keynesian welfare policies. They were first
experimented with in Pinochet’s Chile under the guidance of a group of university of
Chicago graduates called the Chicago boys. Later Thatcher in Britain announced “there is
no alternative” (TINA) to neoliberal reforms and Reagan in the US adopted neoliberal
strategies to advance sharp economic growth. Gradually neoliberalism spread across the
globe to places like the Philippines, Nicaragua, Mexico, Eastern Europe and the postSoviet states and is still in the process of consolidation in many of these countries. In
1978, Deng Xiaoping embraced liberalization in China, which had a communist led
economy. During the 1980s, Bretton Woods institutions –the World Trade Organization
(WTO), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), International Monetary Fund
(IMF)--were transformed into agents to mobilize peripheral and semi-peripheral countries
to market reforms.
India opened to an era of market liberalization in the 1990s under the leadership
of Narasimah Rao. The gulf war-related rise in oil prices had resulted in the depletion of
India’s foreign reserves (Cerra and Saxena 2002). At the same time, two of the leading
international credit rating agencies downgraded India as an investment destination
(Ahemad 2011). As a result, non-resident Indian investors withdrew their local deposits,
further reducing India’s foreign currency reserves (Cambridge and Harriss 2000 cited in
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Ahemad 2011). In January of 1991, India was running an account deficit of $10 billion.
The economic crisis forced the government of India to seek a loan of $1.8 billion from
the IMF but only on the precondition that India would devalue its currency, abandon
import substitution and planned growth strategies in favor of implementing ‘macroeconomic stabilization’ and ‘structural adjustment’ policies (Bradhan 1999, Ahemad
2011).
However, scholars maintain that over the last decade, neoliberal changes have
been slow due to local resistance from the public and politicians alike. Since then, a
neoliberal lobby made up of a huge international network of foundations, institutes,
research centers, publications, scholars, and writers has been engaged in a process of
what Gramsci called ‘cultural hegemony’ to normalize neoliberal reforms and
subjectivity. CCS is working against this backdrop to disseminate neoliberal ideas and
anti-state sentiments.
The magnitude of scholarly attention given to neoliberalism makes it impossible
to discuss it in detail here. But general themes in geography include spaces of
neoliberalism (Peck and Tickell 2002, Jessop 2002, Smith 2001), the scale of
neoliberalism (Kohl and Warner 2004, Newstead 2005), neoliberal governmentality
(Larner and Walter 2004), and globally hegemonic forms of capitalism (Peck 2001,
Roberts et al 2003, Peet 2002, Peet et al. 2003, Harvey 2005). Even though neoliberal
theory can be described as a set of coherent ideas and doctrine, in reality there is a vast
disjuncture between theory and practice. These variations are integral to the
dissemination of neoliberal doctrine in different social, political and cultural climates
(Walker et al 2008, Brenner and Theodore 2002, Barnett 2004, Harvey 2005, George
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1999, Massey 2007, Garth and Delazy 2000, Peck 2004). These “actually existing
neoliberalisms” are mutated and “hybridized” forms of neoliberal doctrine and we must
pay close attention to their path dependent dissemination and contextual embeddedness in
different socio-political and economic landscapes.
CCS’s discourse of empowering the poor can be visualized as contextually
embedded in urban Delhi. First, CCS takes advantages of the specific historical tradition
of political and social movements against the colonial government and the post-colonial
developmental state that have more or less been defined under the rubric of civil society.
Second, the articulation of the neo-liberal discourse of a limited state with the problems
of the marginalized has been established on the grounds of corruption that characterizes
the local institutional framework. Third, the process of manufacturing consent for the
dissemination of neoliberal ideology and projects has been initiated in response to the
slow introduction of neoliberal practices due to their unpopularity among the local elites,
who see them as a threat to their material benefits and to the Nehruvian policies of mixed
economic development.

Contributions
My study contributes to the field of urban geography and geographies of
neoliberalism in the global south, where I present a novel case study of “actually existing
neoliberalism” while paying attention to the path dependent dissemination of free market
policies in India. While investigating the “roll out” of neoliberal policies, the dissertation
explores how they mutate and hybridize in the Indian social-political and economic
landscape. This work also contributes to the field of political geography where, following
Spark (2006), I investigate how macrospaces of governance (such as cities, SEZs,
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countries where structural adjustment strategies have been applied) are connected to their
development as a practice in microspaces of governmentality (corporations, finance
centers, think tanks, universities). By doing this, the work expands geographies of think
tanks, which are limited to North America and Western Europe, to India. While engaging
with the current engagements in geography where street hawking is viewed as spatial
practice, this dissertation also makes contributions to the urban cultural geography by
developing a framework of entangled spaces of informality where street hawkers are
believed to continuously interact with multiple actors in multiple spaces at the same or
different times. This focus is not restricted to their interaction with inefficient
government and its corrupt enforcement agents but includes their interactions with the
benevolent state that they often call for and in some ways desire. I conceive the space
where they operate as much larger than the marketplace or even conventional public
space. This space includes “spaces of common” or indigenous public space, private
spaces of their homes in slums as well as the rural hinterland from where most of them
come.
Geographic literature on street hawking in urban space is limited as it
concentrates on the state’s fierce responses ranging from wide-scale eviction to more
apparent anti- hawking policies that are put in place as an effort to create a revanchist
city. There have hardly been any studies that pay attention to how hawkers are divided
and then reorganized and mobilized to form a part of global hegemonic discourse of
neoliberalism that in turn shape “anti-hawking laws” but this time with their consent.
This dissertation pays attention to such developments in India by bringing a Gramscian
understanding to the current politics of street hawking, and paves the way for future
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scholarship to critically analyze the role of third sectors in the spaces of hawking. Finally,
this dissertation adds to Gramsci’s conception of state and civil society as I show how the
model of participation in polices regarding urban space, specifically street hawking, are
moments of passive revolution through which neoliberal hegemony is forged and
consolidated.
While contributing to the academic scholarship, this dissertation has on the
ground implication as it also provides one of the first organized critiques to the National
Policy of Street Vendors that is forwarded as a pro hawking arrangement of urban space. 1
Various NGOs, think tanks, activists, scholars as well as academicians have been
associated with the development of the policy and eagerly await its adoption in Indian
cities. Hawkers, who form more than 2 percent of the urban population, are going to be
regularized, managed and affected by this elite centered policy that has hardly been
debated and researched by critical scholarship. Hence, this dissertation takes a social
stance against this neoliberal policy and consequent exploitation of marginalized street
hawkers.

Objectives And Outline Of The Dissertation
I wish to highlight the engagements of CCS, a free market advocacy think tank, in
policy spaces for the poor and marginalized. By doing this, the dissertation brings forth
the neoliberal undertones that are antagonistic to street hawking as a practice in the rather
neutral and seemingly pro-hawker stance of CCS and other think tanks and NGOs.2 By

1

One exception is the article by Bandyopadhya at el (2012) “Zoning crossroads: a
critique” in Seminar, August 2012
2
I will discuss the labeling of CCS as both a think tank and an NGO in Chapter 3.
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finding a locus in CCS for an ethnographic inquiry, my work highlights an anti-hawking
bias in the celebrated National Policy of Street Vendors 2009 that was recently passed by
the Union Cabinet of the Government of India as Protection of Livelihood and
Regulation of Street Vending Bill on 1 May, 2013.
While it is apparent that liberalizing cities are adopting an anti-hawker stance to
manage urban space, it is important to investigate how these cities are able to do so at the
policy level. Who are the actors participating in such policy developments, and why do
they do so? To find this out, I delve into the questions of what makes CCS a legitimate
site to talk about street hawkers. How are they able to harness the authority to speak for
and represent street hawkers? I believe that the discourse of civil society aids in this
process and hence I seek answers to questions like how is the discourse of neoliberalism
reproduced within the particular discourse of civil society that is employed by CCS?
Second, why is this particular articulation sought after? In other words, why is it
beneficial for neoliberal doctrine to articulate with civil society discourse in this specific
way? I answer these questions in Chapter 2 where I analyze the concept, discourse and
practice of civil society. I discuss the history of civil society as a concept and theory to
shed light to the current contextual engagements of the term. While discussing the
practice of the term in contemporary Indian politics, I outline the history of this rich
concept since the time of the Greeks. I discuss Gramsci’s ideas in detail and relate them
to the development of state and civil society in India. This exercise sheds light on the
selective appropriation of the term civil society by CCS. I show that although CCS
zealously capitalizes on the term civil society, it ignores the interpretations of civil
society that highlight it as a site of exploitation. In the last part of the chapter I discuss
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how the discourse of civil society aids in deploying the global neoliberal hegemonic
discourse and neoliberal governmentality in India.
Since my research studies the interaction of CCS and street hawkers to investigate
the politics of representation, chapter 3 and 4 provide a literature review and
historiography of think tanks and street hawkers in the global context as well as India
specifically. I also discuss my research methodology and positionality as a scholar during
my interactions with both the groups in these chapters. I dedicate chapter 3 to the analysis
of CCS as a transnational apparatus of governmentality and answer why it is an important
site of inquiry. I discuss the reasons behind the dearth in scholarship on think tanks,
especially ones in the global south, and explain how a geographical understanding can
open new lines of inquiry to study them. My work provides a case study of neoliberal
think tank in the global south, specifically India, where global neoliberal demands and
regional constraints have crystallized CCS as a think tank that focuses on advocating
changes on behalf of the poor and marginalized. Next I conduct a comparative analysis of
the evolution of US and Indian think tanks, partly as an effort to show the climate that
gives rise to different think tanks and partly to address the scarcity of scholarly literature
on Indian think tanks. I outline different approaches to study think tanks by various
scholars and show how CCS’s activities may be difficult to study by any one of those
specific approaches. This is because in order to get recognition and funding, CCS has
adapted as a think tank that, in the words of its founder Parth Shah “does it all.” Unlike
other advocacy think tanks, CCS not only does advocacy and research but also works on
the ground with the marginalized, just like an NGO. The policy cycle approach
developed by Ableson (2002) that integrates all the existing approaches and pays
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attention to the changing climate of opinion as a success factor is then used to analyze
CCS as an institution and its various tactics to disseminate neoliberal ideas. In this
chapter, I also outline my methodology, which includes discourse analysis and network
analysis. In order to show how this methodology works on a think tank, I present two
case studies that chart the tactics of CCS to garner the most important thing to its
survival—media and public attention. This chapter grounds CCS as a transnational
apparatus of governmentality and fulfills an important exercise of situating it in the
global political economy in order to analyze its local politics.
In chapter 4, I discuss questions regarding informality and street hawkers as
research subjects. While discussing different approaches to study informality and their
inherent problems, I develop my own integrated approach that pays attention to the
multiplicity of social space and the heterogeneity of hawkers as subjects. Next, I conduct
a literature review of street hawkers and situate hawking and the state’s response to it in
the past 150 years of urban space of India. In this section I trace the Indian state’s
response to street hawking in the latter half of 20th century to its colonial legacy and then
move on to discuss hawkers’ responses to the state’s practice over the last two decades.
These new developments have set the stage for the formation of an alliance led by
various NGOs that calls for changes in current spatial laws. I then reflect on some
methodological and epistemological issues that I ran into at the beginning of my research,
and discuss how my current work addresses them. This section also offers a critique of
the research epistemology of CCS, NGOs and scholars who are active parts of the
hawkers’ alliance in India.
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In Chapter 5, I discuss how CCS and NPSV view spaces of hawking. The
objective is to show that the rich social space in Indian cities is increasingly being treated
with the neoliberal principle of space as commodity. I begin this investigation with the
analysis of hawkers’ presence in public space. While discussing three connotations of
public space, I analyze CCS’s stance on public space in its various publications and show
how it challenges and attempts to limit the “public” and open character of space. In the
second part of this chapter, I discuss NPSV’s decree to transform urban streets and parks
into hawking and non-hawking zones. Using Timothy Mitchell’s ideas of enframing, I
discuss how NPSV’s transformation changes rich communal space into abstract space
that facilitates capitalist production and consumption; divides space to bifurcate rich
social life into public and private, exterior and interior; and constructs a space that
initiates and invites a tourist gaze that drives consumption as the sole social practice.
In Chapter 6, the problems with NPSV’s proposed Town/ Ward Vending
Committees (TVC &WVC) that are in charge of regulating street hawkers are outlined. In
the first section, I discuss the issues that may arise while creating these committees,
issues that NPSV simple refuses to acknowledge. Larger ward committees that form as
the directive for these subcommittees have not yet materialized in many of the cities and
hence, to believe that the creation and working of TVC and WVC will be a smooth and
efficient process is foolhardy. In the next section, I go into the details of how the internal
structure of these committees has a majority of members who will undermine the
participation of hawkers in key issues because of their elite modernist imaginations of
urban space. I discuss this vis-à-vis the rise of Resident’s Welfare Associations and the
Bhagidari initiative that are attempting to transform Delhi into a world class city. I use
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geography literature on urban neoliberalism to demonstrate, how Bhagidari system is
attempting to transform Delhi into an entrepreneurial city. Lastly, I highlight the
entangled spaces of informality while discussing everyday problems of hawkers that have
been exacerbated due to the introduction of market reforms in the spaces where the
welfare state used to operate.
Chapter 7 outlines the problem with NPSV’s model of participation that invites
hawkers to form a part of TVC. CCS and other NGOs claim that street hawkers are street
entrepreneurs, and in the first half of this chapter I will bring out the contradictions in
these claims by using excerpts from various interviews and two hawker’s conferences
that were held in Delhi and Jaipur. During the Jaipur conference, certain locational
discords in NPSV became apparent, that I will discuss these in detail in the next section.
Lastly, while discussing a case study of a Jaipur fruit and vegetable market that CCS is
assisting through its advocacy work, I will bring attention to the growing presence of
organized retail as a factor that affects street hawkers. Neither NPSV nor any of the
NGOs consider this as a major threat. CCS, going further, completely supports the
growing presence of malls and department stores as fair competition and as something
that is imperative to the growth of hawkers. In the last two chapters I attempt to show
how the current model of participation envisaged by NPSV speaks to Gramsci’s passive
revolution theory because it allows only forms of participation which elite NGOs and the
capitalist state deem acceptable. Chapter 8 offers the final summary and concluding
remarks.
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Delhi As My Field Site
Delhi is an ideal site to study the state and civil society relationships in a
neoliberal climate. It is the seat of parliament and of the ministries, and because of this
the headquarters of most of the public companies like national airlines and national
railways. Cadène (2000) maintains that Delhi and its hinterland are the second largest
industrial agglomerate in India after Mumbai. On the one hand, it is the center of state
power and on the other hand, it is distinguished in the field of industry, education,
information and communication. In this sense, Delhi makes an ideal city to study
contextual geographies of neoliberalism.
According to Vadal et al (2000) Delhi is often considered too fragmented, a
patchwork of nine historic cities, and for that reason it is unable to invoke appreciation or
a sense of belonging among the people who inhabit the city. I do find this fact accurate
because of a conspicuous lack of literature on the city, especially when we compare it
with the bourgeoning critical literature on Mumbai, Calcutta and more recently
Bangalore. However, Hosagrahar (2005) calls Delhi “a city of many cities: imagined,
lived, and controlled, the landscape has been re-created, rebuilt, and made meaningful by
the daily acts of inhabiting as well as planned interventions”(3). Instead of a viewing
Delhi as a kitsch landscape, in Benjamin’s vein, I read Delhi as palimpsest. This is in fact
the raison d’etre for its national capital status. Lastly, I was born in Delhi and have lived
there for most of my life. I disavow the ‘lack of passion’ identified by Vadal et al (2000)
and hope that my study contributes to the critical literature of the city.
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Reading Delhi through its Past and Present
Hosagrahar (2007) maintains that modernity is plural and experienced differently
in different space, culture and society. Scholars have shown that modernity is transient,
fleeting, contingent, discontinuous and has no sense of historical continuity (Baudelaire
1981, Harvey 1989). Though Delhi in the late 19th and early 20th century was not modern
in the normative western sense, its citizens experienced modernism as a result of the
“complex interplay between modernization as the deliberate reordering of space and of
political and economic forms of organization” (Hosagrahar 2007, 5) and also as a result
of their own cultural and social responses to these changes. The old walled city was an
excellent example of mixed use practice, where different aspects of the inhabitants’ lives
like work, home, worship found concrete forms on one single space. In 1863, the British
established the Delhi Municipal Committee with an aim to reinvent the old city and make
it tangible and aesthetically modern. The efforts to renew and modernize the city did
change the urban and social character of the city but not in the way it was intended. After
all, the conception of space traditional for the Indian mindset is very different. For
example, Kaviraj (1997) discusses the misinterpretation of the novel Ghare Baire by
Rabindra Nath Tagore to talk about the notion of public or common in Indian society.
This famous novel was translated into English as “The Home and the World”. Kaviraj
points out the misleading translation where ghare is correctly translated as ‘home’ but
baire is misleadingly translated as ‘world’ when it actually means outside. He explains
this confusion further by identifying public/private as western concepts of modernity,
which are often conflated with traditional Indian cultural concepts of inside/ outside,
own/others, self/not-self. However, the overlapping of concepts from different societies is
never neat. In traditional Indian thinking, home is sacred, while the outside is dirty. For
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example, it was and still is normal for women to clean the houses with great care and
throw the garbage just outside their front entrance. To a western eye, this may appear
absurd in terms of aesthetics and hygiene since the immediate surroundings of the
dwelling remain filthy. However, the Indian tradition understands the “outside” as a
space of ambiguity, risk, and lack of belonging and hence such practices are often
deemed natural.
The modernization efforts during British rule met traditional identities, which
created local resistance and tactics to subvert the dominant order in myriad ways. Hence
the British, out of frustration, went outside the wall city to construct the modern capital of
New Delhi. However, the city of New Delhi at its conception was meant only for the
British. The segregating character of colonial rule was manifested in the design “where
wide avenues segregated the white rulers from brown babus in a finely calibrated
hierarchy of status” (Baviskar 2003, 91). After independence, New Delhi was
successfully co-opted by the Indian government and actively mobilized in creating a
modernist national identity.
Post-independent Delhi Master Plans follow the same “interventionist biopolitical
rationality,” western modernist vision, and “politics of segregation” as did the British.
The Delhi Development Authority (DDA) was constituted in 1957 to manage the space
of Delhi and its major task was to avoid haphazard and unplanned growth. Baviskar
(2003) notes that the Delhi Master Plan “envisaged a modern city, prosperous, hygienic
and orderly, but failed to recognize that this construction could only be realized by the
labors of large numbers of the working class poor, for whom no provision had been made
in the plan”(91). During the 1970s, in the wake of the upcoming Asian games in 1981, a
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massive construction project was taken up to build flyovers and luxury apartments, and in
these projects DDA violated its own regulations, justifying it as a matter of national
prestige.
In the 1980s Rajiv Gandhi took a step closer to liberalization and consequently
DDA started envisioning a new public-private partnership involving transfer of land on
lease to private cooperatives to build luxury homes in northwest and southwest of Delhi.
New consumerism demanded shopping complexes around these areas, driving up the
value of real estate. Of course, the slums were the first targets of bulldozers in these
areas. However, the unruly character of the masses represented by slums was hard to
control, especially when most of the affluent city could not survive for a day without their
help. Modern Delhi presents a brilliant example of a “splintering post-metropolitan” area
where the significance of the city as a national capital has always worked in contradictory
ways for its citizens. These processes intensified after 1991, when Delhi embarked on a
route to achieve a “global city status” by actively recreating its image as investorfriendly. This is been done by encouraging urban entrepreneurialism, increasing publicprivate partnership and withdrawing the welfare state from many important functions. As
Harvey (1989) has noted in the case of advanced capitalist countries, these process of
economic restructuring are accompanied by changes in urban imaginary, which is being
demonstrated in the rise of the new middle class in Delhi who are imprinting their
imaginary on the city space. In recent years, Delhi has hosted sporting events like the
Commonwealth games, which became just like Olympic games have elsewhere, a
“catalyst to urban change” (Essex and Chalkey 1998). The aspirants of a utopian city
soon made it a neoliberal urban dystopia for its poor inhabitants. I will raise these themes
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and recent developments throughout the dissertation in order to situate the politics of
representation of the street hawkers in various policies concerning urban street hawking
and ideas held and disseminated by CCS.
Finally, my research inquiry into CCS’s interactions with the hawkers briefly took
me to the capital city of Jaipur in the northwestern state of Rajasthan. Jaipur, the pink
city, is located on the outskirts of the desert and attracts scores of international tourists
because of its rich heritage. The head of CCS, Parth Shah, invited me to study CCS’s
work for street hawkers, by spending time with Ram (name changed), the national
coordinator of their Livelihood Campaign. Ram had moved to Jaipur in 2009 on request
of the corporate funder for their project of street hawkers. The corporate funder wanted
CCS to partner with another NGO that had already been working with street hawkers.
Also, the state of Rajasthan was perceived to be somewhat receptive to implement NPSV.
In recent years, Jaipur is trying hard to assume a world-class city status in order to attract
foreign tourists. Situated in the north-west of Jaipur, Vidhyadhar Nagar was developed by
the Jaipur Development Board on a plot of 400 hectares in the late 1990s. About 8 years
ago, hawkers from the central city district, which was declared a no-hawking zone, were
relocated in the new township and given fixed hawking spots. According to several
hawkers, they had a good business for first few years because of the growing demands of
the new township. However, the opening of several retail departmental stores has affected
their sales negatively in past 5 years. At the time I met Ram, he was trying to figure out
why that had happened and what could be done about it. Although my research does not
contextualize the fieldwork to the recent urbanization and developments in Jaipur

17

because my focus area is Delhi, the Jaipur interviews were indispensable to discern the
politics of representation of hawkers by CCS.
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Chapter 2: Civil Society: Concept, Discourse and Practice

Introduction
In 2011, Prakash Karat, the general secretary of the Communist Party of India
(Marxist) felt the need to announce that “civil society movements cannot be substituted
for political parties at any stage.” Here Karat was referring to the ongoing obsession with
“civil society”, which was epitomized by the Jan Lokpal bill proposed and popularized by
the famous Gandhian social activist Anna Hazare.3 On April 5th Anna Hazare embarked
on a hunger strike to pressure lawmakers to pass his bill, an anti-corruption measure that
aimed to establish a Lokayuktas.4 In wake of high profile scams such as the 2G spectrum
and the Commonwealth Games scam, different segments of civil society, particularly the
urban middle-class, came to the support of Anna Hazare more than willingly. 5,6 On 27th
August 2011, the parliament succumbed to the fast undertaken by Hazare and passed the
anti-democratic bill.7

3

Also called Citizen’s Ombudsman Bill demands the creation of an independent body
with non-democratically selected representatives from various civil society organizations
to investigate corruptions.
4
Lokayuktas mean anti-corruption ombudsman organizations
5
2G spectrum scam involved corruption charges against government officials and
various politicians for undercharging mobile telephone companies for the licenses for
frequency allocation. Commonwealth Games scam involved corruption charges against
officials of the Games' Organising Committee for embezzlement of funds during the
preparations and organization of the games in Delhi.
6
For further reference read Sitapati, Vinay. 2011 “What Anna Hazare’s Movement and
India’s New Middle Classes Say about Each Other” Economic and Political Weekly
XLVI 30.
7
CPI-M would go on to support Jan Lokpal bill in later stages
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There is no disagreement that a vigorous anti-corruption undertaking that targets
corruption at the top political and bureaucratic level is essential in today’s India8. Despite
the hopes associated with the market’s ability to curtail political corruption, it has
irrefutably reached a point at which every section of the society is eager to take a leap of
faith on anyone or anything that proclaims to fight back. This desperation enabled Anna
Hazare to ride the wave by exercising his moral authority through the Gandhian tactic of
satyagraha or non-violent resistance and fasting. Though all sectors responded to
Hazare’s tactics, the most striking element is the Indian middle class’s strong relation
with the success of Hazare’s campaign and the campaign’s ability to impose the middleclass vision of civil society on the entire nation’s. Sitapati (2011) notes of the three
segments of the Indian middle class: “the neo-Gandhians conferred legitimacy; India
Shining provided energy and finances; and Legal Activists helped navigate the legislative
path” (39) to the campaign. This campaign also fits aptly with the goal of NGO-isation
supported by multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and IMF.9
Harkening back to Karat’s statement, the alarming feature of this middle classand NGO- led campaign is that the ‘civil society’ is decreed to have inordinate power
over the state, the sovereign and democratically elected representatives. This chapter
outlines the problem with such a conception of civil society. In order to explain why the
Jan Lokpal bill, purported to be pro-civil society, is actually quite anti-democratic and

8

But first and foremost the task is to define corruption and differentiate between types of
corruption. Political and bureaucratic corruption is different from common corruption,
which involves poor hawkers bribing the local authorities to practice their livelihood in
off-limit public space. Read more
9
Three of the core members of “Team Anna” are winners of the Magasaysay Award,
which is endowed by the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations. These members also run
numerous NGOs funded in part by international institutions and individuals.
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narrow in its outlook, we need to know what exactly civil society is and why it is such a
popular phenomenon in urban India. The term ‘civil society’ permeates the political
language, as if the word itself could provide a panacea for India’s urban crisis.10 Daily
urban newspapers, news broadcasts about cities, or any conferences or seminars on urban
issues for that matter, are all peppered with the term ‘civil society’. In the post-liberal and
active urban political scene, the claims to the city are often couched in the language of
civil society and its partner terms such as empowerment, local participation, social
capital, liberty etc. Think-tanks and NGOs that champion the rights of hawkers also use
language of civil society to gain access to the hawkers’ organizations and policy
networks; hence it is important to investigate the usage and practice of civil society as a
phenomenon in order to understand its implications.

Civil Society
Global Spread of Discourse of Civil Society
Theoretically, civil society can broadly be defined as a space between family and
state--though not necessarily mutually exclusive of them--a sphere of associational
grouping where the type of association is a subject of debate and disagreement in terms
of politics and economics (Mcllwaine 1998). There is a general consensus among
academicians that the discourse of civil society in the latter half of the 20th century
manifested a tendency that resulted in its decoupling with the state (Alexander 1997,
Chandhoke 1995, 2005, Ehrenberg 1999, Nandy 2002, Roy 2003, Gupta and Ferguson
10

There are differences between organizations that comprise urban and rural civil
society. Rural civil society organizations are mostly represented as dominant caste
associations while the urban civil society are increasing becoming dominated by the
Resident Welfare Associations and elite citizen’s groups.
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2002, Ferguson 2006). In the face of general frustration with the strong and repressive
state apparatus, civil society appeared as a panacea to many who disliked some or any
form and function of the state.
The rise of the solidarity movement in Poland marked the insertion of civil
society movement in contemporary political debate in Eastern Europe (Arato 1981,
Kumar 1993, Rupnik 1979). Ehrenberg (1999) maintains that in the climate of “actually
existing socialism” the concept of civil society in Eastern Europe derived lineage from its
liberal conception of ‘constitutional republics’ and was pitted against the “grasping and
intrusive state apparatus, obsolete central planning of heavy industrial production, and
pervasive repression of social initiatives origination outside the control of party-system”
(173).
In Latin America, the discourse of civil society was formulated by the leftist antimilitary leaders as a struggle against the military dictatorships in the 1970s and 1980s
(Fals Borda 1992, Garretson 1989). There the discourse was further invigorated with the
collapse of bureaucratic authoritarian regimes due to economic crises and subsequent
fiscal restraints. The grassroots organizations that filled up the hollow spaces of the
state’s actions also gained approval of the social and cultural forces such as organizations
associated with Catholic Church (Kamrava and Mora 1998). From Southeast Asian civil
rights activists to African peasants to Middle-East intellectuals, those opposing repressive
regimes picked up the language of civil society as they advocated for people-centered
development. In an attempt to reconcile the project of socialism with democracy, the idea
of civil society was deemed by these movements as one of the underpinnings of modern
democracy (Fine and Rai 1997). However, as Rodan (2003) maintains, it is not necessary
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that the civil society would lead to the path of democracy. In fact, authoritarian regimes
may engage in political accommodation with some groups without fundamental changes
in their authoritarian rule (as in the case of Singapore). In the 1990s a “new policy
agenda” forged under neoliberal principles, emphasizing the importance of civil society
was undertaken by multilateral and bilateral organizations like the World Bank, IMF, and
UNDP. These initiatives directed the participating countries to foster “ways of increasing
the resilience of societal institutions that may be able to fend off anarchy even if the state
is very weak” (World Development Report, 1997, 160). Influenced by the liberal political
theory, the notion here is that the NGOs are a part of civil society and are much more
efficient than state in delivering aid to poor.

Importance of Analyzing the Concept of Civil Society
An understanding of the roots of the notion of civil society and its spread as a
discourse is critical to my analysis. This is because scholars (such as Weaver and
McGann 2000, McGann 2011) often define think-tanks and NGOs as a part of civil
society or the third sector that stands outside both state and the market. I challenge this
contention here by problematizing the neat category of civil society itself. Taking the
discussion from there, the concept of civil society provides the best entry point for the
critical analysis of the process whereby urban poor such as hawkers confront neoliberal
urban social-economic space with the help of free market think tanks and NGOs which
work under the rubric of civil society.
Such think tanks and NGOs zealously capitalize on the language of civil society
and its partner terms such as freedom, empowerment, liberty, rights, association and
participation to establish social causes with which to fight the state. For this reason, it is
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important to explore the critical history of the concept of civil society in its different
phases in order to understand and contextualize the current neoliberal usage of this term
in different countries and societies. Also since the advent of modernity, this contested
term has aroused countless debates and theories, some of which I will outline in next
section and in some of these conceptualizations, I hope to, as Ehrenberg (1999)
maintains, “evaluate contemporary assumptions about its democratic potential” (ix) and
thereby locate the critique of the current neoliberal avatar. Chandhoke (1995) maintains
that conceptual histories are significant in making us aware of the “pitfalls of inherited
interpretations” (77). This is especially true for civil society since a romanticized
adherence to the concept can impel “flawed political practices” (77). Lastly, a genuine
theory of civil society is indispensable to the understanding of the politics where NGOs
and think tanks are involved. Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, politics of intellectuals, and
ideas of common sense provides a brilliant investigative framework to evaluate the
current anti-state rhetoric in India as a whole and Delhi in particular.
The term ‘civil society’ conjures conflicting meanings, images and
interpretations. Scholars have claimed that most explanations of civil society can be
broadly grouped under Left and Right (Kaldor 2003, Edwards 2004, Powell 2007). This
particular categorization seems to overlap with another categorization that is based on the
relationship of civil society with the state. Some usages of civil society associated with
the Right--for example the ones employed by CCS-- tend to position civil society against
the state. These uses contrast with the ones on the Left, according to which state and the
civil society are different faces of the same coin and decoupling the two would result in
an impoverished understanding of both (Kumar 1993, Chandhoke 1995, Gupta 1997,
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Nandy 2002, Robinson 1997, Roy 2003). Dunn says that “civil society is frequently
employed to pick out a feature of the history of the universe which is presumptively good
[or at least comparatively trustworthy] in contrast with a feature of its history [the state]
which is tendentially or necessary bad [or at least comparatively untrustworthy]” (Dunn
2001, 54). However, one thing that will stand clear in the inexhaustive repertoire of
interpretations that follows is that the term ‘civil society’ is pliable enough to cater to the
different social conditions of each of the time periods in which it has been used, starting
with the ancient Greeks.

Conceptual Legacy of Civil Society: Analysis of Current Theoretical
Engagements
While developing their thoughts on the polis (Greek city-state)11, Plato and
Aristotle encountered (civil) society that was comprised of nuclear families and a village
community. 12 Both philosophers employed a teleological mode of thought to designate
different spheres of civil society in an all-encompassing state. Man was essentially a
political being and naturally a part of political society called Koinonia politik. The state,
11

According to Stauss (2005), the blossoming of the polis in 5th century BC owed its
spiritual roots to the fact that the form motive (constant like water) gained primacy in
Greek thought over the matter motive (changing like ice, steam). This corresponded with
the transition from the older undifferentiated clan to the more differentiated legal order of
the polis. For Plato, rational understanding was only possible of the things that are
invisible and constant and, things that were visible can only be absorbed through senses.
Plato’s polis was the embodiment of the form motive, and hence capable of being
understood rationally. Hence, the knowledge of forms was the most essential art for a
king who is also a philosopher king to rule. This was the first time a system of positive
law developed. The rational element of the city which is ‘one’ would reign over the
multiple irrational and all the disagreements among the citizens would be dissolved in the
polis.
12
The term civil society does not find expression in the writings of ancient Greeks since
the society was actually considered a political society.

25

they assert, regulated all the aspects of society and converted mere life into the good life.
Of course, the Greeks’ conception of polis took place amidst the moral and political
confusion of the day and hence both the philosophers strived to establish a moral
principle of government. 13
The Hellenistic age saw the transformation of the city-state into a larger central
state (Garnsey 2000, 401)14. At this time the polis exerted a weaker pull on the
philosophers and the widespread disenchantment towards political society was reflected
in the development of moral philosophy as separate from political philosophy. Epicurus
(341 BCE- 270 BCE) rejected politics and said that the individual desire for happiness
and pleasure was the only means for ‘good life’. Pain should be avoided by living a life
withdrawn from all political and societal associations.
In Roman times, the most significant development which provided the conceptual
grounds for the development of modern civil society was the birth of individual law,
particularly the right to own property. During the time of Augustus (63 BC- 14 AD) a
legally recognized private realm started evolving alongside the public realm. According
to Eherenburg (1999) the Roman notion of res publica soon implied a coexistent sphere
of res privata. The Roman law stopped at the doorstep—the individuals were separated

13

Both philosophers addressed the moral confusion of being in the city and increases in
private wealth in their writings on state and society. Plato asked in his The Republic “Does
not the worst evil for a state arise from anything that tends to rend it asunder and destroy
its unity, while nothing does it more good than whatever tends to bind it together and make
it one?” (Plato 1997, 163 cited in Ehrenberg 1999, 5) Aristotle in his famous condemnation
of usury and profit maintained that the human potential of human activity can get distorted
by the pursuit of wealth (Aristotle 1996).
14
Massive successful conquests of Philip(II) and his son Alexander have been linked to,
and often blamed for, the destruction the system of a free and independent polis ( Brown
2007, 79; Coleman 2000 ). The large size of the Empire encouraged people to travel to
different cities and citizenship was not bound to one single city.
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into a public citizen and a private person. Roman law regulated the relations between
individuals and property, giving security to individual ownership as well as making it
easy to transfer ownership through legal procedures.
From the disintegration of the Roman Empire until the late middle ages,
Christianity provided a consistent theory of civil society and state, the former now
organized by the church and the latter a promoter of the church. Pope Gelasius (493)
proposed a “two sword” theory, which saw church and state as separate spheres despite
their united purpose. This initiated a separation between “sacred and secular, the
ideological and the political without which emancipation of the society, development of
nations state, Renaissance and later day reformation would have not occurred” (Szücs
1988, 300).
According to Cohen, and Arato (1992), there were two main changes in the next
few centuries that opened the necessary space for modern civil society to originate. First,
the absolute primacy the church enjoyed through the 12th or 13th century began to be
challenged by the growing power of the royal prince. As the market extended, the new
bourgeoisie started evolving, helping the transfer of local monopolies in trade to the royal
power that could help expand trade by exploiting national resources and conducting
foreign relations (Eherenburg 2001, 56). Amidst the environment of corruption in the
absence of a strong political authority, Machiavelli’s (1469- 1527) ardent belief in the
republican tradition of ancient Rome, led him to conceptualize a theory of a society
where politics recaptured the forefront with the new prince at its helm.
The second change that Cohen and Arato (1991) address is the depoliticization of
the former power holders, estates and corporate bodies that created a ‘veritable society of
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orders’ (86). This led to the development of the modern concept of civil society in the
17th to19th centuries. During the early 17th century in the writings of contractarians and
theorists of natural law such as of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau Montesquieu, the state of
nature emerged as pre-political. Here we witness the inauguration of the separation
between the State and state of nature-civilization although a clear distinction between the
civil and political is still absent (Bobbio 1988). For Hobbes, the state of nature was
characterized by unbridled passions to accumulate power and wealth that hindered
physical and material well-being. The only way to avert this condition of anarchy was for
man to enter into a contract with the state where there is mutual and universal transfer of
the natural right to it; in return, the state, headed by a strong sovereign provides peace
and stability. 15
Among all the contractarians, Locke was the first influential naturalist to bring the
theory of property to the forefront of a theory of civil society. For him, the state of nature
was not violent and was, in fact, an extra-political entity called society “marked by civil
exchanges between free and propertied individuals” (Chandhoke1995, 80). The only
reason the state was required was because it could protect private property. In these
theories, the state and the society were neither historically nor spatially located; this
vision was later shifted by the classical political economy school.

15

Hobbes’s civil society had similarities to the ancient commonwealth where the state
and society were fused together by the will of the people to create better living
conditions. But unlike the Greeks’ political society that ‘relied on a notion of moralized
law rooted in ethos’, Hobbes’s society was based on positive law limited only to
enactment and command” (Cohen and Arato 1991, 87). Even though the civil society
was an act of politics, contrary to the popular conception, Hobbes did leave “a
considerable room for private intuitive and unregulated activity” (Eherenberg 2001, 76)
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The ideas of the political economy school, which was a product of the
Enlightenment, parallel the teleological narrative of modernity. Civil society formed the
apex of civilization and the lower states were that of ‘oriental and occidental despotism’
and feudalism (Chandhoke 1995, 91). These stages were characterized and distinguished
on the basis of modes of production. Hence, now the sphere of economy, not of politics,
formed the ‘determinant of notions of propriety, property, government moral principles,
and society and political institutions’ (90).
Foucault (1994) traces the separation of civil society and political society to the
work of Scottish Enlightenment philosophers such as David Hume, Adam Ferguson and
Adam Smith. According to Brewer (2007), 18th century Scotland’s emphasis on
universal, non-elitist education as well as respect for science, invention and rational
inquiry sets the backdrop of Ferguson’s An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767)16.
In his theory, Ferguson tried to limit political power and ascribed more confidence in
“mixed government rather than simplistic versions of democracy” (Brewer 2007 107).
Ferguson believed that commercialization would not necessarily bring peace and liberty
and that is the reason why his theory strived to base “civil society on a set of innate moral
sentiments”. While Hobbes’s and Locke’s society were marked by individual interests in
private gain, Ferguson’s civil society was characterized by people who were driven by
altruism, solidarity, and generosity (Eherenburg 2001, 91).
Oz-Salzberger (2001) credits both Hume and Smith for bringing commerce’s
civilizing potential to the forefront in their theories of civil society. The transformation of
16

In this Ferguson developed a typology of society – rude, barbarous and polished and
spent much of his intellectual endeavor trying to chart the structure of the polished
society and the threats that it faced from the negative aspects of industrialization (Brewer
2007).
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mercantilism into capitalist manufacturing society formed the backdrop of Adam Smith’s
The Wealth of Nations in which he integrated growing market processes and economic
activities into the first bourgeois theory of civil society. Highly critical of the nefarious
state bureaucracy that regulated economic affairs and impeded growth, Smith celebrated
the freedom of rational individualism, which formed civil society. Civil society was
based on the market-organized network of mutual dependence. In the age of freedom, the
specialization of labor would contribute to the mutual dependence of actors in civil
society. Egotistical, self-serving individuals would lead to the ‘unintended consequence’
of benefiting the entire society: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer,
or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest.
We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them
of our own necessities but of their advantages” (Smith 1776, 7). The powerful invisible
hand of the self-correcting market would regulate civil society much more efficiently
than the mercantilist state.
It is important to discuss another anti-absolutist doctrine of the 18th century that
formed the source of one of the modern strains of civil society. The pluralist
interpretation of civil society, a product of the theories developed by Montesquieu,
Rousseau and de Tocqueville find expression in a variety of contemporary usage that
pulls civil society further away from the state and its associated political structure.
Montesquieu (1689-1755 AD), the French Enlightenment thinker propagated
intermediate associations and offered a theory of balanced constitution. Impressed by the
English model, he believed that aristocratic associations and commerce would bring
peace and stability in society. He was one of the few theorists of civil society who
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identified the interests of one class with the interests of the whole society. The primacy of
Montesquieu’s nobility, Locke’s natural rights and Hobbes’s sovereign were challenged
by Rousseau’s conception of a moral civil society. Adopting a new take on the contract
theory, Rousseau (1712-1778) maintained that giving away rights to the sovereign for a
peaceful civil society or relying on self-interested actions to build a productive civil
society would be unsuccessful. Individuals, instead, could exchange their rights mutually
to form a general collective will. Alexis De Tocqueville adapted different pluralist
interpretations of civil society into one and announced the United States to be the
prototype of modern civil society. In the U.S., he argued the democratic associations and
intermediate voluntary organizations that are bonded by common cultural values in terms
of customs and manners countered the absolutist and centralizing tendencies of the state.
The theories of classical political economy contributed immensely to the concept
of civil society. Civil society was separated from the state and politics and was relocated
to the sphere of economics. However, Chandhoke (1995) maintains that the project of
classical political economists was limited, as they assigned excessive privilege to the
economic sphere in order to fight the absolutist state. The work of Hegel and Marx and
later Gramsci attended to some of the tensions in this valorized sphere of civil society.
Hegel argued, unlike Adam Smith, that the egoistical individual had the capacity
of destroying the ethical life of civil society. For Hegel, the historically-produced realm
of civil society was different from both family (characterized as ethical life of
unreflective love) and the state, (characterized as universal and institutionalized ethical
life). Civil society was not a separate sphere but dialectically related to the family and
state where the mediations between particularity and universality took place and by this
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very dialectical advance, “subjective self-seeking turned into the mediations of particular
through the universal” (Ehrenberg 1999, 124). So what exactly was the universal ethical
life for Hegel? Chandhoke (2003) maintains that for Hegel, the ethical life was “found in
a society where the members share(d) certain ideals and where they are united by a
morality which prescribes their role” (119). Hegel attempted to seek a model by vertically
connecting the civil society with the universal state, the latter extending the system of
mediations within the former. These systems of mediations are of two orders. First are the
public authorities that guarantee the rights of the individual, such as courts, welfare
agencies, and police. Second are the classes, or the estates and the corporations, which
monitor and manage the actions of individuals. At the same time, these estates provide
socialization that convinces individuals that their salvation lies in associating with others.
Marx rejected Hegel’s universal state. Marx formed his theory of civil society and
state when he came into conflict with the Prussian censors during his early days as a
radical journalist (Ehrenberg 1999). He realized that “arbitrary censorship and economic
regulations” (132) were inclined towards the powerful (bourgeoisie). This fact made it
difficult to conceptualize state power as autonomous. Later, in On the Jewish Question,
Marx formulated the famous critique of young Hegelian Bruno Bauer, who blamed
religion as the major impediment to the human progress. Marx contended that driving
religion, or for that matter class, ethnicity, caste, property etc, out of politics does not
mean that it would cease to exist in civil society. Failure to realize this distinction leads to
uncritical confusion of political emancipation with general human emancipation (Marx
1843, 30). Keane (1988) elucidates this further in relation to a secular and democratic
state and society: “the modern bourgeois era as Marx pointed out is unique in so far as it
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effects a separation of political and social forms of stratification. It subdivides the human
species for the first time into social classes; divorces individuals’ legal status from their
socioeconomic role within the civil society and sunders each individual into both private
egoist and public citizens” (57). The political revolution had left the “pillars of the house
standing” and had not affected civil society where man lived a depoliticized life (Marx
1843). In civil society, particularity became a universal principle, which was the domain
of exploitation where the appropriation of surplus labor took place. Civil society for Marx
represented a monolithic bourgeois ideology.
Civil society was the arena where reproduction of dominant relationships took
place but it could equally have been the site where the subaltern classes fight for social
and economic emancipation. Marx found the proletariat to be the universal class and an
agent who could bring about a radical revolution that aimed at general human
emancipation, not just partial political revolution. The first step would involve the
overtaking of the state by political revolution. The second stage would involve the
destruction and dissolution of all the forms of existing capitalist social order by using
political supremacy. Thus for Marx, even if the state was an illusory condition, its
democratic potentials were significant for superseding civil and political society for
human emancipation. Marx therefore made clear distinction between bourgeois and nonbourgeois civil society, which belonged to a bourgeois and non-bourgeois state
respectively.
Fontana (2006) explains that Marx’s critique of liberalism and bourgeois society
ended in reproducing the distinction between the state and society that was so
characteristic to his liberal opponents. The state was negative, repressive and coercive
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with no positive functions and redeeming value. Gramsci, on the other hand, went back to
the Hegelian distinction between state and civil society, thereby giving the state a more
positive role. Also Gramsci’s analysis disagreed with the teleological pattern of society
envisaged by the earlier political economists such as Smith, Hegel, and Marx that was
marked by “unilinear expansion and contractions of capitalism, in which each country
followed in line behind the leader” (Burawoy 2003, 203). Capitalism could develop in
multiple directions with varying configurations of state, society and economy and that is
the reason Gramsci’s theory and conjunctural analysis is most relevant in the current
global climate.

Gramsci’s Idea of Civil Society
At the time when Marx wrote Capital in 1867, England, France and Germany
were replete with numerous intense working-class movements. In contrast, when Gramsci
started writing Prison Notebooks, capitalism had entered a monolithic phase. Also, in his
own country, fascism was suppressing working class unions and eroding the
achievements from their previous struggles. Subsequently, the success of Bolshevik
revolution in Russia led Gramsci to develop his concept of hegemony, civil and political
society and the role of intellectual, all while he was trying to discern why socialism had
failed to take off despite the abundance of working class movements.
Gramsci maintains:
What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major superstructural ‘levels’:
the one that can be called ‘civil society’, that is, the ensemble of organisms
commonly called ‘private’, and that of ‘political society’ or ‘the state’. These two
levels correspond on the one hand to the functions of ‘hegemony’ which the
dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of ‘direct
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domination’ or command exercised through the state and ‘juridical’ government
(Gramsci 1971, 12).
In his conception of state and civil society, Gramsci inverted the relationship
between the base and the superstructure and maintained that the civil society instead of
the base mediates history. The superstructure is comprised of both political and civil
society. Both political and civil society corresponds to different sites and forms of power.
Political society is the location of the coercive apparatus involved in disciplining the
body by institutions like penal codes and prison; civil society, on the other hand,
disciplines the mind through educational, cultural and religious institutions and is the
location where the state functions in minute, invisible ways to influence people. Gramsci
maintained that so far as state is referred to as the ‘night watchman’, the coercive forces
still predominates, but as soon as the state is called civil society, or the ethical state, the
coercive forces are no longer needed and society is regulated by itself. He argued:
The assertion that the state can be identified with individuals ( the
individuals of a social group), as an element of active culture (i.e as a movement to
create a new civilization, new type of man and of citizen), must serve to determine
the will to construct within the husk of political society a complex and wellarticulated civil society, in which the individual can govern himself without his selfgovernment theory entering into conflict with political society- but rather becoming
its normal continuation, its organic complement (Gramsci, 1971, 268).
This significant role played by civil society does not mean that it is in any way
independent of the economic base. A structural change in the economic base will
manifest its effects on civil society too, but it is civil society along with political society,
which will ultimately manage the base.
Unlike Marx, for Gramsci, history did not unfold in a prescribed teleological
manner but as “a discontinuous series of hegemonic formations or hegemonic blocs”
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(Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 71). If the bourgeois civil society was successful in negotiating
the dichotomy between the economic base and the superstructural state, the outcome
would be the creation and continuation of capitalist hegemony; if it failed, the counterhegemonic current would subvert the capitalist state to construct new forms of political
organization.
As opposed to the liberal conception in which civil society protects an individual
from the state, both Gramsci and Marx maintained that it is the state and the ruling elite
that civil society safeguards. But unlike Marxian civil society, the Gramscian model had
the potential of rational self-regulation and freedom. In this sense, Gramscian civil
society was closer to Hegelian civil society. Gramsci acknowledged the alternative
currents that flow within civil society and as much as it is a “site where legitimacy of the
state is forged, it is also the terrain of contestation” (Chandhoke 1995, 154). The
ideological and cultural practices of civil society are actively engaged in the production
of consent, which Gramsci described as the creation of hegemony, which is the influence
of one group over all other groups. For example, the ruling bourgeois class, through the
sites of consent, diffuses such ideas, norms, values, social relations and cultural traditions
that the working class identifies its own welfare with that of the former and do not revolt
against the exploitative setup. Creation of hegemony may involve coercion, sometimes
overt while other times, in specific configuration with consent. Hegemony can be limited
and as well as expansive. One example of limited hegemony is the one attained by
coercion. Passive revolution, a way for the bourgeoisie to maintain its hegemony by
allowing small concessions to the subaltern groups or the proletariat is also an example of
limited hegemony.
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For my analysis hegemony is a very useful concept. First, it explains things better
than the term domination and class alliance. Second, Gramsci wrote that “popular beliefs
and similar ideas are themselves material forces” (Gramsci 1971, 165). So the theory of
hegemony provides a break from the concept of ideology as a set of mere ideas, thereby
directing our attention to the materiality of ideology. For a better understanding of
hegemony we must understand Gramsci’s concepts of ideology, collective will, organic
intellectuals, and historic bloc.
Gramsci rejected Marx’s negative connotation of ideology as something that
conceals the contradictory character of the hidden real essential patterns, for one where
ideology becomes a neutral concept referring to the political consciousness of classes
including that of proletariats (ibid 250). Ideologies are more than mere systems of ideas.
Gramsci explains this by distinguishing between the ‘arbitrary elucubrations of particular
individuals’ (1971, 376) and organic ideologies that are necessary for a given social
structure. The latter “organize human masses and create the terrain on which men move,
acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc” (Gramsci 1971, 377). Haugaard
(2011) maintains that for Gramsci, the bourgeois strength of ideology does not reside in
obscuring the truth which gives rise to false consciousness, but “is located in the capacity
of a set of ideas and consciousness to tie together divergent interests into a singular
hegemonic interpretative horizon” (47). This is critical for the function of moral and
intellectual leadership that creates hegemony that goes beyond class distinction to create
“common will”. Laclau and Mouffe (1985) agree : “For, whereas political leadership can
be grounded upon a conjectural coincidence of interests in which the participating sectors
retain their separate identity, moral and intellectual leadership requires that an ensemble
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of ‘ideas’ and ‘values’ be shared by a number of sectors- or to use our (their) own
terminology, that certain subject positions traverse a number of class sectors” (66-67).
Ideology, common will and material resources form a historic bloc. According to
Gramsci it is the intellectuals who cement the gaps between the structure and
superstructure in order to create a historic bloc. Every social group in the economic world
organically creates their specific intellectuals. These intellectuals are different than the
traditional intellectuals who are people characterized by intrinsic activity of thinking who
tend to represent a historical continuity and recognize “themselves as ‘independent’,
autonomous, endowed with a character of their own, etc”( Gramsci 1971, 8). The organic
intellectuals or new intellectuals are the ones who can organize and educate the groups to
create a hegemony built on consent and Fontana (2010) maintains that the hegemonic
relationship is necessarily an educational relationship (34). These intellectuals are
involved in the struggle for expansion and solidification of their own class.

Reconsidering Gramsci
In an effort to tackle economic determination in Gramsci and advance the theory
of hegemony, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) replace the concept of ideology with the concept
of discourse. They use Foucault’s conception of discourse that was elaborated in
Archeology of Knowledge. According to Foucault, a discursive formation is a ‘system of
dispersion,’ which has a unity or regularity within the dispersed elements (objects, modes
of statements, concepts, thematic choices).17 The rules that govern such formations are
the ‘rules of dispersion.’ Discourse can be thought of as a set of ideas, or a form of
17

Foucault in Archeology of Knowledge dismissed “four hypotheses of unifying
principle of discursive formation – reference to the same object, common style in the
production of statements, constancy of the concepts and reference to a common theme”
Laclauand Mouffe g 105.

38

language or a group of statements with its own rules that are socially constructed and
frame our understanding of and about something. They provide an organizing structure
that actively shapes our understanding of the world and things in it.
For Laclau and Mouffe, discourse is constructed when the process of articulation
happens, which works to establish a relation among elements in such a way that their
identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice. Just like Gramsci’s ideology,
the practice of articulation of discourse involves both linguistic elements and nonlinguistic elements or the material world. However, the distinction between the economic
base and superstructure that was inherent in Gramsci’s ideology disappears in a
discourse. This happens because both base and superstructure become discursive and
therefore susceptible to instabilities since discourses by their very nature are not unified
(only made of dispersed elements) and fixed. Hence, I refer to civil society and neoliberalism not in terms of ideology but as discourses, which are discrete and unstable.
Geographers in recent scholarship have attempted to bring together Gramsci and
Foucault to conceptualize neoliberal hegemonic discourse ( Ekers and Loftus 2008,
Larner 2003, Peet 2002, Roberts at el 2003, Sparke 2006). I continue this trend and arrive
at a framework of state and society that avoids any kind of structuralist trap in which the
state is seen as a separate entity standing outside of society. Gramsci identified state as
comprised of both political and civil society. For him, the (bourgeois) state is
characterized by set of coercive apparatus or political society that include police and
courts, while civil society is engaged in generation of consent through schools, hospitals,
etc. The role of both state and civil society is to create hegemony in the society. This
sphere is extensive, as for Gramsci, even a father can act as a legislator for his children
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(Gramsci 1971, 266). Foucault extends this notion of Gramsci’s when he declares “cut
off the king’s head (1994, 122).” By this he wanted us to identify multiple ways in which
power works and produces, and so challenges the notion of state as the sole and unitary
center of power. Using the concept of governmentality and bio-power, he directs
attention to the operations of power that cover all sites of social interaction-- community,
school, family and body.
Foucault’s notions of power, discourse and governmentality attend to the class
determinism implicit in the Gramscian formulation of civil society. Governmentality is,
Foucault writes, “the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and
reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of very specific albeit
complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principle political
economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security” (1994, 102).
Governance, Foucault maintains, means ‘conduct of conduct.’ The first connotation of
conduct is to guide and regulate, and the second connotation of conduct is to moralize
behavior. This type of “art of governing is different from the “doctrine of the prince and
the juridical theory of sovereignty (201- 206).” The latter requires exercise of authority
over people and territory, and an ability to regulate and discipline them. The former
requires a specific understanding of the people and their relationship with the things so as
to ensure potential of growth, and prosperity of the population. Population in the era of
“art of governing” became the ultimate aim of the government, an object whose control,
regulation, welfare was the function of the state. Population instead of the “power of
sovereign” became the end of the government. Foucault further maintains that
disciplinary power and governmentality coexist. “We need to see things not in terms of
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the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a disciplinary society and the subsequent
replacement of a disciplinary society by a society of government; in reality one has a
triangle, sovereignty-discipline-government” (Foucault 1991, 219).
While Gramscian notions dismantle the distinction between state and civil
society, Lazzarato (2004) maintains that Foucault’s conceptualization of bio-power
wrecks the distinction between the state and bio. State power is not just negative but also
productive, as it produces subjects. The organized power of armies, schools and factories
are the result of discipline and governmentality. For Gramsci the micro-practices added
up to colossal structures of power which were canonized at the level of the state, and had
their origin in the processes of capitalist society. But for Foucault these macro-processes
of power did not originate in the will to power, rather they are constituted in the logic of
capitalism. So for Foucault, capitalism is a constitutive factor in the production of state,
society and bio power.

Civil Society in Indian Context
Subaltern studies and post-colonial scholar Partha Chatterjee probably provides
the most suited interpretation of Gramsci’s ideas of state, civil society and hegemony in
the Indian context. Chatterjee (1986, 2003) explains that civil society, a product of
modernity, is essentially a bourgeois society, and is “characterized by modern
associational life originating from the western society that is based on equality,
autonomy, freedom of entry and exit, contract, deliberative procedures of decisionmaking, recognizance rights and duties of members, and such other principles”
(Chatterjee 2003, 135). Political society, on the other hand, is a product of democracy and
encompasses all the population that has been left out of civil society. Chatterjee identifies
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this political field as the spatial expanse where governmental technologies work. To
describe this he makes two different routes of connections of both civil society and
political society to the state-- “one is the line connecting civil society to the nation-state
founded on popular sovereignty and granting equal rights to citizens. The other is the line
connecting populations to the governmental agencies pursuing multiple policies of
security and welfare” (2004, 39). He further maintains that “whereas the legalbureaucratic apparatus of the state has been able, by late colonial and certainly in the
post-colonial period, to reach as the target of many of its activities virtually all of the
population that inhabits its territory, the domain of civil society institutions as conceived
above is still restricted to a fairly small section of citizens” (2001, 172).
To explain the development of Indian state and civil society, Chatterjee finds
Gramsci’s ideas of passive revolution insightful. In Italy, Gramsci explained that the
bourgeois state was able to satisfy the demand of the society by “small doses, legally, in a
reformist manner—in such a way that it was possible to preserve the political and
economic position of the old feudal classes, to avoid agrarian reform, and especially
avoid the popular masses going through a period of political experience such as occurred
in France” (1971, 119). A similar thing happened in India. Chatterjee (1986) describes
Indian struggle for independence from the British as a kind of passive revolution which
after its success did nothing to eradicate colonial institutional structures or the precapitalist dominant class.
Kaviraj (1991) establishes that the state’s planning elite—‘the body of experts’
who were to maintain the relative autonomy and managing the competing interest of the
bourgeois and other dominant class--could not remain neutral for too long and
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succumbed to the pressures of the dominant class with grand visions of development.
Chatterjee maintains that“[W]here an emergent bourgeois lacks the social conditions for
establishing complete hegemony over the new nation, it resorts to a ‘passive revolution’,
by attempting a’ molecular transformation’ of the old dominant classes into partners in a
new historic bloc and only a partial appropriation of popular masses, in order to create a
state as a necessary precondition for the establishment of capitalism” (Chatterjee, 1986,
30)
Since the dominant class’s intellectual-moral leadership in India has always been
fragmented, Kaviraj (1991) maintains the postcolonial developmental projects are unable
to connect to the vernacular and the poor. This has given rise to considerable tensions in
neoliberal India, and I will extend this line of thought further in Chapter 4 to explain the
politics of informals.

Anna Predicament: Problems with Civil Society based on Associations
The revival of ideas surrounding the term civil society in post-colonial India
emerged amidst a climate of disenchantment with the developmental state (Béteille 1996,
Ghosh 1989, Guha 1989, Gupta 1997, Kothari 1988, Kothari and Seth 1991, Mohanty
1998, Shah 1988, Rubin 1987). As opposed to the 1980s romantic revivalism of the
concept by social movements and citizens groups that represented the poor who were
excluded from the benefits of elite modernization schemes, the recent interest in civil
society represents an assault launched in the name of neoliberal doctrine on the
regulatory welfare state. CCS espouses this particular concept that is influenced by antistate theories of Adam Smith and Richard Plain as well as associational models of
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pluralist schools of thought. With a review of literature of civil society in Indian setting,
let me show how such an interpretation is anti-democratic and leaves pillars of
domination intact.
Rajni Kothari (1988) criticizes the Indian state for its excessive focus on, ‘market
efficiency’, ‘profitability’, ‘development’ and ‘national security’. He hopes that civil
society would strengthen democracy by acting as a launch pad for human governance.
Civil society, which incorporates contemporary social movements and networks of
voluntary and self-governing institutions like village panchayats18, form the grassroots
model of mass politics in which ‘people are more important than state’ (Kothari 1988,
212). Here Kothari falsely assumes that the associations which form civil society are
democratic in their composition; he thereby neglects the social and caste cleavages that
propagate exclusion and hierarchy. Béteille (1996), influenced by de Tocqueville, attends
to this by proposing a slightly different conception of the associations of modern civil
society. A vibrant civil society constitutes open, secular and democratic institutions like
banks, hospitals, municipal corporations, schools and newspapers that are based on
individual autonomy instead of direct participation or self-governance. Béteille, a skeptic
of religious institutions, also views the state as an enemy of civil society. He misses the
essential point that the state is significant to the working of civil society. Civil society
needs the basic political-legal framework that institutionalizes the normative pre-

18

In the 1950s and 60s, in an effort to decentralize power and governance, Panchaiat or
Panchayat was evolved as a system of governance in Indian villages. In this system, five
elderly and wise men of the village are elected to make important decisions about the
development of the village, to plan the finances, and to solve petty disputes.
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requisites of rights, freedom and rule of law. Secondly, civil society needs the state for its
organic growth and to function democratically.
Anna Hazare’s anti-corruption campaigns overlook and undermine this crucial
relationship between the political-legal framework and fundamental rights on the one
hand and democracy on the other. Hazare’s engagements elsewhere demonstrate this fact.
Hazare, the environmental warrior, lives in a small room behind a temple in the village of
Ralegan Siddhi in the state of Marahasthra. His accomplishment lies in the fact that he
was able to transform the draught- prone and poverty- stricken village into a lush, green
and sustainable model village. This he achieved through changing the environmental
character as well as the social-political, economic fabric of the town by the exercise of his
moral authority coupled with occasional coercive measures. Mukul Sharma (2006) talks
in detail about some rules that Hazare enforced:
Five universal rules have evolved out of the developmental experiences in
Ralegan. They are ‘nasbandi’ (restriction of family size), ‘nashabandi’ (ban on
alcohol), ‘charaibandi’ (ban on free grazing), ‘kurhabandi’ (ban on tree felling) and
‘shramdan’ (donation of voluntary labour for community welfare). It is mandatory
for the villagers to take oath that they will follow these rules. The path of rural
development here depends in a large measure on many other ‘dos’ and ‘don’ts’. No
shop in Ralegan can sell ‘bidis’ or cigarettes. Film songs and movies are not
allowed. Only religious films, like Sant Tuka Ram, Sant Gyaneshwar can be
screened. Only religious songs are allowed on loudspeakers at the time of marriages
(Sharma 2006, 1984).
Anna Hazare’s ties to Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the influential rightwing Hindu nationalism organization, are no secret. Sharma identifies the language used
to make people acquiescent ‘highly brahaminical and hegemonic.’19 In a nutshell the
success of the environmental movement has helped to consolidate the moral authority of
19

Brahmin is the highest and the most privileged caste in Hindu society and Brahmins
have exercised cultural hegemony over Indian social structure for many centuries.
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Hazare, which he uses to enforce his notion of an ideal Hindu society within the village.
As Sharma notes, his “achievement establishes it’s own institutions, justifying its own
structure of governance” ( 2006, 1985).
Disparaging elections, Hazare claims that power and politics bring corruption.
And so there have been no election of gram Panchaiat in the village in 24 years. Civil
society as a sphere of democratic dialogue and contestation is compromised with
Hazare’s highly selective ideology. In fact, many religious or nationalist civil society
movements such as the one signified by Anna Hazare’s environmental movement use
language and emotional vocabulary of passion, sacrifice and martyrdom versus the
mundane democratic language of political debate, minority and indigenous inclusion and
tolerance. These movements are seen to increasingly join hands with the new middle
class and pro-neoliberal lobby groups who bemoan the result of social democracy
(extended in chapter 4) to fight and oppose the welfare state in the name of civil society.
The same is true for NGOs and think tanks such as CCS, who use discourse of the state’s
mismanagement, corruption, and decentralization as reasons to bypass the state. Spivak
(2008) rightly calls them “self-selected moral entrepreneurs who give people
philanthropy without democracy”.

Why is the Discourse of Civil Society Essential to the Project of
Neoliberalism?
As is apparent from earlier discussions, civil society discourses are often pitted
against the repressive state. This is a technique that CCS uses too. This trend is important
to investigate further because as Ferguson (2007) explains, “the uncritical and ahistoric
use of civil society, which at one time helped people to fight repressive state is now
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helping to promote a “profound antidemocratic transnational politics” (91). Historically,
civil society has never been used in isolation from the state, but discourse about state and
society makes their separation seem natural. Roy (2003) complains, “strengthening civil
society and endeavors of the state are seen as inversely related to one another: the state
must retreat if civil society is to flourish” (82). There is no questioning of the fact that
neoliberal doctrine in the form of projects and market logic is penetrating across the
globe. But why is the discourse of civil society instead of any other discourse used to
achieve these changes in countries such as India? How does the discourse of civil society
work and why has it become essential to the project of neoliberalism in India? One
explanation is that the popular discourse of civil society suits the discourse of
neoliberalism because ‘civil society’ is a discourse of utopia that envisages the ideal selforganized democratic society and dismisses authoritarian or obsolete state. But as
Gramsci has maintained:
The ideas of the Free Trade movement are based on a theoretical error
whose practical origins is not hard to identify; they are based on a distinction
between political society, which is made into and presented as an organic one,
whereas in fact it is merely methodological. Thus it is asserted that the economic
activity belongs to civil society and the state must not intervene to regulate it. But
since in actual reality civil society and state are one and the same, it must be clear
that Laissez- faire too is a form of State “regulation” , introduced and maintained by
coercive means ( Gramsci 1971, 160).

Since civil society and the state are “one in the same”, perhaps the second reason
explains things better. The many of the contemporary discourses of civil society do not
bemoan all kind of state activities. In fact, they oppose only a kind of welfare and
regulatory state that hinders freedom of the market. In short, these discourses promotes
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free market ideas; aids in deploying global hegemonic discourse of neoliberalism with
rather ease; and helps in the creation of a neoliberal governmental subject.

Making Common Sense Work: Connecting the Discourse of Civil Society to the
Global Hegemonic Discourse of Neoliberalism
Hegemonic discourse is composed of careful, rationalized and organized
statements, which carry certain ideas that claim to be true and are disseminated by
experts and organic intellectuals. Peet (2002) contributes a Gramsci-Foucualdian notion
of global hegemonic discourse (GHD) while studying neoliberal Africa. GHD refers to “a
system of political ideas, derived from leading class interpretations of regional
experience, elaborated in coherent and sequential theoretical statements, as with policy
formations, within internationally recognized body of experts” (57). With intense
regulatory power and a broad geographic swath, these discourses penetrate different
locales and are able to persuade or coerce people to become its subjects. Neoliberalism is
one such hegemonic discourse. However, scholars studying neoliberalism have also
emphasized the “contextual embeddedness” of hegemonic neo-liberal projects and I
argue that the use of civil society in neoliberal discourse is a result their contextual
embeddedness and path-dependent interactions.
Let me explain this process with the help of Gramsci’s idea of common sense.
According to Gramsci, hegemony can also be understood in relation to his concept of
common sense. Gramsci maintains that "[E]very philosophical current leaves behind a
sedimentation of common sense: that is the document of its historical effectiveness.
Common sense is not something rigid and immobile, but is continually transforming
itself, enriching itself with scientific ideas and with philosophical opinions which have
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entered ordinary life. Common sense creates the folklore of the future, that is, a relatively
rigid phase of popular knowledge at a given place and time” (324). However, as Jones
(2006) maintains, common sense for Gramsci is also “unsystematic, heterogeneous,
spontaneous, incoherent and inconsequential, a ‘chaotic aggregate of disparate
conceptions’ that holds together” (Jones 2006, 54). Common sense can be intervened by
hegemonic influences and since by nature it is not rigid, it can be actively created by the
mediations of hegemonic groups. I believe that the term ‘civil society’ currently resides at
the level of common sense, where people in India uncritically accept anything associated
with civil society as good, democratic, pro-people and community. Hence, it is beneficial
for neoliberalism to co-opt the term civil society in order to invade the common sense of
people and shape them into neoliberal subjects.
It is easy to see how this has come to happen in the Indian setting. Roy (2003)
explains that the discourse of civil society has been used to propagate a neoliberal
doctrine of the roll-back of state in terms of less regulation, privatization and withdrawal
of welfare initiatives because the discourse of “state” and “free market” are no longer
relevant. On the one hand, with the growing discontent of the IMF and WTO, the poor
have actively refuted the discourse of a free market. On the other hand, state in many
countries of the south is also looked upon with skepticism. For example, in India, it is a
well-established fact that after the British left the country, elite groups co-opted the
Indian state successfully. Kaviraj (1984), maintains that ‘state-bourgeoisie agency’ even
after independence was based on institutional structures of the colonial rule. The
institutional structure lacked a necessary precondition that was supposed to bind it
together--unforced commonsense (227). Instead, something else was used to bind the
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state together. Nandy (1989) explains that the “(Indian) state has established closed,
inviolable links with megascience and megatechnology- not only because it must depend
on modern science, and technology to give teeth to its coercive apparatus, but also
because it can use the achievement in these sectors, especially when they are spectacular,
to legitimize itself as a repository of scientific knowledge and negation of native
irrationalities” (10). Armed with a reliable discourse of science and technology, the
modernist state agenda never felt the need to co-opt “low culture”, the rural, ethnic or
“vernacular”. Hence, in 1970s and 80s, the developmental state entered a crisis phase
with social movements springing up in different parts of the country. The phenomena of
NGOs and other community organizations, adorned with civil society discourse, in this
backdrop appeals to the “low culture” as they work closely with the community and pay
close attention to their issues, even if they follow the same notions of development and
modernity as the modernist Indian state or the west.

The Power of Freedom in the Discourse of Civil Society: Promoting Neoliberal
Governmentality
The discourse of civil society also aids in promoting neoliberal governmentality.
Foucault (1991) maintains that analyzing “regimes of practice means to analyze
programs of conduct which have both prescriptive effects regarding what is to be done
(effects of Jurisdiction), and codifying effects regarding what is to be known (‘effects of
‘veridiction’)” (75). Foucault’s work on governmentality adds not only to the neoGramscian analysis of the ideological conditions for the operation of neoliberalism
exemplified by Stuart Hall (1984, 1988) on Thatcher’s Britain , but also directs our
attention to the “ethical and technical character of neo-liberalism as an art of
government” (Barry et al. 1996, Burchell 1993, Rose 1993). Foucault saw two major
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differences between eighteenth- century classical liberalism and modern neoliberalism.
First for neoliberals, the market regulates and controls the state, while liberal theorists
state defines the market (Lemke 2001). Lemke (2001) writes that for Foucault the second
difference arises from the basis of government. Individual freedom was the precondition
for the rationale of the government in classical liberalism, and the state could undermine
the freedom only when its foundation was challenged. However, in the neoliberal era,
where economic norms such as ‘cost benefit calculations and market criteria’ penetrate
the social domain, the rationality of the state is pegged no longer with pre-given human
nature but with an ‘artificially created form of behavior’:
[N]eo-liberalism no longer locates the rational principle for regulating and
limiting the action of government in a natural freedom that we should all respect,
but instead it posits an artificially arranged liberty: in the entrepreneurial and
competitive behavior of economic-rational individuals. Whereas in the classic
liberal conception, homo economicus forms an external limit and the inviolable core
of governmental action, in the neo-liberal thought of the Chicago School he
becomes a behaviouristically manipulable being and the correlative of a
governmentality which systematically changes the variables of the ‘environment’
and can count on the ‘rational choice’ of the individuals” (Lemke 2001, 200).

Rose (1999) elaborating this phenomena explains that modern neoliberalism
operates through the mode of freedom, where technologies of self prepare an individual
for the subjection of the self. “These technologies – a form of injunctions to moral
government …are embodied in language, in knowledge, in technique, in fabrication of
spaces” (43). The free human being, a self-activating, self-managing and selfenterprising individual, is transformed and inscribed with mores of work efficiency and
optimization and wealth creation. In modern times, in the name of freedom, the process
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of self-subjection of individuals has provoked Rose to distinguish “freedom as the
formula of resistance from freedom as a formula of power” (65).
Dean extends the concept of technologies of self to add “technologies of agency
which seek to enhance and improve our capacities for participation, agreement and
action; and technologies of performance in which these capacities are made calculable
and comparable so that they might be optimized” (173). These technologies working at
the level of family, school, neighborhood, and workplace, reconfigure and reorganize
social relations and empower individuals to work as active citizens, responsible
customers, and efficient individuals aware of their own risks. Burchell (1996 ) calls this
‘contractual implication’ (29), a term that he borrows from Jacquese Donzelot (1991).
This implies that in order for individuals to exercise freedom of action and decision that
hitherto were managed by the state; the individual assumes absolute responsibility not
only for their actions but also for the outcomes of their actions.
Ram, CCS’s national coordinator for the Livelihood Champaign, commented on
the kind of freedom that CCS as a civil society organization envisions: “CCS’s main goal
is free the civil society of India, which means economic freedom, social freedom,
political freedom, freedom to do whatever you think...even if it may do some wrong to
few people… we’ll say, go ahead and do it. Because you are not doing it for me, you are
doing it for yourself. If the result is harmful, at least you will blame yourself not someone
else.”
This new form of responsibilization that is an effect of governmentality is the
pertinent theme to my study as the street hawkers are also implicated in ‘contractual
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implication’ once the welfare state withdraws from the spaces of informality. Also, civil
society discourse that promotes governmentality in the name of freedom, helps different
strands of neoliberal ideology to get articulated with the existing ideas, practices and
subjects. For example, existing social relations are being reshaped in the form of new
socialism or communitarianism based on the western concept of secular yet closed
associations rather than the ones based on traditional Indian values of family, clan and
kinship. Citizens are encouraged to be transformed into hyper-consumers in order to be a
part of an active consumerist society. Modernist spatial ideas are intensified under elite
citizens’ groups to give way to a sanitized city.

Civil Society as a Floating Signifier
As mentioned earlier, civil society discourse sometimes is more successful in
promoting pro-market ideas than are the discourses of the state and neoliberalism.
Arnoldi (2009) maintains that in order for an idea to be sellable, there has to be a certain
level of catchiness. It is also useful for a term to be vague so that it can be attached to
many different referents. According to Rose (2001), “part of the power of a specific
discursive formation may rest precisely on the multiplicity of different arguments that can
be produced in its terms” (158). A universal discourse is able to penetrate the local
common sense successfully if it is deployed through interpretative repertoires, which are
“systematically related sets of terms that are often used with stylistic and grammatical
coherence and often organized around one or more central metaphors. They develop
historically and make up an important part of the ‘common sense’ of a culture, although
some are specific to institutional domains” (Potter, 1996, 131 as cited in Rose 2001, 156)
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The concept of civil society can be connected to almost any issue. Specifically
listed on the CSS website are education, livelihood, environment, and governance, which
themselves constitute vague and inclusive referents. Arnoldi, using Hardt and Negri,
explains this vagueness in terms of ‘floating signifiers’, which work on the principle of
inclusion rather than binary exclusions. These floating signifiers can be attached to many
different referents precisely on account of their vagueness. This is in fact their strength.
Hegemonic discourses are powerful if they are flexible enough to co-opt whatever issues
happen to be of pressing importance in public discourse on a day-to-day basis.
For Kumar, civil society is “a concept rich in historical resonances; a concept
where a good part of the appeal is the sense of many levels and layers of meaning,
deposited by successive generations of thinkers. With it, as most of its uses clearly
testify, we are in the realm of the normative, if not indeed the nostalgic. 'Civil society'
sounds good; it has a good feel to it; it has the look of a fine old wine, full of depth and
complexity” (1993, 376). Civil Society forms an interpretative repertoire which is
regionalizing the universal discourse of neoliberalism. Here the buzz words of civil
society discourse such as self-help, social capital, decentralization, micro-level planning,
and participation are the best in generating neoliberal governmentality.

Conclusion
There are two things that stand distinctly in the analysis of the critical history of
civil society. First, every philosopher conceived his notion of civil society at a particular
time and in a specific climate. For example, the Hellenistic philosophies drew inward
amidst expansion of the Roman Empire and loss of a feeling of belonging in the polis.
Medieval philosophies were influenced by the dominance of Christianity while
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Enlightenment philosophies reflected the expansion of markets. Hence in our current
study, it is important to contextualize the current use of civil society in the contemporary
political, economic and social environment. In the last section of this chapter, I have
attempted to answer how the model of civil society envisaged by CCS reflects on the
current neoliberal environment. CCS’s interpretations of civil society draw from the
selective theories of Adam Smith and Richard Plain. All of the other conceptualizations
of civil society that highlight the importance of state and outlines the dangers of market
and individualism in civil society are ignored. Secondly, it is clear that different scholars
have posited civil society and state in various configurations throughout history. Liberal
thinkers and classical political economists have attributed a degree of autonomy to the
sphere of civil society while the works of Hegel- Marx-Gramsci (HMG) highlight that the
two are closely interrelated and analysis of one requires the understanding of the other.
HMG presented a strong critique of not just the liberal tradition of civil society but via
that also a critique of the capitalist society inflicted by exploitation, poverty and
alienation. I will use these theories as the base to analyze the current conditions of the
marginalized section of Indian society represented by hawkers.
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Chapter 3: Altering the Climate of Opinion: The Centre for Civil Society as a
Think Tank

"We must make the building of a free society once more an intellectual adventure,
a deed of courage." —Friedrich . A. Hayek (statement of philosophy, CCS website)

20

Introduction
This chapter is dedicated to the analysis of The Centre for Civil Society (CCS) as
a think tank. I begin with a brief discussion of how think tanks and NGOs function as
transnational apparatus of governmentality. Next, I provide my working definition of
‘think tank’ and explain why they are neglected as central objects of analysis in scholarly
research, a lacuna that I address. I move on to present a comparative analysis of the rise
of think tanks in the US and India and while doing so, I introduce to readers different
models of think tanks that exist in the contemporary world. I conduct a literature review
and discuss different approaches to studying think tanks that have been developed by
scholars and explain how CCS may be difficult to analyze using any one of those
approaches. I also outline my methodology for studying CCS that includes discourse
analysis and network analysis. In order to show how these methodologies work on think
tanks, I present two case studies that chart the tactics of CCS to garner the most important
things for its survival—media and public attention.

20
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Think Tanks: Transnational Apparatus Of Governmentality
What are think tanks and why do they form an important site of investigation? To
scholars studying the spread of hegemonic global capitalism through penetration of
neoliberal policy changes in different countries, think tanks can provide an important site
of inquiry. According to Harvey (2005), neoliberalism can be thought of as two distinct
but overlapping phenomena: a moral-philosophical theory of individual rights with
principles of liberty and freedom; and a project to strengthen the capitalist elite. The
philosophical theory is used to rationalize the capitalist agenda but where the agenda
fails, rhetorical expertise is deployed to justify and obscure the contradictions. Think
tanks are “shock troops of neoliberalism” (Cahill and Beder 2005, 43) that make
contradictions fuzzy and the climate of opinion more palatable for policy changes to kick
in. Sparke (2006) emphasizes that political geography of neoliberalism should investigate
how the expansion of neoliberalism in macrospaces of governance (such as cities, SEZs,
countries where structural adjustment strategies have been applied) is connected to its
development as a practice in microspaces of governmentality (corporations, finance
centers, think tanks, universities). Firstly, this can be done by analyzing the “globalist
ideologies that suture together ideas about institutional and individual entrepreneurialism
with grand vistas of free market led development” (362). Works of “TINA – touts” such
as Thomas Friedman and Jagdesh Bhagwat, who is an active member of CCS, provide
21

valuable sources for such analysis. Second is to explore the force of TINA discourse in
action-- charting its emergence and marketing through appeal to common sense,
exemplified by civil society and empowerment discourse; tracking its spread through
21

TINA is an abbreviation to “There is no alternative”, a slogan used by Margaret
Thatcher to emphasize the necessity of free market policy and structural changes.
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organizations such as think tanks funded by the World Bank and foreign business donors;
and tracing its impact on local policies. About 75 percent of CCS funding comes from
foreign contributors. Armed with these funds, CCS invades local policy and advocacy
networks, thereby representing foreign interests.
Scholars have talked about how foreign interests easily permeate when state and
civil society are separate entities. Ferguson (2006) points out the analytic limitation of the
state-civil society opposition and maintains that this opposition is susceptible to antidemocratic political and ideological use. The state-civil society opposition often entails
an understanding of civil society as “sandwiched between the patriarchal family and
universal state” (Mamdani 1996, 14 as cited in Ferguson 2006, 92). This understanding
places state above the local and has enabled the nation-state to gain legitimacy through
what Gupta and Ferguson (2002) term as ‘claims of vertical encompassment’ (982).
Three analytically distinct ideas of “superior spatial scope; supremacy in the hierarchy of
power; and superior generality of interest, knowledge and moral purpose” (995) – fuse
into a single figure, the ‘up there’ state. They challenge this binary of the ‘up there’ state
versus the ‘local’, ‘community’ and ‘grassroots’(990) by displacing the primacy of the
nation-state frame of analysis. They ask us to visualize state and society on a horizontal
instead of vertical level to see how both state and society have been transnationalized.
This move also helps to focus and understand the “transnational apparatus of
governmentality” of which NGOs and think tanks form an integral part.
Retreat of the state in the neoliberal era does not imply that it has ceased to
function. Scholars have shown that the state is far from being eroded and is in fact
restructured to play a salient role in disseminating neoliberalism and the globalization of
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capital (McMichael 1993, Kafkalas 1987, Peck 2004, Ong 2006, Harvey 2006). USinfluenced multilateral international agencies play a key role in opening up countries to
structural adjustment programs that are initiated through the state. In this case however, it
is not the state, but the Washington Consensus promoted by the World Bank, IMF and
US Treasury Department, that is taking up the role of the state in forming certain types of
discourses and influencing practices. Often labeled as “re-colonization” of previously
colonialized nations, structural adjustment programs not only manage micro-economic
relations such as currency-exchange rates but also demand states to curtail social
expenditures.

Though many of the NGOs and think tanks that have come up in past two
decades identify themselves as part of civil society, they can be understood as extensions
of multilateral agencies like the IMF and World Bank, and funding agencies like
European church groups and multinational corporate donors. These funding agencies can
easily bypass the state and provide funds directly to different NGOs and community
organizations in the global south. These NGOs often seek to proliferate multi-sectorial
relationships with both the state and capital investors. For example, they seek funds from
not just corporate affiliated foundations such as Kellogg and Ford but also multinational
corporations such as Nike, Cisco and Microsoft (Roberts et al. 2005).

Scholars have well established the fact that the relationships between NGOs and
their donor agencies are skewed and it becomes difficult for NGOs to maintain autonomy
when they are so dependent on donors for funds. Not only do NGOs have to follow the
managerial style of transnational corporations, scholars maintain that their accountability
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procedures are distorted toward the needs of donors rather than beneficiaries (Mcllwaine
1998). Studies have shown that NGOs have “little conceptual understanding of how their
interventions facilitate the empowerment process in a situation of cultural change” (Desai
2006, 120). Needless to say, many NGOs, especially the ones that are internationally
funded, employ a highly western notion of development and participation (Kamat 2003,
Walker et al. 2007). These transnational NGOs operating under the influence of
international capital and the logic of economic rationality inhibit grassroots movements
which are so vital for the development of a counter- hegemonic current in civil society.
On a closer analysis many of the current NGOs and especially the right wing think-tanks
such as CCS fall in the category of organic intellectuals of neoliberalism (this obviously
depends on their objectives, their allocation to transnational donors). These NGOs and
think-tanks are the key for the smooth expansion of a neoliberal working order in many
countries. Hence, multilateral financial institutions, neoliberal states and NGOs can be
understood in terms of transnational apparatus of governmentality.

Think tanks play an important role in this process as part of what Peet (2002) calls
the academic-institutional-media (AIM) complex. “The center of persuasion” (54) or
AIM complex influences local politics and disseminates neo-liberal discourse among the
masses through policy prescriptions, press releases, popular columns, and commentaries.
The Gramsci-Foucualdian framework enables us to understand that think tanks are
actively involved in articulating universal discourses with regional ideas to penetrate the
common sense. The neo-Gramscians view these hegemonic constellations of neoliberal
ideas, networks, and institutions as a project of transnational capitalists interests (Gill
1990). With this understanding, I proceed to study CCS. Here I touch upon the
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conventional line of inquiry—studying its influence in local and regional policy-making.
Next, I go beyond the traditional approach to think tank analysis by locating the politics
of CCS on the local, national as well as global stage. Last, I outline various contradictions
in CCS ideology and offer a geographical critique of their work on hawkers and vendors.

What Is A Think Tank?
There are more than 5,000 research institutes of varying character operating in
163 countries (McGann 2010). However, in this ‘age of experts’ the significance of these
intellectual institutions or ‘change agents’ has not yet been captured in the critical
literature and is largely under-theorized as well as under-investigated empirically (Blank
2003, Stone 2000 a). This lacuna is noticed in two areas. First, although there has been a
considerable amount of literature on NGOs in the South, most of the studies on think
tanks address organizations largely in the United States and Britain and to a smaller
22

extent Canada, Western Europe, and Australia. Secondly, the little attention think tanks
23

have garnered has only come from political scientists. Other social scientists like
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There are a few exceptions-- James G. McGann Democratization and Market Reforms
in Developing and Transnational Countries: Think tanks as Catalysts, Routledge (2010);
Raymond J Stryuck, Reconstructive Critics: Think Tanks in Post-Soviet Bloc
Democracies, Washington DC: Urban Institute Press (1999); Johanna Bockman (2007)
“The Origins of neoliberalism between Soviet Socialism and Western Capitalism: ‘A
galaxy without Borders’” Theor Soc 36 (2007): 343-371; Daniel C. Levy “Latin
America’s Think Tanks : The Roots of Nonprofit Privatizations” Studies in International
Comparative Development, 30 no. 2 (1995), 3-24; Barry Naughton “China’s Economic
Think Tanks: Their Changing Role in the 1990s” The China Quarterly, (2002).
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Political Science scholars have focused on the political history of think tanks and their
relationship to the rise of the conservative movement, or the New Right: David M. Ricci,
The Transformation of American Politics: The New Washington and the Rise of Think
Tanks, New Haven: Yale University Press (1993); Richard Cockett “Thinking the
Unthinkable: Think Tanks and the Economic Counter –Revolution, 1931-1983, Fontana
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sociologists, anthropologist and geographers have rarely tackled think tanks as research
subjects. My study attends to both these gaps. My work provides a case study of a
neoliberal think tank in the global south, specifically India, where global demands and
regional constraints have crystallized a unique think tank namely CCS. Secondly, I
analyze CCS from a geographic point of view by situating it in global politics and
highlighting spatial contradictions in its engagement with street hawkers.

Press (1995); Andrew Rich, Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics of Expertise,
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press (2004); James Allen Smith, The Idea
Brokers: Think Tanks and the Rise of New Policy Elite, New York: the Free Press (1991);
Andrew Denham, Think Tanks of the New Right, Aldershot: Dartmouth (1996); Johanna
Bockman “The Origins of Neoliberalism between Soviet Socialism and Western
Capitalism: “A Galaxy without Borders” Theor Soc 36 (2007): 343-371; Robert Carl
Blank “ From Thatcher to the Third Way: think tanks, intellectuals and the Blair
projekt”, bidem-Verlag (2003). Recently, scholars have also started conducting
comparative analysis of think tanks in various countries: Diane Stone, Capturing the
Political Imagination: Think Tanks and the Policy Process (London: Frank Cass, 1996);
Richard Higgott and Diane Stone, “Limits of Influence: Foreign Policy Think Tanks in
Britain and the USA”, Review of International Studies, 20 (1994): 15-34; Donald E.
Abelson and Christine M. Carberry, “Following Suit or Falling behind? A Compartitive
Analysis of Think Tanks in Canada and the United States”, Canadian Journal of Political
Science, 31, no.3 (1998): 525-555.; Wolfgang Reinicke, Tugging at the Sleeves of
Politicians: Think Tanks- American Experiences and German Perspectives (GuÈ ttersloh:
Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung, 1996). James McGann and Erik C. Johnson, Comparative
Think Tanks, Politics and Public Policy, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar (2005) Scholars
have also started studying the role and impacts of specific think tanks on the actual public
policies: Donald E. Abelson, A Capitol Idea: Think Tanks and US Foreign Policy,
Montreal and Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s University Press (2006); Richard Haass, “Think
Tanks and US Foreign Policy: A Policy-Maker’s Perspective” US Foreign Policy Agenda
November (2002) (http://usinfo.state.gov/journals); Damien Cahill And Sharon Beder
“Neo-Liberal Think Tanks And Neo-Liberal Restructuring: Learning The Lessons From
Project Victoria And The Privatisation Of Victoria’s Electricity Industry” Social
Alternatives 24 no. 1 (2005); Sharon Beder “Neoliberal Think Tanks and Free Market
Environmentalism” Environmental Politics, 10, no.2 (2001): 128-133. ; Kevin. G Welner
“Free-Market Think Tanks and the Marketing of Education Policy” Dissent 58 no.2
(2011): 39-43.
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Various reasons can be blamed for the lack of critical attention to these
organizations among scholars. First is the bias of social scientists against the study of
think tanks (Rich 2004, Stone 2000a), which may have risen from the difficulty in
defining and categorizing think tanks. Think tanks are often conflated with or treated as a
form of pressure group or NGO. While defining a think tank numerous questions need
answers: are think tanks public or private organizations? Do they work for profit? What
does one mean by “profit”? In order to qualify as a think tank, does the organization have
to conduct original research or can it simply disseminate research done by others? How
much autonomy does an organization have to maintain from the state or corporate
interests in order to qualify as a think tank?

Secondly, the late development and characteristic of these organizations (Stone
2000a) may also have contributed to the way they eluded scholarly attention. Before the
mid-1970s, these organizations were “low-profile actors seeking to inform policy in a
detached non-partisan scholarly fashion” (150). These organizations rarely debated about
their research or findings in public with one another or with other political actors and
hence attracted little attention. Lastly, it is challenging to evaluate the role of ideas in
policy and politics. It is equally difficult to gauge success of think tanks, especially when
their role is limited to advocacy and setting up a climate of opinion. Hence the attention
given to think tanks is less than what they deserve.

A part of the reason for the lack of attention to the think tanks in the countries
other than the US is the fact that think tanks are believed to be a quintessentially
American phenomenon. Indeed, the exceptional features of American politics – “the
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constitutional separation of powers, party system historically grounded in electrical and
political ambitions rather than ideology and a civil service tradition that gives leeway to
numerous political appointees” ( Denham and Garnett 1998, 4-5; Smith 1993, ix)—are
characteristic of think tanks.

Because of the relative anonymity of this breed of intellectual influence in critical
literature, it is important to first define: what are think tanks; where did they come from;
what the nature of their work is. The term think tank was a military jargon for a private
room where invasion plans and strategies were discussed during World War II. From
there it was borrowed to describe contract research organizations set up by the military in
the 1950s, such as the RAND corporation. It was only in the 1960s that the term became
popular to describe a variety of private research organizations (Smith 1993). According
to Stone (2000a), think tanks are independent (often private) policy research institutes
with people who focus on a particular policy or a broad policy issues with intent to
educate and influence policy experts or general public.

Think Tanks: Comparative Analysis of the Evolution of US and Indian Think
Tanks
Many scholars define think tanks as policy research institutes but as Abelson
(2000) emphasizes, it may be more fruitful to classify them based on their central
function rather than their institutional characteristics. This is because “like chameleon
constantly changing their complexion to suit new environments, think tanks have altered
their behavior to compete in the marketplace of ideas” (2000, 216). He recognizes four
waves of think tanks in American history with distinct motivations and different
institutional character and functions: policy research institutions, government contractors,
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advocacy think tanks, and vanity or legacy based think tanks, which are largely an
American phenomenon. Abelson says that it is important to understand that one wave of
think tank has not replaced the older one, in fact all coexist. In the remaining of this
section, I will explain the characteristics of each type of think tanks and outline their
different waves in India since the early 20th century. While doing this I will discuss the
circumstances that gave rise to CCS.
The first wave of think tanks was characterized by policy research institutions that
arose in the first decades of 20th century as an outgrowth of progressive era reforms
emphasizing scientific management (Smith 1993, Abelson 2000). A small group of
private philanthropists established research institutes to fill the gaps that traditional
universities focusing solely on teaching could not address. The studies produced by these
institutes met the highest scholarly standards and often prompted the government to
assume new social responsibilities. The examples are the Brookings Institution in 1927
and the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace in 1919. In India, the British
established the Societies Registration Act (SRA) in 1860 under which NGOs could
function as a legal entity. Even today all modern think tanks in India are registered under
this act. It is hard to ascertain if there were any organizations in India that fit the criteria
of a think tank before Independence. Sudarshan (2001) argues that there were a few
organizations during pre-independence times—notably the Gokhale Institute of Politics
and Economics (1930) in Pune, the Indian Statistical Institute (1932) in Calcutta, and the
Tata Institute of Social Science (1936) in Mumbai—that deserve to be classified as think
tanks. She further maintains that a notable feature of Indian think tanks was that they
were involved in both research and training. All the above mentioned organizations, in
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fact, worked as proxy universities at the time when institutions of modern higher
education were limited. This is the reason I would not necessarily call these institutions
“think tanks”. Perhaps All-India Village Industries Association (AIVIA) fits the bill.
Mohan Das Karamchand Gandhi helped set up AIVIA (Akhil Bharat Gram Udyog
Sangh) at Wardha in 1934 under the guidance of J.C. Kumarappa, an economist trained
from Columbia University in the US. This was a self-acting, autonomous, non-political
organization, which focused on programs and research to reorganize and reconstruct
Indian villages. Kumarappa was also the principal preceptor of Gandhian economics and
is considered the founding father of green thought in India ( Govindu & Malghan 2005).
He published the monthly Gram Udyog Patrika from 1939 to 1956 from AIVIA’s
24

office. In 1935, at AIVIA, Gandhi initiated a movement called Science for people with
an advisory board of famous scientist and luminaries such as Rabindranath Tagore, J.C.
Bose, P.C. Ray, C.V. Raman, San Higginbottom, Robert McCarrison, Vallabhbhai Patel,
B.C. Roy, S. Subbarao, M.A. Ansari, Rajabally, G.D. Birla and Jamal Mohammed Sahib,
(Gupta 2002, Reddy 2004). However, due to several complications AIVIA was not able
to deliver much and was far less influential than what was hoped for when founded (see
Lindley 2007). Ultimately, the conspicuous absence of effective think tanks before
independence was because the British economic and political dominance restricted
organized intellectual activities due to the fear of their subversive characteristics.
The second wave of think tanks in the US began with the government contractors
in post-World War II period. In the climate of the cold war and US hegemony, policy
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In addition to this Kumarappa designed, organized and wrote up three book-length
studies of economic conditions in various parts of rural India all based on extensive
household survey (Lindley 2007).
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makers actively sorted expert advice from engineers, physicist, biologists, statisticians
and social scientists to formulate domestic and foreign policy and strategy. For example,
the Rand Corporation (Research and Development) 1948, a product of the cold war
period, used system analysis, game theory, and simulation models to serve various state
and federal departments, specifically the Department of Defense.
Just as the advent of government contractors in the US was a response to the
growing pressures of the cold war, around the same time numerous contractor think tanks
also evolved in newly independent India and played a significant role in the nationbuilding process enacted through five-year developmental plans. In his study of different
types of research institutes, Weiner (1979) notes that after independence, the Indian
government started opening research institutions within different government and state
departments that could provide the government with basic quantitative and qualitative
information. Sudarshan (2001) attributes these to the dearth of policy research coming
from universities, which were primarily engaged in the “business of teaching and
research without seeking to play an active role in policy making” (87). The Bureau of
Economics and Statistics was opened within the Planning Departments of the State
Governments in early 50s. By the1950s, the Central Government started funding research
institutes outside the government department and ministries. The first such institute to
come up on the recommendation of Dean Paul H. Appleby, a Consultant with the Ford
Foundation, was the Indian Institute of Public Administration (1954). It was inaugurated
by Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, who chose to be at the helm of the
institute. Other notable examples are Delhi’s National Council of Applied Economic
Research (1956), Institute of Economic Growth (1958), and Center for Developing
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Society (1963). In 1968, the Indian government set up Indian Council of Social Science
Research (ICSSR) to fund the existing research institutes and help nurture new research
centers in different states that could assist policy makers in regional issues. A few
organizations that emerged as a result were the Institute for Social and Economic Change
(1972) in Bangalore, the Centre for Development Studies (1971) in Trivandrum, and the
Madras Institute of Development Studies (1971) in Chennai. Up until the 1980s, the task
of different think tanks and research institutes was to fill the existing gaps in the
information available to policy makers (Sudarshan 2001). In the 1980s, India moved a
step closer towards liberalization in macro-economic policy and avenues of foreign
funding opened up. As the state funds were limited, private and international donors
stepped in and number of institutes arose that focused on development as the central
concern and stayed out of advocacy. Notable think tanks of this time were the Indian
Council for Research on International Economic Relations in Delhi (1981) and the Indira
Gandhi Institute of Development Research in Mumbai (1986).
Breaking from the nonpartisan approach of the former think tanks, the third wave
of think tanks in the US in the 1970s were the advocacy think tanks. Institutes such as the
Heritage Foundation and Institute of Policy Studies do not adhere to the high standards in
scholarly inquiry and sophisticated research to serve public policy and instead appear
more like “interest groups and political action community” (Abelson and Carberry 1998,
537). According to various scholars (Denham and Garnett 1996, Weaver 1989, Arnold
2007) such think tanks are more concerned with “influencing the public debate, brokering
political ideas, and especially with mobilizing public and media support”(Arnoldi 2007
58). These institutes function as lobby groups and seek to influence the electorate rather
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than the scholarly community. For this they hire staff based on political affiliation instead
of academic credentials; produce low quality research for already prescribed audience;
seek funding from politically motivated donors; and spend time and money to gain access
in media and policy circles (Arnoldi 2007, Denham and Garnett 1996, Stone 2003).
In India think tanks at different times have engaged in advocacy on numerous
issues. For example, the International Institute for Population Sciences in Mumbai (1956)
advocates raising the “positive value of demography and population sciences as a
developmental tool among political representatives and other strata of society” (IIPS
25

2010, “About Us”). The Indian Institute of Foreign Trade in Delhi (1963) advocating
for foreign trade, National Institute of Urban Affairs (1976) seeking improvement in
urban infrastructure and Centre for Women’s Development Studies (1980) advocating
gender equality are few other examples. In the 90s educated Indians with elite
backgrounds started joining think tanks with the intent to influence policy and public
opinion. With increasing globalization and India’s formal entry into IMF-led
liberalization changes, themes such as liberalization, its progression in various sectors
and its effect on the general population, growing urban crisis in the cities, defense
strategy, and diplomacy started being tackled by new think tanks that sought funding
from government, private donors and big corporations from home and abroad and
international agencies. For example, the Indian Council for Research on International
Economic Relations (ICRIER) in Delhi (1981) conducted research and advocacy on trade
liberalization; Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations in Mumbai (2009)
brought corporations and other prominent people to engage in foreign policy discussions.
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However, the advocacy think tanks that dotted the US landscape in 1960s and 70s had not
yet found expression in India.
In January of 1991, India was running an account deficit of $10 billion. The IMF
had loaned $1.8 billion that did not resolve the problem and the reserves were down to
two weeks’ worth of imports. With its credibility low, financial borrowing was out of
question. The inflation surged to an annual rate of 13 percent with minimal inflow of
foreign currency from non-resident Indians. That is when India opened to the era of
market liberalization under the leadership of Narasimah Rao and then Finance Minister
Manmohan Singh. However, scholars maintain that over the last decade, neoliberal
changes have been very slow due to the local resistance by the general public and
politicians alike. India’s slow progress on the neoliberal route could be attributed to
popular democracy (Chibber and Eldersveld 2003) and limited popular support (Yadav
1996). Since then, lobbying by an extensive international network –comprised of
foundations, institutes, research centers, publications, scholars and writers--has sought to
normalize the neoliberal reforms. One of these constituents, the think tank CCS, is the
first of its kind to openly embrace market principles and disseminate neoliberal ideas and
anti-state sentiments through various channels. They do this in a slightly different way
than their US counterparts. Operating in a popular democracy where a majority of people
are poor and have voting rights, CCS positions its arguments as pro-poor and promarginalized, and then proposes market-based solutions. In the next section I will briefly
discuss different approaches that are used to study think tanks. These approaches have
framed my research questions as well as methodology.
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Approaches to Study CCS
According to Abelson (2002) scholars have used three different conceptual
frameworks to study think tanks. First, they regard think tanks as elite organizations that
maintain close ties with policymakers to forward their or their sponsors’ agendas. This
approach helps to discover latent, close ties between the members of think tanks and
powerful people in business and government. Also, by analyzing boards of directors at
different times, scholars can interpret why some institutions enjoy more funds or media
coverage than others. However this approach faces many disadvantages. This conceptual
framework is well-suited to investigating big think tanks like the Brookings Institution
and RAND, but many small think tanks do not necessarily represent elite organizations.
For example, there are many left-leaning think tanks in Washington DC such as the
Institute for Policy Studies that do not necessarily represent elite interests and work with
pro-poor agenda. Despite the limitations of this approach, it will be useful for studying
the impact of CCS in policy circles and success in gathering funds from donors. The CCS
Board of Trustees and Board of Advisors are filled with high profile names from media
and corporate worlds, industries, law and private equity firms. These ‘learned
practitioners’ not only provide ‘institutional access routes’ (explained later in the chapter)
into various political organizations and government departments, they also act as
spokespersons in an already staged public theater. For example, when the founder of
CCS, Parth Shah, moved to India to set up the think tank, he faced the challenges of
finding a temporary place to live in crowded Delhi, gaining access to a temporary office
to start the organization, and building credibility to attract funds. Ashok Desai, a famous
University of Cambridge educated economist, who in 1991 helped then finance minister
(now Prime Minister as of 2013) Manmohan Singh to kick start market reforms, provided
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Shah his own apartment to make a home office. Shah describes the initial months of the
think tank:
Before and immediately after the formal launch of CCS, our primary focus
was on identifying individuals who were classical liberal in approach, and respected
and well known in their areas of expertise. Even though the think tank may be a new
concept, there are usually several individuals in various walks of life who sympathize
with classical liberal ideas and policies. We brought them together and created a
Board of Scholars. Listing the names of these scholars on the letterhead opened many
doors, provided credibility, and gave us a solid standing in the public arena. They also
became our advocates when engaging with government bodies, the media and donors
(Parth Shah 2008).

The second approach scholars use while studying think tanks comes from the
pluralist tradition, where think tanks are considered as one of the many groups--such as
trade unions, environmental organizations-- competing in the marketplace of ideas to
attract attention from political leaders. One advantage of this approach is that it makes
researchers acknowledge that in spite of the increased visibility of think tanks in policy
circles and debates, they are just one in many groups that compete for power and
influence. Also, think tanks sometimes employ strategies similar to other nongovernmental and grass root organizations to gain attention in a market place of ideas.
This framework provides insights that the think tanks themselves sometimes ignore. For
example, CCS started clearly as an advocacy think tank; they openly accepted that they
simply want to influence ideas and opinions of the people. Ram maintained that for a
long time, CCS’s motto was “social change through public policies.” But Parth Shah
admitted that this model was not working in India as both the policy makers and the
donors wanted to be associated with an organization that demonstrated that the ideas
could work on the ground-- something NGOs such as Self Employed Women’s
Association (SEWA) and National Association of Street Vendors in India (NASVI) were
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doing in the case of street hawkers. This constant comparison with NGOs is not
surprising as according to a government estimate, India had about 3.3 million NGOs
in 2009. That is one NGO for approximately every 400 people, and many times the
number of primary schools and primary health centers in India (Shukla 2010). While
talking about CCS’ initially unsuccessful efforts of pitching different liberal policy ideas
to policy leaders, Shah maintained that “they (leaders) liked the idea and said that ‘it
makes sense but we don’t see how it will work on the ground’”. Shah explained that in
order to gain credibility, “we do things that many US think-tanks may not do. We are not
just a think-tank that does research on policy issues, brings out publications and seminars,
we do research, we do advocacy, we run campaigns, we focus on one or two issue
campaigns like livelihood campaigns, school choice campaigns and we run pilot projects.
We have even gone beyond that, we help government, help them establish schemes. You
have to respond to your constraints, to your customers” (2010). Hence, scholars studying
think tanks can use this approach to broaden their field of inquiry to analyze complexities
and contradictions between ideas and practice. For my research on street venders this
approach enables me to identify the internal politics between different actors-- think
tanks, NGOs, hawkers associations, resident’s and trader associations. Also, as I will
discuss later, analyzing the work of CCS on the ground with other NGOs, helps me
identify various contradictions between their theory and actual practices.
Even though the pluralist approach is useful, it also suffers from some
disadvantages. As it dispels the overhyped importance of the think tank in policy debate,
it does not acknowledge that many think tanks are by their very nature associated with
intellectual elites and are indeed in a better position to influence the policy debate than
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NGOs that more often work with marginalized people on the ground. For example, CCS
tactics to organize and take credit for arranging the executive conference regarding
implementation of NPSVI in Jaipur were clearly more efficient than those of its
counterparts like NASVI. NASVI’s coordinator for organizing the conference in Jaipur
told me:
I did all the work, met with several hawker’s union heads to arrange the
conference, took them to the state departments etc, but the final letter from the
government that was sent to various departments urging planning executives to
participate in the conference only mentioned CCS as the organizer. My boss shouted
at me when we saw that our name was not on the letter. But what can I do? This is a
perfect example where someone reaps the fruits of someone else’s hard work because
they are at the right place at the right time; they have connections with big people
(NASVI Staff 2010).
Think tanks that work to influence the climate of opinion through advocacy work
may not be properly analyzed with this approach as they engage in a war of ideas that
many NGOs do not. Clearly, this approach is useful only when it is integrated with
others.
The third approach is the institutional approach and can also be categorized into
three subsets. First is the historical approach that focuses on the evaluation of a specific
think tank or changing role of a think tank in a particular country. The main disadvantage
of this approach is that it doesn’t provide data to support or deny the claims of any
specific think tank that it has played a significant role in a particular policy. The second
institutional approach is that of epistemic or political community, in which the think
tanks consist of elite experts and organizations and are invited to participate in policy
discussions with government decision makers. At the beginning, this approach indeed
appeared helpful to study CCS as its members attend many policy discussions. However
during my field work on CCS’s street hawking operations, I realized that many of these
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policy discussions with the government officials were in fact called for and organized by
CCS itself. For example, in the Jaipur Conference that I discuss in detail in Chapter 7,
CCS and NASVI invited other NGOs as well as a few hawkers to discuss implementation
of NPSV with government officials. In some cases, many campaigns that CCS conducts
are anti-government in nature and do not particularly involve working with the
government. For example, my first acquaintance with CCS was during a conference
called “Delhi Citizens Critique of the City Development Plan,” where participants
discussed issues such as slums, transportation, water, sanitation, and housing in the
proposed Master Plan of Delhi 2021. Although the title suggested that it was Delhi
government’s initiative to hear the concerns of the citizens, the conference was organized
solely by CCS and the participants were not common citizens, but intellectual elites from
different organizations that formed part of CCS networks. Although the list of
participants was narrow, there was a huge audience (including myself), perhaps because
of the popularity the topic and venue (India Habitat Center). One attendant asked the
head chair of all the discussion panels Dr Shreekank Gupta, who is a professor at Delhi
School of Economics and serves in the board of scholars of CCS, why officials of the city
development plan were not invited. To this he replied “We wanted to keep this a civil
society event.” He meant that at this point they were trying to avoid any discussions with
the state or the government officials. So in this case we see that the epistemic community
approach is not best suited for the think tanks that seek to change the climate of opinion
and is relevant for the ones that actively participate in policy debates with government
officials. Another problem (methodological in nature) with using this approach is that
when CCS participates in policy discussions, it uses the networks that it has formed with
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other NGOs or experts to raise an issue. For example, in the Jaipur discussion organized
by CCS, members of at least four other NGOs (including SEWA, NASVI, Nidan) were
debating with government officials on the issues. As Abelson writes: “ this approach may
tell us who is sitting at the table when key issues are being discussed, but it does not
profess to tell us whose voices have struck a responsive chord with those in a position to
influence policy decisions” (2002, 55). Another issue with this approach is that some
intellectual elites—including many who are associated with CCS—are also part of many
different networks such as that of media, academic institutions or corporations and also
other think tanks. Hence it becomes hard to distinguish which particular position or
network is providing them more authority to leverage their ideas in a debate.
Abelson calls his third institutional approach the policy cycle approach and
maintains that like NGOs, think tanks vary in size, resources and priorities. Thus, the best
way to study them would be to analyze their efforts in different stages of public policy.
After all “not all organizations have the desire or the necessary resources to participate at
each stage of policy cycle” (2002, 57).
I believe that both Abelson’s elite institution and pluralist approaches provide
some insights to the study of think tanks, but one should use caution not to impulsively
label think tanks as either elite or NGO-like organizations as if the two are mutually
exclusive. Aided by insights from all of the above approaches, the policy cycle approach
provides the best framework to investigate CCS as a think tank. This approach enables
me to identify climate of opinion as a part of the policy cycle. The data set used to
evaluate the success of CCS then can be composed of tangible as well as intangible
performance indicators. For example, although CCS is not able to influence many
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policies directly, it is indirectly creating a climate in which policy changes can be pushed
or readily accepted. The indicators to look for are not just successful media citations, but
also presentations before government officials, designing and offering workshops to
further their ideology. According to Stone (2000a), if a think tank wants to impact long
term government thinking, it may invite politicians and bureaucrats to attend seminars
rather than reach them through magazines and scholarly research papers. The think tank
will place higher value on influencing media if it wants to frame the parameters of the
policy debate.
These above approaches have helped me to understand the larger political
economy in which CCS functions. The first part of my analysis of CCS looks into the
political economy of think tanks while in the second half I do an in-depth analysis of
CCS discourse on hawkers. While the first part adds to the existing literature on the new
right think tanks, the second part develops a new line of inquiry of think tanks by
critically challenging their actual work and ideas.

Methodology To Study CCS
While studying CCS, I use discourse analysis to analyze and unravel the process
through which the global discourse of neoliberalism hegemonizes and articulates with the
local discourse of civil society. This process cannot be studied in isolation from the
political-economy of ideas. The credibility of an idea in the market determines its
potential value and use for different actors (like politicians) and therefore plays a
significant role in its dissemination in the wider society through policies. Along with
rhetorical use of language, a set of mutually enforcing networks are important in
providing credibility to ideas. In order to study the political economy of an idea, I find
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both discourse analysis and network analysis very helpful. I spoke with two main
members of CCS during my fieldwork. Parth Shah is the President of CCS, with whom I
conducted a semi-structured interview that lasted for about 2 hours in their Delhi office.
The National Coordinator of Jeevika Champaign, whom I call Ram (name changed), had
worked for CCS for three years as a coordinator to the Youth Program and was the most
vital subject of my research. After completing a Masters in Social Work, Ram had joined
CCS and later with the help of Parth Shah went to Canada to get a degree in Think Tank
MBA from Atlas Economic Research Foundation. During the time of fieldwork, he
moved to Jaipur to overlook the Jeevika (livelihood) Champaign for the hawkers. Ram,
after working for CCS for many years came to firmly believe that neoliberal ideas
provide the only solution to the complex problems that India faces. This he often
explained in simple sentences and by giving small examples. When I asked why CCS
picked Jaipur for their hawkers’ project, he explained that their main donor had agreed to
fund CCS only on the condition that they would set up an office in Jaipur and work in
partnership with other NGOs that were already working with hawkers. So he had moved
to Jaipur to figure out in what way the hawkers could be helped.

England (2002) maintains that gaining access to elites is hard work. But in the
case of CCS which is an advocacy think tank, more attention means more success, and
they invite researchers’ attention. Indeed, Shah was pleased to know that a graduate
student from a US university was interested in writing about their work and interactions
with the street hawkers. However, I believe that if I had wanted to investigate instead
some of their other projects, like the controversial School Voucher Campaign, my
research position and background might have invited more scrutiny and skepticism. But
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the current work of CCS on street hawkers echoed with many other NGOs and academic
scholars who were pushing for implementation of NPSV; hence, Shah was probably
happy that instead of NASVI or SEWA, I chose CCS as my site of inquiry.

But just because I was welcomed by my research subjects does not mean that my
actual fieldwork was not ridden with anxieties. On the one hand, my preliminary field
work in 2008 was a guiltless exercise as I did not realize at the time that CCS was a free
market think tank. I approached it just like any other research institute and made use of
their library and reading room to study their work on street hawkers. On the other hand
my main fieldwork that ran from 2010 to 2011, made me quite nervous because of my
negative position on the think tank. I felt like an exploiter, albeit an exploiter of the elite
exploiter. While I spent time with Ram, I was always conscious that the result of my
research would cast him in a bad light. I also occasionally anticipated CCS’ fierce
response if they discovered my stance towards their activist work. For that reason, I selfcensored and decided to not ask things that I thought they would not want me to know,
such as information about funding of the street hawkers project, the demands of the
funders, and how CCS worked to get that funding. I planned to simply accompany Ram
during his interactions with street hawkers and do a participant observation. I did ask
some general questions about what he thought about certain issues, but none of the
questions required dispensing some hidden or private information. Most of the quotes in
the dissertation came from group discussions that involved hawkers from Vidhyadhar
Nagar mandi, members of other NGOs or from the Jaipur conference which was open for
public.
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Discourse Analysis
Discourse can be thought of as a socially constructed set of ideas, or a group of
statements, that frames our understanding about something. Fairclough (2003) explains
discourse as “an element of social life which is closely interconnected with other
elements” ( 3). According to Peet (2002) discourses are symbolic formations that result
from collective interpretations of historical experience. Rose (2001) maintains that
“discursive formation is the way meanings are connected together in a particular
discourse” (137). For Foucault it is a regularity within the systems of dispersions between
different statements. The rules that govern the dispersion (or regularity between the
objects, types of statements, concepts or thematic choices) are the rules of formation; that
of “coexistence, maintenance, modification and disappearance” (1972, 37-38).

There are various adaptations of discourse analysis but broadly they can be
categorized into two mutually overlapping but somewhat different methodological
emphases (Fairclough 2003, Lees 2004, Rose 2000, Van Dijk 1997). Rose (2003) calls
them discourse analysis I and II. Discourse analysis I pays close attention to the text and
images. This kind of analysis is more linguistic and visual, which directs greater attention
to the structure of the statement. This discourse analysis is more “concerned with
discourse, discursive formations, and their productivity” (140). Discourse analysis II, a
methodology more “left implicit” pays attention to the “practices of institutions” and
takes our attention to issues related to power/knowledge, regimes of truth, institutions and
technology. Here discourse is synonymous to the ideology itself, it attempts “to conceal
the power of the vested interests and to induce the consent of the dominated to their own
domination” (Lees 2004, 102). Fairclough writes that even though social scientists tend
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to ignore the first method, there should not be any ‘either/or’ and scientists should try to
connect these two in their analyses (2003, 3).

This separation assists to distinguish ways in which I approach both my
methodological and theoretical argument. Discourse analysis I helps as a methodology to
do what Foucault asks: disturb the tranquility of the pre-existing categories in the texts
(1972, 25). For me, these texts are CCS web resources, media coverage, and publications
by the occasional contributors to CCS. The CCS publication Law liberty and Livelihood
proved to be the most important text for my project and was analyzed through discourse
analysis I. Interviews conducted with two CCS members and quotes from two hawker’s
conferences were also analyzed using this methodology. Discourse analysis II, on the
other hand, assists in understanding the broader neoliberal changes associated with the
rise of NGOs, community organizations, hyper-consumerist spaces such as malls, and
other institutional practices that initiate neoliberal subjection.

Discourse analysis as a methodology to study CCS
According to Tonkiss (1998) in discourse analysis “language is viewed as the
topic of research… rather than gathering accounts or text so as to gain access to people’s
views and attitudes, or to find out what happened at a particular event, the discourse
analyst is interested in how people use language to construct their accounts of social
world” (Tonkiss, 1998, 247-8). Language is considered a social practice that orders and
shapes people’s identities and their relation to things. Fairclough (2003) maintains that
textual analysis helps in social analysis where the language or texts are evaluated on the
basis of their effects on power relations. This method is insightful as it allows me to pay
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attention towards the choice of words used to convey a particular idea. For example, CCS
builds a case that presents external regulation of the state as undesirable. If the state
regulates at all, it should do so based on economic rationality. This idea is communicated
to the people in the form of a set of discourses selecting particular words like civil
society, empowerment, liberty, entrepreneurs and self-regulation. This discourse subjects
consumers of CCS’ ideas as agents with economic rationality. I have already explained
this concept at length in chapter two.

Finding the sources to analyze discourse is not difficult, but does require an open
eye. Fairclough (2003) maintains that while doing textual analysis, not only are written
and printed text useful, but also the transcripts of conversations and interviews,
webpages, visual image and sound effects can provide important material for analysis.
Depending on the project, there can be large variety of sources such as government
documents, newspaper articles, political speeches, parliamentary debates, personal
accounts, advocacy pamphlets, and interviews. At the collection stage, Tonkiss (1998)
maintains that the richness of the textual data matters more than the actual quantity of the
data. The flexibility in terms of data collection in discourse analysis encouraged me to
access multiple sources that were listed on the CCS website. In order to conduct
discourse analysis of CCS, I looked at : A) the content and language of posts on the
website and their printed publications such as Law Liberty and Livelihood: Making a
living on the streets, and Ward Power: Reforms in Urban Governance ;B) the
organization and layout of the CCS website, identification of contributors in its different
categories, and their situation in terms of intellectual and material affiliations; C) the
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public image and interactions of CCS in the media; and D) CCS’s quotes during
conferences and workshops on street hawking.

Rose (2001) maintains that sometimes while conducting initial discourse analysis,
the coding process and content analysis can be helpful to identify the tone of statements.
According to Tonkiss (1998) even though the coding process involved in discourse
analysis is similar to qualitative interviewing, the way data is handled in the former is
different. It involves a “process of shifting, comparing and contrasting the different ways
in which these themes emerge within the data” (255). This is fitting with Foucault’s
assertion to let go of conventional categories, “disturb the tranquility” and look for the
relation between the different statements in a new way while analyzing discourse. By this
he means that we should forgo “first, the quest for a secret origin behind the discourse,
and second, the search to identify a deeper and hidden meaning behind the ‘already said’”
(25). This does not mean that we should forsake the old categories, but rather they should
be kept in suspension for some time. The point is that we should be able to identify the
rules of dispersion between different statements.

Coding and content analysis during preliminary fieldwork in the pre-proposal
phase framed my research project in unexpected ways. During the initial phase CCS’s
campaign for street hawkers was intriguing to me for its altruistic tones. Allured by the
‘civil society as panacea’ maxim, I set out to investigate the role of think tanks as agents
of civil society to help fight the battle of the deprived. Weeks passed as I followed their
advocacy work through meetings and conferences that they had arranged. I visited their
office where they happily offered me some of their publications and directed me to their
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website which had a copious supply of information. After conducting a visual content
analysis of their website and coding their various publications, a different theme surfaced.
Numerous articles on vastly different subjects such as hawking, forest conservation,
education, wildlife, had the same common theme in the concluding paragraphs-dissatisfaction with the state and showcase of “free market” was the panacea to all the
problems. Words such as competition, market, liberty, freedom and individual rights
came up several times. Also, the phrase civil society was always linked to individual
rights, free market, entrepreneurship, education, etc in such a way that it directed
attention to state inefficiencies and corruption.

Since discourse is socially produced and it is concerned with social modalities of
the text (Tonkiss 1998, Rose 2000), there is a special need to look at “strategies of
persuasion” while analyzing such texts. This takes us to the matters of the power of truth.
A researcher must pay attention to how certain ideas are made to look true. What is it that
is providing credibility? Tonkiss maintains that one way to find this answer is to pay
attention to variations in the text. Paying attention to difference in the accounts points to
the work that is done to weld things together so that they appear smooth (see case study
B).

This aspect of discourse analysis also gives flexibility to analyze the layout and
organization of the CCS website to see what and who (scholars) is included where and
what are the variations between different categories. Then with the help of network
analysis, one can determine the reason behind the organization of the website in such a
fashion (see case study A).
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According to Foucault, discursive formations are not coherent and hence it is
important to pay attention to “complexity and contradictions” (Rose 2001, 155). Potter
(1996) uses the term interpretative repertoire, for something like mini discourses which
have evolved over history and reside on the level of our “common sense”. With an
understanding of Gramsci’s idea of common sense and hegemonic discourse, I believe
that the persuasive hegemonic discourses are the ones that are able to penetrate our
common sense and make us believe in something that is mediated as natural and in tune
with our culture. Hence, the interpretative repertoires are local and specific in nature
where universal discourses get coated with regional understanding (I have discussed in
chapter 2 how the term civil society is more effective in dissemination neoliberal ideas in
India than the state and the discourse of free market itself). In a similar vein, Tonkiss
(1998) maintains that another crucial component of discourse analysis is attending to
silence. This involves paying attention to gaps and silences and letting our thoughts run
to the alternative accounts that have not been mentioned or are excluded from the text.

Network Analysis as a methodology to study Think Tanks
It is important to be mindful of networks, partnerships and alliances, both vertical
and horizontal, in the terrain of global hegemonic politics. In methodology, network
analysis is a subset of discourse analysis that examines the relational embeddedness of
the speakers. A network can be thought of as consisting of nodes, which are subject
positions linked to each other through ties such as ideology, vision or funds. People can
occupy many subject positions in different networks and their different subject positions
can help them enhance the capacity of all their networks. For this reason, I use network
analysis, which includes assessment of material, social and intellectual connections of the
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key actors involved in the functioning of CCS. Fox (1993), using an integrative
approach26 to study state and civil society, provides an excellent framework to analyze
networks. Institutional access routes are “structurally selective filters in the state
apparatus that make some institutions especially vulnerable to the concerns of particular
societal actors” (39). The basic premise of this concept is that various non-state actors
can get access to different agencies by means such as funds, relationships, and
ideological associations. While keeping this in mind, it is easy to pay attention to the
political and social affiliations of CCS and the help they receive from those associations
to access different state departments and political organizations. Policy currents are the
coalitions between state and social actors, which become political and ideological bridges
that run between state and society. These are linked through institutional access routes.
The different political currents running through the state and society may also form
objective alliances with each other or individual agents to influence the state. This idea is
26

For Fox, it is insufficient to describe the state’s power in terms of one way capacity.
States action is a result of reciprocal interaction with society and therefore the unit of
analysis of the state needs to be changed to “actors.” State organizations comprise a
range of actors with different interests. These state actors form relationships with other
actors in order to pursue their goals: “Mobilizations provoke counter mobilizations
among both state and social, and the way these processes unfold are not predetermined by
a static initial distribution of power resources” (23). State’s actors are motivated by
varying combinations of goals, for example national interest, rent-seeking, subaltern
interests. Similarly, for Fox, civil society is not a residual category outside state. Social
actors influence state in two ways, first they pressure the state for reforms, and second
their response to the reforms determines the success of the reforms. Collective actions by
a social group demands two things: “the perception of shared interests or identity
(represented by class, race, community, gender etc) and the opportunity to act as a
group.” Collective action does not necessarily mean mass defiance but passive resistance
and hidden nonconformity also forms a part of collective action (25). When social action
regularly interacts with the state, whether through defiance or negotiations, they are
necessarily affected by such interactions. The identities might not change, but the
negotiations may change them as actors. Social actors are shaped by 1) institutional
structure of state 2) regime governing electoral politics 3) electoral politics 4) diffuse foot
dragging 5) mass direct action 6) armed struggle 7) representative leader
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particularly useful to understand hegemonic politics discussed in chapter two. According
to Fox, different policy currents in the objective alliance may be each other’s enemy but
since they may gain from each other’s victory, they join hands. Both institutional access
routes and policy currents can be local as well as global in nature and hence international
strategies need special attention when studying a policy change. According to Garth and
Dezalay (2002) the concept of “international strategies” requires us to study the
relationship between global influences and state transformations. It refers to the ways in
which “national actors seek to use foreign capital, such as resources, degrees, contacts,
legitimacy, and expertise …to build their power at home” (7). The authors maintain that
national actors build their influences based on competing forms and technologies, which
are available to them through international capital. This happened in Chile when the
Pinochet regime came to power with the help of the Chicago boys and also later when
they were discredited based on international human rights laws. International strategies
are more often learned strategies. Learned practitioners include not just academic
scholars but also lawyers, consultants, economists and public administrators. Since
“learned practitioners play a major role in international transformations”, think tanks and
independent research institutes need to be part of any analysis of state transformations.
While analyzing international strategies, one should be wary of the risk of
decontextualizing international strategies and not paying attention to the “national field of
power in which they are embedded” (8).

In order to conduct discourse analysis of networks I find the method of relational
biography, like the one used by Dezalay and Garth (2002) very helpful. This method
involves lengthy personal interviews. For my project it assists in conducting network
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analysis, which includes assessment of the material and intellectual connections of the
key actors involved in the functioning of CCS. Network analysis helps in identifying the
AIM complexes, the import and export of ideas as well as funds at various scales.
According to Dezaly and Garth, “this method helps to overcome the artificial
segmentation that prevents an understanding of relationships and influences that cut
across categories and institutions” ( 9). In an attempt to bypass the conspicuous unities,
this methodology assists in identifying the regularity within systems of dispersion.
Dezaly and Garth maintain that biographies link categories that have been constructed, in
part, to hide connections. Using this method it is easy to ascertain how various agents
mutually reinforce each other’s legitimacy.

Interviewing elites such as scholars, however, involves certain difficulties of
gaining access and attaining information about the personal lives of the subjects. England
(2002) maintains that as a researcher she has to practice ‘shameless eclecticism’ or
‘methodological opportunism’ to penetrate this usually inaccessible circle of elites. Some
scholars working with elites have found that although elite institutes are inaccessible and
elites are too often elusive, there is usually a large amount of data with which to verify
statements and triangulate findings (Herod 1999, Cochrane 1998). CCS has a very
explicit website with publications and biographies of the elite contributors that I used
frequently.

Center for Civil Society: Analysis
Neo-liberal think tanks form the organizational backbone of the new right or
radical neoliberal movement. Scholars have tracked and accounted for the spread of these
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neoliberal ideas through the networks of right wing think tanks and associations such as
the Mont Pelerin Society and the Economics Department at the University of Chicago
(Bourdie and Wacquant 1999, Cockett 1995). The Center for Civil Society is perhaps one
of the first few advocacy think tanks in India that openly admits to free market ideologies
and actively pursues liberal policy changes. But, unlike other liberal think tanks around
the world, CCS takes a slightly different approach- it first champions for the poor and
marginalized and then moves on to discuss market-based solutions. During an interview,
Parth Shah said that this approach highlights “the human face of liberalism” (2010).
While blaming the State for the hardships faced by the poor, CCS does not shy away
from taking a pro-rich approach. In their publication Law Liberty and Livelihood, Shah
and Mandava (2005) maintain that “the reason for the plight of the poor is often depicted
as exploitation by the rich or callous… (this) is more of a mythology or folklore” (19).
Dr Parth Shah, a US trained economist, set up CCS in 1996. One of his associates
recounted a rather quixotic tale of the circumstances that made Shah move to India to set
up the think tank. Sometime in 1995 or 6, Shah met with a serious accident. At that time
he promised himself that if he survived the injuries, he would quit his job and go back to
India to do something for the betterment of his country.
Shah writes:
[I]nitially, I wanted to start a think tank soon after I completed my PhD at
Auburn University. I visited India in the late 1980s and met a large number of people,
but the level of support was lukewarm. I realized that I needed to learn the roots of
the think tank trade and, more importantly, save enough money to support my
personal expenses for at least three years. While studying economics at Auburn
University, I learned a great deal, first hand, by working at the Mises Institute on the
campus. Later, while teaching at the University of Michigan-Dearborn, I was
fortunate enough to be able to attend several excellent workshops hosted by the Atlas
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Economic Research Foundation and I was inspired by Leonard Liggio28 and Alex
Chafuen. I was encouraged by the network of like-minded people across the world
and by the work of institutes such as the Cato institute (Washington DC)29, the
Institute for Human Studies (Arlington, Virginia), the Foundation for Economic
Education (Irvington-on-Hudson, New York), the Heritage foundation (Washington
DC) and the Mackinac Center for Public Policy (Midland, Michigan). The key person
who got me to buy my one-way ticket to India, however, was David Kennedy of the
Earhart Foundation when he promised to support my institute during its initial years
(Shah 2008).
In this conversation, Shah names numerous famous individuals who propagate
neoliberal and free market idea. Shah’s academic and personal connections therefore
were important for the CCS to start working as a think tank. Not only has Shah taken
advantage of the international strategies to get support and recognition, over the last
decade Shah has also been able to identify institutional access routes in various state and
central departments, and political organizations.

Organization of CCS website: Case Study A
The political economy of ideas and think tanks are as important as the ideological
hegemony of which they are a part. This section pays attention to the political economy
of the think tank by conducting both network and discourse analysis. Think tanks are a
useful application for network analysis, as they usually provide lists of their personnel
and records about their financial contributors, author attributions, etc. on their websites.
An important first step in web-based think tank analysis is to track down institutional and
financial affiliations. More than 75 percent of the funding for CCS comes from
27

Atlas Economic Research foundation is a US based nonprofit organization that
supports and strengthens about 400 free market think tanks around the globe.
28
Leonard Liggio is a classical liberal scholar, professor of law at George Mason
University and is also the vise- president of Atlas Economic Research Foundation. Atlas
Economic Research Foundation is a non-profit that has connected a global network of
400 free market research organizations around the world.
29
Ceto institute is a free market think-tank based out of Washington DC.
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international donors, the names of whom are not mentioned in the audit records,
unfortunately.
In the United States, many NGOs and think tanks trace their funding back to the
Ford Foundation. Historically, funders like the Ford Foundation have been known to be
called upon by the CIA to wage cold war on cultural fronts in many countries. Anti-left
intellectuals were specifically recruited to dispel the communist threat. In India, Nehru
solicited the support of the Ford Foundation to co-opt communist led agrarian struggle
through community development projects. Since the mid1980s in India, the international
funding for NGOs has increased 20 times and since then the registered NGOs have also
increased by 250 percent (Biswas 2006).
Think tanks are often funded by grants from larger institutes that form a part of
corporate philanthropy. It is no surprise that these institutions adhere to a model of
development influenced by the west and dream of a western kind of utopia by imposing
rational solutions. Part of the funding for CCS can be traced back to two such
philanthropic institutions --Sir Ratan Tata Trust (SRTT) and Sir Dorabji Tata trust
(SDTT), both associated with the key industrial groups in India. SRTT was set up in 1919
to help usher India into the industrial revolution that Europe had already witnessed.
Affiliations that cross institutional lines can often be discerned by looking at the
overlap of personnel. One can seek answers to questions such as: are many of the
researchers affiliated with a particular university; are some of them former World Bank
employees; or did they all go to the same business school? These are ways to attain
important information about the intellectual and financial affiliation of the think tanks. If
a statement or a publication on the website has a name of the author, it is easy find
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something about the speaker’s network position by looking at biographical sketches often
included on the think tank web sites. With the help of biographical sketch we can also
determine the institutional access routes of the members within different state
organizations and various international strategies that they employ.

Here I have used the method of discourse analysis and network analysis to
critically examine the divisions and the layout of the CCS website. For example, there are
separate sections for research and commentaries on CCS website. Why has this
separation been created? One of the first names that come up during the initial analysis of
the commentary section is Gurcharan Das, who is a famous writer, a venture capitalist,
and also consultant to industry as well as the government of India. A Harvard MBA
alumni, he served as CEO of Procter & Gamble, India, and took an early retirement to
become a full time writer. In his book India Unbound, Das claims that the period after
1991, or post liberalization era is the golden period in India’s 200 year history. This book
has made him a household name in India. Das is a well- connected personality in terms of
access to the media as well as the industry. But for CCS he is more of a symbolic than
social and scholarly capital. A closer look at his written contributions for the CCS
website shows that although he served in the board of directors at one time, he no longer
writes articles for the think tank specifically. But his articles that are written elsewhere
such as daily newspapers are picked up and posted on CCS’s website under the
commentary section. In order to gain legitimacy and readability, which is often linked
with sell-ability, think tanks can attach themselves with famous names such as Gurcharn
Das and gain access to the market.
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Arnoldi maintains that think-tanks often a face dilemma of how to conduct and
portray their research. On one hand their research should be rigorous to gain academic
legitimacy, and on the other it should be legible and understandable for the general
public. And so CCS has thus created two separate sections of commentary and research
to attract different readerships.

Public altercations: Case Study B
Weaver (1989) maintains that advocacy think tanks often “synthesize and put a
distinctive ‘spin’ on existing research rather than carrying out original research” (567).
CCS openly admits that it takes the research of other “experts” and uses it to support its
agenda. During a conversation Ram explained: “In our network, there are people who
work at the grass-root level on street vendors, they do exceptionally good work and they
are emotionally attached to these people. They do good research, articulate great ideas
and writing papers, so we do not need to do that. We can bring our expertise to their
work, our expertise is in implementation at the policy level” (2010).
But that does not mean that the adoption of others’ research is a straightforward
process. I have used a public controversy between the CCS and another researcher
concerned with the plight of street vendors to highlight the nature of CCS involvement in
the case of vendors and hawkers. Public arguments between competing producers of
discourse are often the most insightful entry points for analyzing hegemonic politics.

Tavleen Singh, a famous journalist and political reporter, wrote an article in a
weekly magazine India Today, disassociating herself from a preface that she had written
for a book published by CCS called Law, Liberty and Livelihood: Making a Living on the
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street. She maintained that she only wrote the preface of the book because “some months
ago a man who identified himself as Parth Shah, called me and pleaded with me to write
a preface for a book that he said his Centre was bringing out on street vendors and
rickshaw-pullers…He made it sound as if Madhu Kishwar, Manushi’s driving force was
associated with the book…”(2005). Madhu Kishwar is the founder of Manushi, a feminist
journal, the scope of which extends beyond social justice for women to include minorities
such as peasants, workers, slum dwellers, rickshaw pullers and hawkers. Based on her
commitment for the rights of street hawkers, Kishwar did experiments with an ideal
market in which she tried to designate fixed places to hawkers and vendors so that the
spaces looked aesthetically modern and well organized.
Singh further writes “Imagine my horror when Madhu rang me last week to tell
me that Parth J Shah had plagiarized huge chunks of research and documentation done by
Manushi and had not bothered to slip in the smallest acknowledgment” ( 2005 ). Singh
later berates CCS as a “phony center” and condemns “misguided international funding”
that awarded CCS’s publication with a prize. She said during their conversation Madhu
maintained that “Not one street vendor or rickshaw-puller or small shop owner would
endorse CCS’s claims to be the champion of their rights.” Here, Kishwar is basing her
claim for credibility on her personal relationship with the vendors in her empirical
research while denouncing CCS on the grounds that they do not have this personal
connection.

Shah sent in his response to the newspaper saying:
Urban livelihoods is one of the six areas of our focus, apart from Education,
Environment, Governance, Globalisation and Rule of Law. We appreciated Ms

94

Kishwar’s work among street hawkers and cycle rickshaw pullers in Delhi and began
to develop it further by more detailed case studies and surveys in other cities and
towns of India with the help of enthusiastic college students as research interns.
Economic freedom—the freedom to produce and trade—is one of the core principles
of CCS work. That is the message we want to bring to our current as well as the
future decision makers. They are our audience, not the actual street hawkers or shop
keepers. Street hawkers experience everyday the effects of the lack of economic
freedom—the brutality of the license-inspector raj. It is the decision makers and the
middle-class mindset that need to be challenged. Therefore our more than 35 student
seminars over last five years attended by over 2390 students from all over India
where speakers like P Chidambaram, Swaminathan Aiyar, Ashok Desai, Bibek
Debroy and many others have discussed these ideas. And the programs for IAS
officers, professors and teachers, and the CCS Policy Meet for MPs (Shah 2005).
Naveen Mandava wrote a larger CCS’s response to this article (appended at the
end of the dissertation) and took a completely different approach than Kishwar to
claiming credibility. Before refuting the allegations, he included a paragraph, which
highlighted rational markets and the idea of competition behind CCS' philosophy. First,
he uses vendors as a metaphor to discuss the intellectual competition between CCS and
Kishwar, noting that CCS has been more successful at selling ideas derived from
Kishwar’s research. Like an uncompetitive vendor accusing a successful vendor of
having shoddy goods, Kishwar is denouncing CCS as the desperate last resort of an
uncompetitive seller. Later in the article Mandava denounces Kishwar for having no
understanding of how markets work. Here, a technocratic understanding on the abstract
model of free market theory is taken as superior to an empirical knowledge of the
vendors themselves. The use of rational principles of modern science and knowledge of
the market can be identified as a strategy of persuasion.

While doing discourse analysis of this response, I have tried to pay attention to
the silence and gaps within the argument. I realize that one major gap in Mandava’s piece
is that the urban politics of space in which vendors are involved is not even mentioned.
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Even Kishwar espouses the principle of empowerment, liberty and free market, and fails
to realize that the problem of vendors is intricately related to the problem of a bourgeois
city that is increasingly becoming neoliberalized. Mandava does not mention the Resident
Welfare Associations and Trader Welfare Associations in his response and directs all the
attention to the corrupt state agents. The inherent contradiction between the unruliness of
vendors and the entrepreneurial neoliberal city is silenced in the mind of the readers. In
Shah’s response, the hawkers are not described as the target audience of CCS’s advocacy.
The middle class, elite politicians and bureaucrats are targeted as they are the ones who
will bring about change. In the latter half of this dissertation, I will demonstrate how such
sentiments are getting translated to NPSV and other policy recommendations that are
coming from CCS.

Conclusions
In this chapter, I explained the global and local political economy of which think
tanks form a part. While doing so, I have tried to bring light to the penetration of
neoliberalism on the level of ideas and opinions. Thank tanks are the backbone of
neoliberalism and form an important component of a neoliberal bourgeois civil society
that actively seeks consent for implementing neoliberal policies. Here, I set the stage for
the remaining chapters by describing different types, models and politics of think tanks.
The analysis of CCS provides the readers with a background of the organizations and will
help to contextualize their work and stance on street hawkers within the larger political
economy of ideas.

Copyright © Priyanka Jain 2013
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Chapter 4: Hawkers as Informals: Theoretical Reflections

Introduction
30

A street hawker is a person who sells goods ranging from clothes, to utensils, to
cooked food or vegetables and fruits in public space or the city streets. Most street
hawkers in India are informal: they do not have a legal permit to sell goods and thus work
illegally. Street vending is characterized by mobility and flexibility, and because of the
low cost of investment it is relatively easy to enter. According to Bhowmik (2010), 2.5%
of India’s urban population is involved in street hawking. Out of 10 million street
hawkers in India, commonly accepted estimates state that approximately 200,000250,000 work in the city of Delhi. Some studies suggest that this number could be as high
as 500,000 (Manushi Trust 2001). Perhaps this concentration in Delhi is so because Delhi
is the fastest growing city in the country. Between 1991 and 2001, Delhi’s population
increased by 47.02 % in comparison to Mumbai’s 20.03% (Kumar and Bhowmik 2010).
Of all these hawkers, only 10% have a formal permit or tehabazari to sell in the city and
the rest are informal.
Street vendors are a significant group of informal workers, often surrounded with
controversy, mostly because of their acute visibility in public space. The state’s
ambiguous response to hawkers oscillates between violence and protection, from taking
bribes, carrying out raids, or forcing evictions to tolerance, replacement, and

30

There are different kinds of street hawkers. There are hawkers that squat on the side of
the road and sell their goods to passersby. Then there are phere walla or reripatte walla,
the itinerant hawkers who roam around different neighborhoods in the city during various
hours of the day.

97

rehabilitation. Even though the number of hawkers and vendors are increasing rapidly
(Kumar and Bhowmik 2010), there is hardly any substantial research available on this
issue. Perhaps this is the reason why an anti-hawking policy such as NPSV and a think
tank that at its very core is anti-hawker and antagonistic to poor people is able to appeal
to the sensibility of those who wish to help hawkers. On May 1 2013, the Union Cabinet
of the Government of India passed NPSV as the Protection of Livelihood and Regulation
of Street Vending Bill and hence the analysis of NPSV and its supporter CCS becomes
even more of a pressing issue.
In this chapter, I create my own theoretical framework through which I
understand and analyze hawking specifically and informality in general. Then I outline
how my understanding of street hawking and street hawkers is different from the one
typically espoused by NGOs and think tanks. I later provide a historiography of the
Indian state’s response to street hawking since the time of the British and describe how it
has changed as the Indian nation state and its democratic institutions have matured.
Finally, I address questions regarding methodology and reflect on my own positionality
as a researcher. These epistemological discussions not only help me critically analyze
different policy measures and solutions to tackle problems of street vending that have
been proposed by CCS and other NGOs, they also enable me to form a substantial
critique of CCSs knowledge and methodology.

Informality
The term informal economy first surfaced in the work of Keith Hart (1973) to
describe self-employed street based entrepreneurs in Ghana; since then, according to
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Rakowaski (1994), the research on the informal economy (also called informal sector)
has diverged into four different paths. In the 1970s, the International Labor Organization
(ILO) - PREALC31 propagated the two sector dichotomy under a structuralist
framework. They view informality as an antithesis of modernity and as often associated
with the third world and a traditional economy. Informal activity is seen as a survival
strategy for the poor who have failed to enter the process of industrialization due to
structural factors such as excessive supply of labor, worker characterization, and rural to
urban migration (Cross 1998, AlSayyad 2004, Rakowaski 1994, Whitson 2007).
Research under this paradigm is no longer relevant in the face of growing informality in
spite great advancements in industrialization; even so, interpretations that link the
informal to the traditional or third world is still prevalent in the everyday jargon of the
NGOs that I interviewed.
Stepping away from the dualistic framework is the underground economy
approach comprised mainly of work by neo-marxists. While retaining the structuralist
approach, they consider informality as integral to the successful working of the capitalist
economy as it ensures a reserve army of labor (Castells and Portes 1989; Sassen-Koob
32

1987). Informal workers are in fact “disguised employees” that form a part of capitalist
exploitation. Both approaches differ but they still associate informality with poverty and
31

PREALC or “Programa Regional del Empleo para América Latina y el Caribe” is a
policy-oriented think tank of Latin America and Caribbean comprised mainly of
economists.
32
Focusing on “exposing class conflict, exploitation of labour, the spread of imperialism,
through worldwide economic restructuring”, neo-marxists maintain that “infomalization
is a mechanism to reverse the costly process of proletarianization, weaken the rights of
workers and unions, and disenfranchise a large sector of the working class- with the
acquiescence of the state in the interest of renewed economic growth” (Rakowaski 1994,
503- 4).
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view it as an expression of the uneven nature of capitalist development where informal
workers either survive or face the predetermined fate of super exploitation.
The third approach is a neoliberal-inclined legalist approach that views informal
workers as entrepreneurs and argues against state intervention. Developed by the
Peruvian economist Hernando De Soto (1989), here informality is believed to be the
cause of over-legalization and state regulation. He writes that the “informal economy is
the people’s spontaneous and creative response to the state’s incapacity to satisfy the
basic needs of the improvised masses” (Soto 1989, 14). Disagreeing with the neo-marxist
on the victim status of informal workers, the legalist celebrates their heroism. Although
more optimistic than the previous two approaches, the legalist approach further
propagates the dualism between the formal and informal, thereby overlooking how
informal workers are often disguised employees in the formal enterprise. The fourth
approach identified by Rakowaski is the micro enterprise development approach,
comprised mostly of NGOs. These are oriented towards action and do not necessarily
adhere to a specific conceptual ideology. However, they are typically neoliberal in
orientation and integrate the ILO approach of assisting informal workers in overcoming
barriers to growth.

33
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At first glance, CCS seems to fit the microenterprise approach, but from a closer look it
is apparent that it follows a strong legalist paradigm. Of course it is the legalist approach
that assists CCSs main agenda of retreat of state from every sector- not just from the
informal economy, but also from education, health, water, and electricity. The right of
hawkers to vend in public space is not the main concern of CCS. The subtle difference
between the last two approaches became apparent during my interview with other NGOs
and organizations working on behalf of hawkers. According to members of NASVI they
did not have a model to understand the problems faced by street vendors.
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My Theoretical Framework: Entangled Spaces of Informality
The above approaches tend to equate informality with poverty; attribute
informality and poverty to informals’ isolation from the global economy; and delegate the
condition of poverty to the poor themselves. However, the most significant flaw in all but
one of these approaches is that they actively uphold the dichotomy of formal and
informal in their conceptualizations. Scholars have maintained that the formal/informal
dichotomy overlooks complex social relations and strategies (Crichlow 1998, GarcíaRincón 2007, Morales 2001, Roy 2005). Although true, I believe the critique of this
dichotomy must go further. It has been long debated in social theory that boundaries and
categories such as self/other, white/black, west/non-west, core/periphery that appear
natural or neutral are in fact not pre-given (Adorno and Horkheimer 1991) but are
product of a hegemonic process that favors the former ( Foucault 1970, Laclau and
Mouffe 1985). It has also been widely recognized that constitutive power of latter or
other or outside is actively engaged in framing the former (Derrida 1974, Natter & Jones
1998). In that sense, formal and informal are not innocent categories but are actively
constructed, sustained and reworked as tools of domination. In addition, the informal
participates in the construction of the formal; the traces of the informal are always present
in the formal in order for it to function effectively. Based on these criticisms, recent
scholarly inquiries denounce this dualism. For example, Tom Angotti (2006) criticizes
Mike Davis’s (2006) ‘apocalyptic’ Planet of Slums as a kind of ‘urban orientalism’ for
fomenting simplistic dualisms that ignore the multiple connections between formal and
informal (Varley 2013). I believe that lack of this understanding encourages misguided
politics that aims to achieve utopian dreams. My research demonstrates that the most
direct implication of basing politics on this dichotomy is rather grave. Foremost on the
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agenda for NGOs and think tanks such as CCS regarding street hawkers is the aim to
formalize them. Ram asserted that “once the hawkers are formalized their problems will
naturally get resolved. (2010)” On the contrary, in the next two chapters I will discuss
why problems of hawkers can never be resolved by merely giving some of them a formal
status in a so called “hawking zone” or elsewhere. First, in this chapter, I will outline my
theoretical understanding of informality.
Roy (2005) suggests an alternative to bypass the above conceptual shortcomings:
instead of a sector, informality should be thought of as a mode of urbanization. Roy and
AlSayyad (2004) use the term urban informality to describe “a series of transactions that
connect different economies and spaces to one another…(and) indicate an organizing
logic, a system of norms that governs the process of urban transformation itself” (Roy
2005148). As a compatible alternative, Saskia Sassen (2005) proposes “a re-reading of
the city through representations of its post-colonial relationship to topography” (cited in
Varley 2012, 84). Here ‘topography’ refers to the “approaches that divide informal
settlements from the rest of the city” (Varley 2012, 5). Elsewhere scholars have begun to
establish how street vending can be understood as a space of power in which multiple
actors struggle to negotiate meaning and control through deployment of diverse forms of
power (Jimu 2005, Whileson 2007). It is safe to say that to a large extent, recent critical
inquiry on street vending has begun to understand informal activity as a spatial practice.
These developments exemplify the current geographic tradition influenced by Lefebvre’s
conception of space which has brought space to the forefront of any social political
theory (see Gregory 1994, Soja 1996). According to Lefebvre, each mode of production
has its own organizing logic and creates its own dominant unified space. Following
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Marx’s concept of abstract labor, Lefebvre calls this the abstract space, homogenized and
unified by dominant ideology that is prescribed and imposed at all times. This is the
space of the hegemonizer, and this dominant or abstract space also subsumes subordinate
forms of the use of space. However, just like hegemony is never complete, hegemonic
space is replete with uncertainties and contingencies. Lefebvre describes the dialectical
production of space as a concrete universal just like the Hegelian universal state, which is
something that is a perceptible and abstract and yet contains particulars such as
representation, practices and forms that constitute the unity of the abstract. Owing to this
dialectical production one can say that the space is socially produced and at the same
time produces the social, i.e. space and society are mutually constituted. Both reformulate
and reproduce, mediate and transform the other. Low (2000) further divides social
production of space into two processes. By social production she means production of
material settings through social, economic, ideological and technological factors that
include historical emergence and the political/economic formation of urban space. Social
construction denotes actual spatial transformation through “phenomenological and
symbolic experience of space as mediated by social processes such as exchange, conflict
and control...where people’s social exchanges, memories, images, and daily uses of
material setting” convey meanings (128). This insightful division assists in paying
attention to a variety of social processes while analyzing space. In this regard, I believe
that informal activity is an organic part of the production of urban space and in turn is
framed by it.
So what exactly does the urban space of the informals look like? Informality
understood as a space where there is constant struggle over meanings, opens a possibility

103

to recognize multiple actors performing on that site. This urges us not to treat hawkers as
a uniform and homogenous category. Informality understood as a mode of urbanization
entails that even if these sites appear disjunctured, they are connected spaces and form a
continuum that drives urbanization. With this in mind, we can avoid the tendency to view
hawkers as subjects framed only through their economic practice of hawking on the
streets. That misleading practice inflicts not just the core understandings of various
NGOs and think tanks but is also rife among academicians who tend to study hawkers as
fixed economic subjects within the boundaries of market place or public space. Their
focus is narrow and only concentrates on hawkers’ interaction with the state or
customers. I propose to view street hawkers as diverse subjects who are framed by what I
call entangled spaces of informality where they continuously interact with multiple actors
in multiple spaces. Within these entwined spaces, in one space they may clash with one
actor and form strategic alliance with the other while in the same space at a different time
or different space at the same time they may reverse their relationship. Also, one needs to
understand that different spaces in the city are connected. As Roy (2011) maintains,
informality “connects the seemingly separated geographies of slum and suburb” (233).
The theory of entangled spaces of informality has implications on the
understandings of current political struggles and how these struggles are staged or ought
to be staged. Based on these understandings my work makes contributions on two core
areas. First, this new way to study informals brings forth the complexities of everyday
lives of hawkers, which is often ignored by the researchers who study them. Here I view
hawkers as diverse subjects of a larger political economy. The focus is not restricted to
their interaction with inefficient government and its corrupt enforcement agents but also
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includes their interactions with a benevolent state that they often call for and in some
ways desire. I conceive the space where they operate as much larger than the market
place or spaces of utility. This space includes Indian streets or “spaces of common”
which are a part of indigenous public space, private spaces of their homes in slums, as
well as those of the rural hinterland from where most hawkers come. I contend that a
study of hawkers will always be incomplete unless it pays attention to the entangled
spaces of informality.
Once this is done, it is easy to visualize the everyday life of a hawker who
navigates the multiple and connected spaces of informality. Imagine a hawker who sells
her goods illegally on the street and returns home to an illegally constructed slum. In
order to survive everyday in both spaces, she fights to ward off state enforcement
officials through multiple tactics. In the last two decades, we have seen how free-market
NGOs and think tanks like CCS attempt to represent hawkers. They attempt to make the
hawkers conscious of their rights to hawk on public space and stand up against the state
and its corrupt enforcement agents. In response, hawkers have started organizing and
demanding a kind of formalization from the state in the form of property rights in spaces
of home and work. However, the hawker described above who uses illegally obtained
water and electricity to cook food may have different aspirations; she would prefer the
state to ignore these resource overflows and not penetrate and formalize these spaces of
leakages. Indeed, I’ve learned when some kinds of formalization occur, namely
neoliberal changes and resultant privatization of basic amenities, slum dwellers are
particularly unhappy. During my interviews, a common complaint of hawkers was how it
was better for them when these amenities were state-owned. Private companies do not
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give any concessions and charge exorbitant prices for simple amenities like water and
electricity. Similarly, hawkers’ children go to government run schools and get free books,
stationary and a mid-day meal. In case of a medical emergency, a government hospital,
which also offers subsidized drugs to the poor, is the best place to go. Hence, despite
their complaints about inefficiencies and corruption of the state that inflects the hawking
spaces, hawkers still desire a benevolent state that they believe functions as a provider.
Here, we suddenly see a reversal in the relationship between hawkers and the
organizations that claim to have their interests in mind. Free market think tanks such as
CCS would find themselves standing against hawkers who say no to privatization.
Similarly, a hawker experiences the politics of the middle class not just when he practices
hawking, but also when his shack is demolished by bulldozers. At the same time, very
often it is the middle class which calls upon the services of hawkers. Hence, taking into
account these entangled spaces of informality, new questions arise about relationship
between hawkers, the state, wealthy citizens and NGOs that represent hawkers.
It is important to let different fields of informality speak to one another in political
space in order to quell deceptive political struggle and claims of illusionary victories.
This is the area of my second focus in which I create a dialogue between these spaces. I
dismantle one by one the claims of CCS and other such organizations that have come to
the forefront of the political struggle of hawkers and wish to represent them in their fight
against the state. For this I will analyze NPSV and other publications of CCS in chapter
5, 6 and 7. In the next few sections I will tease out the complex relationships between
hawkers and other interest groups that they encounter every day.
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An Overview : Street Hawkers In India
Hawkers are often considered contested figures in urban modernity (Rajagoplal
2001). They appear as the ones who defy the desired spatial and visual order of the city
and hence are portrayed as out-of-place and dirty (Appadurai 2003, Andri Yatmo 2008,
Popke & Ballard 2004). However, time and again scholars have asserted the importance
of hawkers by showing how diversity on the streets and in public space brings liveliness
to the city. Jane Jacobs in her famous study of Greenwich, New York in the 1960s
showed how the very people who appear disruptive on the streets such as vendors, old
people and children were in reality important in maintaining the safety and vibrancy of
the neighborhood. Since then New York has gone through a series of “revitalization”
projects under the reign of Mayor Roudolph Gulliani (1993 to 2001) whose zero
tolerance maxim for dealing with any sort of disorder has turned the city into a purified
neoliberal nightmare for unlicensed peddlers and homeless people. Scholars have shown
how these New York style neoliberal urban polices travel around the globe and wreak
devastations of much greater magnitude in countries with already existing deep
inequalities (Smith 2001, Swanson 2007, Wacquant 2003). Local governments fuse these
neoliberal polices containing modernist undertones with regional prejudices and
provincial discriminatory discourse to sanctify public space for unfettered capitalist
consumption. For example, scholars have shown that urban revival actively engages with
racial discourses such as mestizasation and the project of blanqueamiento or whitening in
countries such as Ecuador to drive out street hawkers from popular urban spots (Swanson
2007). In South Africa, the repression of street vendors has been saturated with the
apartheid sentiment that constructs black immigrants as ‘temporary sojourners’ in white
dominated cities (Beavon & Rogerson 1986). Various scholars have documented
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Operation Sunshine as an Indian version of the revanchist city endeavor (Roy 2004,
Bandyopadhyay 2009). This drive to clean the streets of Kolkota of dirty street hawkers
happened on the eve of the visit of Britain’s Prime Minister John Major, when the
communist state government started making efforts to make the city more investor
friendly. In total, they removed about 100,000 hawkers from the streets. A few weeks
after Major’s visit, a bill was passed by the West Bengal Legislative assembly to make
hawking a “cognizable and nonbailable offence” (Rajagopal 2001).
Authorities often reclaim public space by relocating hawkers from the city center
to mall-like complexes where they are meant to cater to tourists rather than local
customers (Morales 2000; Lewinson 1998). In some cases, hawkers simply choose to
return to their old location (Cross 1998; Hansen 2004; Stamm 2005). A considerable
amount of attention has been given to how these relocation projects have been a part of
overall scheme of tourism promotion (Bromley 2000, Middleton, 2003, Cutsinger, 2000),
although some scholars have also explored how street vendors contribute to tourism by
attracting tourists (McGee and Yeung 1977) and are sometimes used by the authorities to
revive destroyed city centers (Karides 2001). While most studies have investigated the
politics behind displacements in terms of gentrification and tourism, a few have also
investigated the implications of such displacement, such as reduced sales and income
(Donovan 2008, Bromley & Mackie 2009).
From the above discussions it is apparent that there has been a considerable
amount of attention given to the rise of the anti-hawking policies, the state’s response,
and how the policies get translated on the streets. However, there have been few
discussions on how the hawkers respond, resist and sustain in a neoliberal milieu, that is,
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the coalition of neoliberal state, neoliberal government and neoliberal citizenry. This gap
in the research is consistent with the trend that the economic activities of informality get
more academic attention than its political and cultural activities (Stillerman 2006,
Whiteson 2007). Through life biographies and ethnographies, my study on hawkers
contributes to the work that is emerging to fill these gaps. Most importantly, hardly any
study pays attention to how hawkers are divided and then reorganized and mobilized to
form a part of global hegemonic discourses of neoliberalism that in turn shape “antihawking laws,” this time with their consent. While filling that gap, my work investigates
the role of the third sector in the politics of hawking.
There have been some insightful works that attempt to define the politics of
informals. According to Scott (1987), mundane survival strategies of poor workers such
as foot-dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, slander, arson, and sabotage are acts of
resistance that do not necessarily frame poor people as victims. Bayat (2000), however,
finds several reasons to differ with Scott’s assessment. First, these acts of resistance by
poor workers such as hawkers are engaged in not simply to survive, but also to move
forward. Second, these acts are not just defensive but also “surreptitiously offensive.”
These kinds of actions differ from both old and new forms of social movements and are
best described by Bayat as the “quiet encroachments of the ordinary…marked by quiet,
atomized and prolonged mobilization with episodic collective actions – an open and
fleeting struggle without clear leadership, ideology or structured organization, one which
makes significant gains for the actors, eventually placing them as counterpoint vis-à-vis
the state” (533). Unlike Gramsci’s passive resistance, these activities are not carried out
with a political intent, rather, they are acts of necessity to survive and live a dignified life.
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Even so, these quiet acts of resistance do end up shifting the realms of the politics at
some point. I extend this line of thought to the politics of hawkers in Delhi. At this point,
I would not call what is happening in the urban areas simply acts of resistance to survive.
Indeed it is so for majority of hawkers, but the politics of hawkers over all has taken on a
new visibility with their growing association with various NGOs and think tanks like
CCS. Hawkers are forming a variety of alliances with other actors to make demands on
the state. These alliances give them visibility and more power to negotiate. But the same
is true for the other actors such as CCS, which is also demanding specific things and
make certain claims while pursuing the politics of hawkers. Even if these agendas
correspond to the hawkers immediate demands, they may have a completely inimical
aftermath. In sum, several spatial contradictions are hidden at the site of convergence of
these similar but multiple agendas. Such internal dynamics of the politics of hawkers
where multiple actors converge to make claims have not yet been investigated in any of
the studies of hawkers. My work attempts to analyze this area where hawkers operate as
political subjects who form multiple alliances in a neoliberal city in order to get by every
day.
India: Historiography of the State’s Response to Hawking, 1860s- 1980s
The British government in its Asian and African colonies considered street
hawkers as remnants of antiquity, noisy, obstructive, and dirty (Anjoria 2012, McGee
1973, Robertson 1997), who were also “Low Caste and Born Thieves” (Vahed 1999).
The Indian state’s punitive action toward street hawkers until the late 1980s was guided
by numerous sections of colonial Indian Penal Code, 1862 (IPC) and the Indian Police
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Act of 1861 that sought to criminalize vendors for posing obstructions in public space
and roads and also acting as hazards to people in a “public way or public line of
navigation.”
Box 4. 1 : Sections of Indian Penal Code that work against Street Hawkers
Section 283 of IPC called “danger or obstruction in public way or public line of
navigation” states that “whoever, by doing an act or by omitting to take order with any
property in his possession or under his charge, causes danger, obstruction or injury to any
person in any public way or public line of navigation, shall be punished with fine which
may extend to two hundred rupees.”
Section 431 of IPC called “mischief by injury to public road, bridge, river or
channel” states that “whoever commits mischief by doing any act which renders or which
he knows to be likely to render any public road, bridge, navigable river or navigable
channel, natural or artificial, impassable or less safe for travelling or conveying property,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to five years, or with fine, or with both.”

Box 4.2 : Section of Indian Police Act that work against Street Hawkers.
No Person shall cause obstruction in any street or public space by
- Allowing animals or vehicle.
- leaving any vehicle standing or fastening any cattle in the street or in the public
place.
- Using any part of a street or public place as a halting place for vehicles or cattle.
-Leaving any box, bale package or other things whatsoever upon a street for an
unreasonable length of time or contrary to any regulation.
- By exposing to anything for sale or setting out anything for sale in or upon any
stall, booth, board, cask, and basket or in any other way, whatsoever.”
What was the reason behind the colonial government’s stern approach regarding
streets? For this, it is important to situate the IPC within the wider historiographies of the
British Empire in relation to control of space and colonial territory in the 19th century. I
argue that the British colonial government had two reasons to have such a stern stance for
34

Although, post-independence, some of the states like Delhi, Maharashta, and Kerala
have enacted their own police act, these are heavily modeled on the Indian Police Act of
1861.
http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/programs/aj/police/papers/advocacy_paper_police_
act_1861.pdf
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any kind of street obstruction. First, as Das and Verma (1998) maintain, the Indian police
system developed by the British was meant more for the maintenance of order than
prevention and detection of crime and in this way it served the “commercial interests of
an expanding capitalism in search of new markets and resources” (Brogden, 1987 quoted
35

in Das and Verma 1998, 357). Second, unlike Europe that had Foucault’s elegant
sovereignty-discipline-government triangle, the Indian colonial state did not develop visà-vis a civil society, and thus did not have the structure to mobilize the capillary forms of
power (Prakash 1999). For this reason, the colonial Indian police served more as coercive
agents that disciplined society than did their British counterparts in London, who were
primarily involved in prevention and detection of actual crime. Of course, the IPC and
Police Act cannot be separated and were intricately linked to the British modernist vision
and desire to beautify the colonial cities, especially imperial capital of Delhi (Hosagrahar
2005 Irvin 1981). After independence, the Indian national government legitimized itself
through the project of democracy that was emphasized to be a more fitting way to
represent Indian citizens than the colonial model of dominance without hegemony
outlined by Ranjit Guha (1998). But as scholars have noted, there was hardly a dramatic
rupture that marked the beginning of decolonization at that time and definitely
colonialism did not have a settled ending in 1947. In fact, even though at the time of
independence it is easy to identify a sharp political discontinuity between colonial and
nationalist India, economic and social continuities can be traced to a much later time
(Legg 2006). One example of these continuities is the colonial spatial laws of the IPC and
35

In comparison, the Metropolitan London police model emphasized crime prevention,
working in cooperation with locals by winning their trust. The police tried to integrate
themselves into the neighborhoods and advocated restraint on the use of force (Das and
Verma 1998).
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Police Act that were seamlessly inherited by the Indian government. These laws
continued to criminalize marginalized citizens such as street hawkers for inciting
disorder.
Most Municipal Corporation laws pertaining specifically to street hawkers, slum
dwellers and unskilled migrant workers were identical to the Bombay Municipal
Corporation Act (BMC) of 1882 that drew heavily on laws passed in England. The Delhi
Municipal Corporation Act of 1957, which in turn was identical to the BMC required
hawkers to obtain licenses to practice hawking (Bhowmik 2010). The Municipal
Corporation issued hawking licenses and expected only those with licenses to be on the
streets. Of course the number of licenses, also called tehbazari, that were given covered a
fraction of hawkers. Manushi notes that MCD claims that currently there are 300,000500,000 hawkers in Delhi. Of these, less than 3,000 have licenses. So nearly 99 percent
of existing hawkers “are treated as legal offenders and face daily punishments,
harassment and penalties. (Kishwar)” 36
There are several other problems with the Municipal Corporation’s dealings with
the hawkers and its tehabazari system. First and foremost, instead of a democratically
elected councillor, an undemocratically appointed Municipal Commissioner has the
authority to issue licenses or dismantle and destroy any hawking stalls. I spoke with a
female street vendor near Sufdar Jung hospital in Delhi who claimed to have been evicted
more than 30 times in the last 9 years by municipal authorities. Besides MCD flaws,
section 34 of the Police Act of 1951 (see box 4.2), gives the local police the right to
remove and arrest even licensed hawkers for causing obstructions. The system of

36

http://www.manushi.in/articles.php?articleId=720&ptype=campaigns
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tehabazari is so complicated that it is difficult for vendors themselves to understand. In
addition, the law deals only with existing vendors and makes no provisions for new and
aspiring vendors. Because of the inconsistencies between different laws and the limited
number of licenses despite the growing numbers of hawkers, hawking has become a site
of conflict and corruption in post-independent urban India. In Delhi alone state agents
take bribes from hawkers that are as high as Rs 600 crore

37

annually (Bhowmik 2010).

The judiciary in post-liberalization India has successfully added itself as another
layer to sovereign rule over street hawkers and slum dwellers. Besides the MCD and
Police, now Supreme courts and regional High courts are acting on behalf of middle class
citizens, and instituting nuisance laws to deal with hawkers and slum dwellers. Nuisance
literally means something that causes annoyance to other people. In Indian common law,
nuisance can be public or private and creating a nuisance is a criminal offense. The first
time slum-related nuisance was invoked in the courts was in 1980 in Ratlam Municipal
Council vs Vardichan, which blamed the municipality for stagnant and putrid water
originating from the slums. This was also the first time a nuisance law was used for an
environmental issue (Sengar 2007). Since then, and lately with the rise of middle class
environmentalism, nuisance laws have been used with ferocity to deal with slums,
hawkers (especially food hawkers), and poor people in general. I will explain how the
nuisance laws have been mutated and used to remove poor people from urban space in
the next section, but here let me highlight the section in the legal system that details the
nuisance laws.
Box 4.3: Section 133 in The Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973
37

Six hundred crores Indian Rupee is approximately one hundred million US dollars
according to current (July 2013) Rupee-US dollar conversation rate.
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(1) Whenever a District Magistrate or a Sub- divisional Magistrate or any other
Executive Magistrate specially empowered in this of behalf by the State Government, on
receiving the report of a police officer or other information and on taking such evidence
(if any) as he thinks fit, considers(a) that any unlawful obstruction or nuisance should be removed from any public
place or from any way, river or channel which is or may be lawfully used by the public;
or
(b) that the conduct of any trade or occupation, or the keeping of any goods or
merchandise, is injurious to the health or physical comfort of the community, and that in
consequence such trade or occupation should be prohibited or regulated or such goods or
merchandise should be removed or the keeping thereof regulated; or
(c) that the construction of any building, or, the disposal of any substance, as is
likely to occasion configuration or explosion, should be prevented or stopped; or
(d) that any building, tent or structure, or any tree is in such a condition that it is
likely to fall and thereby cause injury to persons living or carrying on business in the
neighborhood or passing by, and that in consequence the removal, repair or support of
such building, tent or structure, or the removal or support of such tree, is necessary; or
(e) that any tank, well or excavation adjacent to any such way or public place
should be fenced in such manner as to prevent danger arising to the public; or
(f) that any dangerous animal should be destroyed, confined or otherwise disposed
of, such Magistrate may make a conditional order requiring the person causing such
obstruction or nuisance, or carrying on such trade or occupation, or keeping any such
goods or merchandise, or owning, possessing or controlling such building, tent, structure,
substance, tank, well or excavation, or owning or possessing such animal or tree, within a
time to be fixed in the order(i) to remove such obstruction or nuisance; or
(ii) to desist from carrying on, or to remove or regulate in such manner as may be
directed, such trade or occupation, or to remove such goods or merchandise, or to
regulate the keeping thereof in such manner as may be directed; or
(iii) to prevent or stop the construction of such building, or to alter the disposal of
such substance; or
(iv) to remove, repair or support such building, tent or structure, or to remove or
support such trees; or
(v) to fence such tank, well or excavation; or
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(vi) to destroy, confine or dispose of such dangerous animal in the manner
provided in the said order; or, if he objects so to do, to appear before himself or some
other Executive Magistrate subordinate to him at a time and place to be fixed by the
Order, and show cause, in the manner hereinafter provided, why the order should not be
made absolute.

India: Historiography of Hawkers’ and NGOs Response, 1980’s onwards
The general understanding towards hawkers changed in the late 1980s after a
Supreme Court ruling:
If properly regulated according to the exigency of the circumstances, the small
traders on the sidewalks can considerably add to the comfort and convenience of the
general public, by making available ordinary articles of everyday use for a
comparatively lesser price. An ordinary person, not very affluent, while hurrying
towards his home after a day’s work can pick up these articles without going out of
his way to find a regular market. The right to carry on trade of business mentioned in
Article 19(1)(g)of the Constitution, on street pavements, if properly regulated cannot
be denied on the ground that the streets are meant exclusively for passing or repassing and for no other use. Proper regulation is, however, a necessary condition as
otherwise the very object of laying out roads – to facilitate traffic – may be defeated
(Sodhan Singh vs NDMC, 1989).

Although this landmark ruling changed little on the ground as hawkers continued
to be harassed and evicted, it depicted a subtle and gradual change in political postcolonial India that can be associated with the development of a mature third world nation38

state outside its western breeding grounds. It is important here to explain the political
environment that has produced this change. According to Nandy (1989), lately the Indian
elite and middle class have grown impatient with the politics and democratic process
38

Nandy notes the growth of the nation state over three hundred years in the west, since
the treaty of Westphalia, particularly since the British and French established their global
hegemony and Bismark created the nation state in Germany( 1989, 4). But according to
Chatterjee (2004), the chronological sequence of modern state in India has been short and
rapid as the governmental technologies that accompany nation-states were applied by the
colonial government long before the formation of the Indian nation-state.
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“because these sections have gone too far in empowering the irrational and atavistic
elements in the society”(11). This dissatisfaction has been concurrent with the growing
reliance of the poor on democratic institutions and electoral politics. Chatterjee (2004)
expands this to include the rise of the debate on the rights to entitlement that shape the
politics of informals. In a larger discussion, he explains that civil society, a product of
modernity, is essentially a bourgeois society “characterized by modern associational life
originating from the western society that is based on equality, autonomy, freedom of
entry and exit, contract, deliberative procedures of decision-making, recognizance rights
and duties of members, and such other principles” (Chatterjee 2003, 135). Political
society, on the other hand, is a product of democracy and encompasses the populations
that have been left out of civil society. Chatterjee identifies this political field as the
swath where governmental technologies work. To describe this he makes two different
routes of connections of both civil society and political society to the state-- “one is the
line connecting civil society to the nation-state founded on popular sovereignty and
granting equal rights to citizens. The other is the line connecting populations to the
governmental agencies pursuing multiple policies of security and welfare” (2004, 39).
For many of the groups in political society, including street hawkers, the everyday
reality of life involves violation of legality, and it is here that Chatterjee’s work provides
a breakthrough analysis. Why do state authorities let these acts go by? One explanation
provided by CCS is that the state actors are corrupt and hence they ignore such
transgressions for personal profit. But I believe that Chatterjee would explain that the
fundamental reason why corruption practices are organized and rampant is that the state
authorities “deal with these associations not as bodies of citizens …(as) their activities
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are often illegal and contrary to good behavior…but as convenient instrument for the
administration of welfare”(49). This is a response to the “marginal groups and
underprivileged population… (who) make a claim to a habitation and a livelihood as a
matter of right”(49). The dilemma for state authorities is how to reconcile the fact that the
marginalized groups need help because the welfare programs of the state have not
reached them, and the awareness that this problem persists, and if tolerated every time,
can invite further “violation of public property and civic laws”(40). This result in a series
of negotiations between the marginalized and the state agents on an uncertain political
terrain. Corruption and evictions are only one aspect of the full story. The other aspect is
represented by authorities letting hawkers into otherwise restricted and enclosed spaces.
Benjamin (2004) describes this phenomena as ‘porous bureaucracy’, a space that has
been created beyond the formal realms of planning to accommodate the demands of poor.
Public interest litigations such as Sodhan Singh to the Supreme Court-- in which the
hawker claimed that his fundamental rights, and specifically his right to carry on business
or trade according to article 19(1) (g), are violated by state authorities each time he is
evicted from urban space--reify this everyday politics of political society on the national
39

stage. As Chatterjee maintains “the field of citizenship, at certain points, overlaps with
that of governmentality” and hence we can say that this insertion, of course, takes
advantage of the tactical fact that the marginalized now have voting rights and assert their
rights of citizenship to demand rights to livelihood. The decades-long confrontation after
these game changing rulings, according to Bandyopadhyay (2012), has resulted in setting

39

For more information on various court cases concerning politics of hawking in urban
space read Sundaram, S (2008), “National Policy for Urban Street Vendors and Its
Impact” Economic & Political Weekly, October 25, 2008.
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“the stage for the emergence of a uniform understanding of the categories of ‘urban’ and
‘street vendor’ at a national scale” that are different than the IPC categorization of street
hawkers.
Through the Advocacy Coalition Framework, Lintelo (2010) charts the creation
of a mass alliance of civil society organizations, mainly NGOs and think tanks that came
together in the late 1990s to develop NPSV. This coalition started coming together
through the initiative of the Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA). Having done
advocacy work for street hawkers as a part of the larger informal sector, SEWA took the
issue of street vendors to prominence after its president Ela Bhatt became an independent
member of Rajya Sabha, the upper house of Parliament of India. Bhatt recognized the
advantage of strategic alliances between different groups of planners and research
scholars to lead towards an effective policy for street vendors at the national level. This
led different groups and organizations such as scholars and planners to come together.
Some of these were Kolkata Hawkers Sangram Samit that was established in 1996 after
Operation Sunshine, Manushi headed by Madhu Kishwar that started work on street
hawkers in 1995, Vasant Kunj Rehri Vapyari Morcha, founded in 2001, and then CCS
that started working on the livelihood issues in 2001.

40

In 2002, various members of the

coalition helped to draft the National Policy of Street Vendors (NPSV) and the union
cabinet accepted this policy in 2004. The central government, which saw a change in
leadership after the initial discussion on the policy, asked the National Commission on
40

It is important to mention that Manushi is one of the few critics of the NPSV, but it
also follows the same neoliberal economic and spatial logic regarding vending that is
followed by many of the other NGOs and think tanks. Many social workers from
different NGOs who are a part of Hawker’s alliance, maintained that Manushi’s Madhu
Kishwar was only antagonistic towards NPSV because she was not invited or involved in
the creation of NPSV.
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Enterprise in the Unorganized Sector (NCEUS) to create a revised draft of 2004 version
and in 2009, after several years of debate, NCEUS came up with a second draft of NPSV
which was almost identical to the earlier draft.

41

Lintelo explains that the reasons behind

the emergence of the NGO alliance were that the urban informal sector had been rapidly
growing in recent decades and due to economic reforms there was an increase in the
state’s repression that needed to be counteracted. However, as I have explained in the
previous chapters, this growing role of NGOs and think tanks is in fact an indicator of the
growing presence of multilateral organizations that initiated the economic reforms in the
first place. As mentioned in previous chapters, many of the NGOs that have arisen in
recent times can be identified as organic intellectuals of neoliberalism and are the key for
the smooth expansion of the neoliberal working order. Because of this fact, the National
Policy of Street Vending has strong neoliberal undertones. In the next three chapters, I
will discuss how NPSV is a neoliberal spatial plan to discipline hawkers and create an
ordered urban space for the transition to a neoliberal city. CCS has taken an active role in
this alliance of activists and has supported the development of NPSV. Through its intense
media focus and strong advocacy ties, CCS continues to support the adoption of NPSV in
different states. Hence, a critique of NPSV is also a critique of CCS’s ideas concerning
street vending. Also, one should not forget that some of CCS’s policy ideas are even
more anti-hawker than the ones outlined by NPSV, so I will highlight this fact by looking
at different publications of CCS.
It is important to mention here that the Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty
Alleviation (MHUPA) was asked to frame a Model Act inspired by NCEUS’s 2009 bill

41

From now on NPSV refers to National Policy of Street Vending 2009
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that could be implemented nationwide. The Model Act MHUPA became known as Street
Vendors (protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vendors) Bill, 2009. This bill
has been a source of discontent among the national alliance for street vendors that
includes different NGOs and think tanks. Bhowmik, the leading scholar and researcher on
street vendors and one of the key members of the National Alliance, outlines a few points
on how this bill disregards the issues that were key concerns in NPSV. In subsequent
sections, I will bring up these points to discuss the complexities and contradictions in
NPSV, its conflicts with its nearly identical and equally problematic Model Act, and
CCS’s own muted versions of the solution of street vendors laid out elsewhere. After an
outcry from the alliance, the Union Cabinet of the Government of India made small
changes in the model bill and passed it as the Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of
Street Vending Bill on 1 May, 2013. CCS and other NGOs are now involved in various
states to oversee the execution of this bill. They maintain that their work from now on
will focus on training officials to help execute the reforms.

Questions Of Epistemology And Methodology
During an informal conversation, I asked Ram, the CCS representative for the
Livelihood Champaign, about the fact that hawkers are often seen as a vote bank. He
replied “I’ve wondered that although hawkers are huge in number, we’ve never really
been used as vote banks and the reasons again is because we are illegal and
informal...like say I set up a business here, I’m a person from rural area and I live on the
street side…I don’t have my identity here… legal identity, and that is why I can never be
seen as a vote bank…the same happens with a big chunk of street vendors. (2010)”
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This response by Ram was intriguing. Not because he failed to acknowledge the
fact that in many instances poor and marginalized are mobilized for political gains -appeased by local politicians only during the time of elections to obtain votes, and
seldom provided any long-term benefit with this association. What I want to point out
here instead is that while putting his stance forwards, very quickly Ram switched from a
second person description to a first person narration even before he finished his first
sentence. During these conversations he would often use “we” instead of “them” to talk
about hawkers, even though he has always been an advocate and never actually sold
goods on the street. This instance captures the complexities of representations. As a
researcher, I attempt to study the interactions between CCS and hawkers and in the
process critically examine CCS’s rhetoric which implies that its political interests and the
political desire of hawkers are identical. CCS claims to represent hawkers, but
representation, as Spivak (1988) maintains, is often violent where it destroys the ability
of the one who is represented ( i.e the subaltern) to speak. Spivak (1988) has taken
western intellectuals such as Foucault and Deleuze, the “best prophets of heterogeneity
and the Other” (67), to task by pointing out how they tend to conflate darstellen (representation which is representation as aesthetic portrait) and vertreten (representation by
proxy or to fill in for or to stand in the place of) while talking about a subject. She writes- “these two senses of representation—within state formation and the law, on the one
hand, and in subject-prediction, on the other--are related but irreducibly discontinuous”
(70). Marx, according to Spivak, tried to address this textuality seriously. In The
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, he explains that the peasants cannot represent
themselves and have to be represented. Here by representation, Marx means vertreten and
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acknowledges the mechanics of agency in formation of the subject. Deleuze, on the other
hand, collapses both when he declares that “there is no more representation; there’s
nothing but action” - “action of theory and action of practice which relate to each other as
relays and form networks” and hence theory is practice (70). Foucault also mis-identifies
agency in his ‘metaphorics of power’ and thereby “masquerade(ing) as the absent nonrepresented who lets the oppressed speak for themselves (87).” Both poststructuralist
theorists end up working with a positivist essentialist assumption and create a universal
subject of Europe. I agree with Spivak when she says that the failure to recognize one’s
own complicity in the process of representation results in “essentialist, utopian politics.”
So instead of helping the subaltern speak, the intellectuals become complicit in creating a
Eurocentric homogenous subject – thereby silencing the subaltern altogether. The idea of
politics of representation developed by Spivak is helpful in developing a critique of the
work of CCS. Ram in the above quote did exactly what Spivak disavows- he spoke for
hawkers as if he and they were identical. This is perhaps the reason why he demonstrated
no awareness of such a common cause of frustration among hawkers as noted by
Bhowmik (2005) – hawkers are promised certain things at the times of the elections but
get no benefit once the elections are over. Throughout the next few chapters, I will
demonstrate how the subaltern, here the hawkers, are silenced repeatedly through CCS
representations. These representations not only essentialize them as a homogenous and
closed subject but also romanticize their politics.
According to Roy (2011) Spivak’s work asks us “to study how the subaltern is
constituted as an object of representation and knowledge — in lieu of the conscientious
ethnography that claims to speak for the authentic subaltern”(229). Researchers should
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first deconstruct how the universal subject of Europe is created. Let me show how to do
this by analyzing the work of Hernando de Soto. I find that his interpretation of informals
as petty entrepreneurs produces a heroic subaltern. For hawkers, this gross
romanticization disavows the obstacles that they face not just in the place of their work
but elsewhere as well. Also, here hawkers are inscribed with single and ahistoric
consciousness. The historic and structural causes of their position are suddenly removed
and they are only understood as the legal or nonlegal subjects of the state. Here, the
subaltern is also considered anything but heterogeneous. When de Soto demands
legalization of informals as the core solution to their problems, their differential positions
in terms of caste, gender, and income are fused into one. This is contrary to the reality.
For example, through my interviews, I have found that most female hawkers face much
more hardship than their male counterparts. Those who treat hawkers as a uniform
homogenous group often support faulty ideas and deleterious policies. In chapter 7, I will
discuss this point further in relation to NPSV, which advocates unionization of hawkers.
Even though I use Spivak’s work to analyze CCS’s discourse, I note that often
times Spivak has a paralyzing effect on researchers who wish to study subalterns. After
all, she never acknowledges varying degree of complicity and leaves everyone equally
guilty of silencing. In light of this guilt, what is the best way to move past paralysis in
order to do research that does not silence the subaltern? Spivak herself answers this by
saying that we are all ‘subject-effects’, and in order to study subalterns meaningfully we
first need to understand our institutional positioning and accept our complicity in
constructing the other. We need to unlearn and then learn again from below. So as a
“native informant” let me first acknowledge my privileged position. I come from a fairly
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wealthy and upper class family in the metropolitan city of Delhi. I have graduate degrees
from premier universities of India and the US. I am married to a similarly privileged
Indian man who has a lucrative corporate job in the US. In the academic world, I have
been influenced by the Marxist tradition and hence have a proclivity towards issues of
social justice and politics of resistance. With such a privileged background, matched with
a strong desire to help, I arrive at the politics of the subaltern with lot of baggage. But I
feel that trying to tell a story is better than not attempting to tell one. While I am aware
that my own social and institutional positioning can taint my understandings of various
issues, I believe that it is still possible to do meaningful research in which the researcher
learns from below by simply observing and paying attention to discrepancies and
awkward moments. Because of the very nature of my project, it became essential for me
to question my own assumptions and learned knowledge. When I started getting
interested in studying hawkers, my own ideas were not much different from the ones
followed by CCS. For example, my first inclination was to do something that could help
hawkers fight corrupt state agents. As my own research project developed and I began
focusing on the interactions between the think tank and hawkers, to my chagrin I realized
that I shared many of the assumptions followed by this extreme free market think tank. I
learned over time that these assumptions were clearly western centric and followed a
distorted model of the urban utopia, modernity and development. So if my own project
had not involved the analysis of the interaction between the think tank and hawkers, I
might have fallen prey to the same claims and generalizations about hawkers that are
made by various NGOs and think tanks. For my project I did what Spivak asks us to do -rather than make the silences speak, focus on what the text cannot say. To do that, I do
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not propose any broad claims, policy ideas or solutions to the “problem” of hawkers. I am
simply not in a position to do so. What I do is to create a dialogue between what CCS
says and my own observations.

Methods
Because of the sheer number of interfaces between hawkers, the state, and
neoliberal changes, a closed study would not yield meaningful results. There are certain
methodological implications of raising research questions that demand a spatial analysis
of entangled spaces of informality. Here an extensive statistical data or complete
ethnography or an absolute survey of a target group of hawkers of a small section of a
particular city may not always be rewarding. Ethnography has a tendency to focus too
much on the subjective experience. While I’m looking for that, I’m also interested in
different discursive formations and historical contexts, which create hawkers as a subject
as well as an object. So instead, life biographies of a few hawkers provide a glimpse of
the entire economic, social and political landscape as well as provide their historical
contextuality of different spatial conflicts. Life biography is one of the most useful
methods to build a kaleidoscopic view of street hawkers in a city where neoliberal
changes have been rolled out. I had numerous formal and informal exchanges with about
70 hawkers from different parts of Delhi and Jaipur. Some discussions lasted several
hours while others finished in just few minutes. But each interaction provided a new
perspective, and that enables me to provide a tale has not been told by the NGOs and
think tanks such as CCS.
In order to make entangled spaces of informality speak to each other, I audio and
video recorded some of the meetings and conferences that CCS had arranged for
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hawkers. Various government officials, state agents, and urban developers attended these
conferences. Here I was able to observe first hand the power dynamics between hawkers
and various groups claiming to represent them during the times of negotiations.
I also conducted focus group interviews where groups of 4-8 hawkers were asked
questions. Most of these meetings occurred in natural settings, meaning that hawkers
were interviewed while they were squatting and selling wares, or when they were taking
a break.S Since focus groups put these hawkers into a group setting, the interactions
between them gave me more room to construct their social and environmental issues.
Here these hawkers formed conversations in which they shared knowledge, challenged
and contested different perceptions, prejudices, and views while making sense of their
own. Gloss (1996, 118) maintains that it is this dialogic characteristic in focus group
interviews that gives a researcher access to ‘multiple and transpersonal understanding’
thereby reflecting the discourse that emerges in original context. This methodology also
allows examination of the process of social meaning-creation in action, as members of
the groups negotiate (Pratt 2002). When a set of unrelated questions are asked, they might
not provoke definite answers. In such instances, the discussions between the groups of
people raise multiple statements that are easily analyzed discursively. For example, even
though it is evident that the state is hostile to vendors and hawkers, it would be
interesting to discursively analyze their discussion as a group about their opinions on the
role of the state. Issues like what areas they think the government should be active in and
what areas from which the government should withdraw are complex and vendors I
spoke with had never even thought about such issues actively. Hence, a focus group
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discussion provided environment for such questions to be discussed in an interactive
manner.

Conclusion
In this chapter I discussed how the artificial dualism constructed between formal
and informal by NGOs and think tanks leads to skewed political practices. In order to
bypass this dualism, I developed the concept of entangled spaces of informality, where
different actors and different connected spaces drive informality as a mode of urbanism.
I explained how understanding hawkers as one of the multiple actors who struggle to
negotiate meaning and control in the spaces of power can bring new insights to the issues
surrounding street hawking. It is important to problematize the presence of NGOs and
think tanks in advocacy campaigns of hawkers and for that reason I have presented the
differences in epistemology and methodology between their and my own research. I have
also outlined a historiography of street hawking and the state’s contradictory response to
it vis-à-vis the development of a democratic Indian nation state. These discussions set the
stage for the remainder of the chapters, where I analyzed CCS’s stance towards hawking
and the anti- hawking characteristics of NPSV.
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Chapter 5: Public Space: The Transformation of Streets into a Capitalist
Commodity

Introduction
The premise of this chapter is that a neoliberal approach treats space as a capitalist
commodity. Space as a commodity should be accessible through a service-delivery
system that should be based on the market mechanism. According to neoliberal
proponents, the optimal distribution of space is only possible when it is justly bought and
sold on the market. Those who can afford it are entitled to it, and those who cannot-- such
as street hawkers--should leave. CCS extends this line of thought to urban vending space
and hence, all pro-hawking ideas or solutions that come from their direction require
analysis. Most of CCS’s ideas of space as a capitalist commodity find expression in the
so called “pro-hawking” National Policy of Street Vendors, 2009 and hence it becomes
critical to analyze that as well. On deeper analysis, we see that NPSV engages in the
rearrangement of space with a neoliberal rationality. As Bandyopadhya et al (2012) note,
the NPSV is a part of a larger strategy to discipline and document the Indian retail
structure as a realm in which corporate and foreign multinational entry in retail is sought
after and hence the presence of hawkers is deemed pre-modern and undesirable. In this
chapter, first I will discuss CCS’s version of public space and their vision of hawkers in
it. Second, I will show how the creation of hawking and no hawking zones which CCS
demands through enactment of NPSV is a neoliberal rearrangement of space that disrupts
the social culture of Indian streets.
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Public Space
Different facets of the politics of street vending boil down to one core issue–the
contestation of public space (Yatomo 2008, Cross 1998a &b, Hansen 2004, Hunt 2009,
García- Rincón 2007). Yet, scholars have noted that the access to public space by street
vendors has not been given its scholarly due (Pratt 2002, García- Rincón 2007). When
talking about the conflict of public space one has to pay attention to two things. First,
understanding that the conflict over who controls public space, the “street”, in part stems
from inherent contradictions and confusions in defining what the “public” means in
“public space.” There are various interpretations of “public” that work for or against each
other, often enabling or stifling one another. Second, the popularized versions of public
space are western constructs and need to be problematized when applied to the Indian
context (Kaviraj 1997, Favero 2003). The act of imprinting the western concept of public
space onto Indian ‘spaces of common’ lies at the heart of the current contestations over
public space in India. So what exactly is public space? Gulick (1998) maintains that the
literature on public space and its disappearance concentrates on three overarching
connotations. I will discuss each of these connotations at length in the context of India
and then move on to show how CCS takes part in diminishing the openness of the public
character of public space, something that particularly hurts street vendors.
In my research, I find that public space is a good entry point to discuss and
analyze the ideas of CCS regarding streets hawkers and the solutions they prescribe to the
problems of street hawking in urban space. In order to analyze CCS’s stance on hawkers
in public space, it is important to understand exactly how CCS visualizes hawkers in
urban public space. I have found that instead of promoting one unified vision of hawkers’
presence in space, CCS proposes different and conflicting visions. In their publications,
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such as Law, Liberty and Livelihood and Ward Power, they vacillate between advocating
ward-level governance of streets or public space and favoring complete private
ownership of these spaces. In public conferences, seminars and meetings with NGOs and
hawkers, they ask specifically for two things: street hawking zones and formal
legalization of all the existing hawkers (i.e giving permits to all of them instead of a
select few). These parallel and incongruous stances help CCS achieve different goals and
success with different audiences. Arnoldi (2007) asks us to look at a small advocacy
think tank as a “nodal statement disseminator, and ‘impartational hub” (62), which tend
to focus less on generating large-scale research and more on picking discrete ideas and
brokering them in mass media. While the idea of private ownership of public space may
sound appealing to free market sympathetic media, multilateral agencies like the World
Bank and big corporations, ward level governance find friends in the emerging new urban
middle class, elite Citizen Groups, and Resident Welfare Associations. The model of
creating hawking and no hawking zones is advanced by other NGOs like NASVI, and
here instead of facing the danger of being “ignored or dis-counted because the institution
is perceived as rigid and predictable” (Weaver, 1989, 568), CCS changes its demand and
asks for the designation of hawking zones that have been proposed by others. This is a
move to adapt and form a place within the bigger NGO network. CCS representatives,
only in front of hawkers, would mention legalization of hawkers, i.e giving all existing
hawkers the legal right to practice their livelihood. Arnoldi (2007) rightly maintains that
the discrete ideas of think tanks should not be seen simply as reproducing certain
discursive formations or ideologies. There is one more logic at work here-- the logic of
attention (62). CCS’s different and conflicting ideas are promoted where ever they are
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suited best to garner as much attention as possible. These insights are essential for
understanding the hegemonic politics of neo-liberal think tanks.

Public space: From unruly streets to private roads
Gulick’s first connotation identifies public spaces as those “properties where right
of a private person to exclude another person from ‘habitation’ is suspended” (136). In
Delhi, this notion of public space has its origins after the first Indian rebellion for
freedom in 1857 when the British assumed power by overthrowing the last Mughal
emperor. Prior to this era in the Mughal city of Delhi, the society was studded by
different races, castes, communities, and religions, where bazaars, streets, squares
primarily were “a male domain, were spaces of anonymity, identity, display, and
interaction” (Chakrabarty 2002, Ballhatchet 1980, Kaviraj 1997, Hosagrahar 2005).
Kaviraj (1997) maintains that the public/private division is a result of western concepts of
modernity and is often conflated with traditional Indian cultural concepts of inside/
outside, own/others, self/not-self. He further calls Indian open areas ‘spaces of common’
instead of public space. Unlike western public spaces, which are based on the notion of
universality of access, these spaces of common had their own inherent norms of
inclusion. These space of common or indigenous public space were regulated by “a
traditional logic of strict nonuniversalism” and “ by logic of segregation and a strict
doctrine of appropriateness and title”(90). However when the British took over, they
deemed such spaces of common not only dirty, unhealthy, and unsafe, but also as spaces
of opportunity where they could create “a secular publicness that aimed to celebrate the
libertarian ideas of benevolent government” (Hosagrahar 2005, 55). Gradually, some
public spaces (like newly constructed parks) in Indian cities became modern private
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property of the state, accessible to all, irrespective of differences. This universal
character, however, always was and is misleading as, instead of Hindu traditional logics
of inclusion and exclusion, now it is the bourgeois state that formulates laws governing
the use of its property. As Kilian (1998) writes, “such laws have usefully vague wordings
[that] can be used and are enforced quite selectively…(may) legalize the practice of
spatial segregation that developed independently of a law and that subsequently came to
be seen as proper” (119-20). The disappearance of public space with regards to the
conception of property would mean closure of property to “only those marginal social
groups –street hawkers, sex workers, the homeless- who rely on it for their material
maintenance” (Gulick 1998, 136). To explain it further, in pre-capitalist Indian societies,
“the rich repertoire of concepts of common responsibility, obligation, and action” deemed
beggars, homeless, and even street hawkers appropriate in the public space (Kaviraj
1997, 89). But in neoliberal Indian cities, instead of the traditional logic of inclusion and
the doctrine of appropriateness, market rationalities frame the laws that define the terms
of access to public space. For example, although CCS works for the cause of street
hawkers, bemoans their eviction from public spaces, and often says that hawkers have a
right to be in public spaces,42 they outline a contradictory understanding of public space
in Law, Liberty, and Livelihood: “This “factor of production”, that is, the space used by
the street vendors is often not designated or intended for their use, but has been paid for
by the tax-payers’ money and designated for other uses—streets or pavements for
example. By using these spaces to hawk their wares, a “public good” is getting diverted
to private use and a rent is being charged by those who have not invested in the public
42

During my ethnography and interviews Amit rhetorically declared several times that
hawkers have the right to be in the public space.
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goods. This represents a diversion and deprivation of the tax payer’s right” (Shah and
Mandava 2005, 74).
Here CCS implies that the actual owners of public space, which at present
unfortunately functions as a “factor of production” in the informal economy, are neither
hawkers nor the State but the tax-paying citizens. By doing this CCS outlines its vision of
who is qualified to be an actual citizen and who is not. Spaces, more particularly public
space, have been known to be one of the important sites where “citizenship is forged,
given meaning, contested, and changed” and yet the role of these sites in citizenship
formation is overlooked (Marston and Mitchell 2005, Staeheli 2009). In the cities where
neoliberal rationalities are just starting to penetrate into policy making, streets as public
space become sites of intense upheaval where the meaning of citizenship is constantly
rearticulated. Hunt (2009) describes how in Columbia, public space was recovered from
street vendors in order to preserve it as a privileged site for citizenship. Here public space
is conceived as an exclusive site “for citizens, thus intimately linking space and
citizenship to a political space other than the national territory” (Gledhill 2005, Hunt
2006). Ong (2006) explains this further, saying that the “components formerly tied to
citizenship- rights, entitlements, as well as nation and territoriality- are becoming
disarticulated from one another and rearticulated with governing strategies that promote
an economic logic in defining, evaluating, and protecting certain categories of subject and
not others” (16). Of course, geographies of consumption have established how a certain
kind of public space is produced in order to create the ideal consumer citizen. I will delve
into this detail while discussing the next connotation of public space. First, here I want to
bring attention to how CCS, through quotes like above, promotes the ideas of bourgeois
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ownership of public space thereby rearticulating citizenship in terms of proprietorship.
Urban governance and the state in many Indian cities are going through a wave of
restructuring influenced by the changing conception of public space, and I will go into
the details of this further while talking about the bhagidari system in the next chapter.
In the above quote, the “other uses” or the more appropriate use refers to the use
of streets as roads that are meant only for commuting and fast transportation. CCS’s
version of streets is akin to Lefebvre’s ideal “representation of space”--the space of
planners, scientists, urbanists etc. Shetty (2012) writes that in the discipline of planning,
the language of cartography is employed to plan urban areas. Here the streets are straight
lines between polygons that represent private properties. The planners conceive of this
space between polygons for passing through and nothing else. Anjaria (2012), agreeing
with this view, maintains that “the street is an object of spatio-legal regimes and a
technocratic gaze – of policy makers’, planners’ and engineers’ visions” (8/13). However,
it is important to note that CCS’s notion of streets takes the view of governmentsponsored planners one step further. CCS, in their publication Law Liberty and
Livelihood book chapter called “Urban Land Management Plans: Master plan for
Disaster” writes: “Planning tools think of the community as a static concept, which is
why it is presumed that the future can be determined reliably and controlled by local and
regional governments…the zonal plans prepared at the local levels and also land-use
regulations don’t integrate development as a fundamental element of the plan or planning
process” (Shah and Mandava 2005, 173).
Indeed, the problem with planners is that they conceive of streets as public space
with a functional value where they only serve as roads for commuting. CCS too

135

vehemently criticizes this sort of planning mechanism but only because the planners here
don’t give preference to the community. CCS bemoans how the community is treated as
static, when in a real sense it is dynamic. What does CCS mean by dynamic? One may be
led to believe that dynamic community should encompass all the actors that are present
on the streets, for example, the upper and middle income propertied residents, lower
income households, slums and informal houses that mushroom in and around formal
neighborhoods, street performers who survive by creating scenes of spectacle, itinerant
yogis and sadhus43 who take refuge under a big street tree for many weeks at a time,
gardeners and street sweepers who mingle with the local crowd at specific hours of the
day, local paan 44 and cigarettes shops that attract idle urban onlookers, household help,
maids, hawkers and vendors, rickshaw pullers. But unfortunately many of these people
find no place in CCS’s so-called dynamic community. CCS’s community is one that
knows how to “adapt and grow as per the changing needs and preference of the time”
(173), i.e the neoliberal time. It is a community represented by the people who own the
polygons along the streets and those who have adapted to the neoliberal rationalities and
desire an ordered and neat public space. This community that is constituted solely of the
propertied class has a bigger function to perform:
In view of the performance-nuisance conflict inherent to the issue, a
framework involving private property rights offers us the most effective policy
solutions. Remember that most encroachments that happen- from hawkers to
slums- are usually on public space owned by the government, spaces not vested as
private property. Anything other than property rights based approach will not
43

Yogis and sadhus are hermits belonging to various sects of Hinduism, who are often
found roaming on the streets and taking refuge under big shady trees on the roadside to
meditate or talk to their followers.
44
Betel leaf stuffed with a variety of things such as addictives like betel nut, tobacco or
coconut, and fruit preserves is smoked and consumed widely in South and South- East
Asia.
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work in the long term and will serve only as a temporary solution. It is only
private parties that have every incentive to seek negotiable and voluntary
solutions for unforeseen problems (Shah and Mandava 2005, 85).
Here not only does CCS imply that the tax paying citizens should have more
control over the streets than those who do not pay, they declare that the only solution to
the problem of street vending is legal privatization of public space, that is, the streets. If
the community owns public space wherever it exists, encroachment is not an issue. Here
for CCS, the “right to be there” is exchanged with the language of “encroachment”. In
this regard, elsewhere CCS has called for the repeal of the Urban Land Ceiling Act
(discussed in chapter 7).45 Let me take a moment here to tie this vision of a private public
space to my earlier argument on civil society and the state in the context of neoliberal
India.
As discussed earlier, Chatterjee (1986) has described the Indian struggle for
independence as a kind of passive revolution that after its success did nothing to eradicate
colonial institutional structures or the pre-capitalist dominant class. This passivity was
due to the relative weakness of modernizing the bourgeoisie who after independence
were forced to form an alliance with the rich peasantry and the state’s planning elite in
order to lead the transformation. It was the state’s planning elite or ‘the body of expert’
that were to helm Nehru’s modernist nationalist vision via planned development,
maintaining the relative autonomy and managing the competing interest of the bourgeois
and other dominant classes. Gradually their relative autonomy started eroding and they
began forming an alliance with the pre-capitalist forces in order to survive (Kaviraj 1984,
233). However, this state bureaucratic agency, which was still based on the colonial
45

The Land Ceiling Act of 1976 prohibited concentration of urban land in the hands
of a few people, aimed to avoid speculation of land and profiteering, and intended
to bring about an equitable distribution of land to serve the common good.
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institutional infrastructure, practiced domination through the non-discursive politics of
command (225). Yet another important feature of this agency was that it “had feet of
vernacular clay (227).” Fullar and Harriss (2000) explain this further-- “as the state
expanded, a profound gap developed too between the bureaucratic elite, at home with the
‘modernist discourse’ which often corresponded fairly well with Weberian rationality,
and the personnel at a lower level, whose ‘vernacular everyday discourse’ was not
structured around the principle of formal rationality at all” (8). By the time policies are
transferred to those “very low in the bureaucracy, they are reinterpreted beyond
recognition” ( Kaviraj 1991, 91).
CCS understands this phenomenon when it says “remember that most
encroachments that happen- from hawkers to slums- are usually on public space owned
by the government, spaces not vested as private property (Shah and Mandava 2005, 85).”
What CCS through its advocacy politics is trying to do is get rid of the lower level of
bureaucracy that has ‘feet of vernacular clay’ and readily give concessions to poor. In
that way they are attempting to make encroachment of public space impossible. Instead
of the lower level of bureaucracy controlling public space, CCS believes that private
individuals with rich bank accounts should both manage and own public space. I will
explain this phenomenon in more detail in the section on Resident Welfare Associations
and the Bhagidar System in chapter 6.

Semiotic Public Space: From Streets to Shopping Spaces
The privatization of public space in the simplest sense means an exchange of
entitlement to the use of public space from the hands of the government to private parties.
But it does not end there. Free market ideology demands a certain type of public space in
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which privatization results in actually changing the physical character of the space.
Privatizing public space means developing a certain character in space that sheds the
public nature, the open character that enables people to interpret it in their own subjective
way. CCS explains its vision for privately owned public spaces:
That streets can be developed and owned privately is not too far-fetched
an idea. There are already numerous real world examples of private streets, which
functions highly effectively. Like the private streets of St. Louis, the streets of
shopping malls and shopping centers (even the aisles of groceries and department
stores may be considered), gated communities or towns world-wide, and the rural
roads owned by associations of property owners in Finland and Sweden (Shah and
Mandava 2005 180-1).
In order to explain the implications of the privatization of public space or streets,
let me introduce the second definition of public space by Gulick-- a “democratic semiotic
space.” Semiotic spaces are those in which artifacts correspond to a sign system that
make them open to visual consumption and sensual experience. These are the places
“where the meanings are mediated by the intentions of [three variants] - landscape
architects, the practices of landscape inhabitants, and the latent ‘systems’ (such as a
capitalist economy, imperial state or a modern totalitarian state) that govern the
landscape’s development” (Gulick 1998, 137). Perhaps inspired by Arendt’s distinction
between public space and social space, Gulick declares that the more one-dimensional
and ahistoric the nature of the landscape, the less democratic or public is the character of
the public space. For Arendt, the public sphere signifies “a world that is common to us…
accommodating the political life, the life of freedom from bare necessities” (Arendt 1973
quoted in Donohoe 2003, 239). The private sphere, on the other hand, accommodates the
necessities of life. In addition to the public and private sphere is the social sphere, where
members of the society behave in adherence to shared norms. Social behaviors such as
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shaking hands or standing neatly in a line are deemed proper. “The social realm is often
confused with the public realm, but it in fact is exclusive of political action that is
characteristic of the public realm” (Arendt 1973 quoted in Donohoe 2003, 239); the
social sphere dismisses the multiplicity of perspectives and follows a common norm
while the public comprises numerous perspectives of the ones who experience it and all
who participate in it. A democratic semiotic public space in effect would be that space
that lets itself be experienced and consumed “without exchanging in the formal process
of commodity exchange ( Gulick 1998, 135).” These urban sign systems are public
because they do not govern, produce or surveil the desire of its subjects.
The semiotics of public space has been a dominant character in constructing
Delhi. In 1863, the British established the Delhi Municipal Committee with an aim to
reinvent the old city and make the changes not just appreciable but also aesthetically
modern. They were soon disabused of any hopes to control and modernize the dense old
city with its long history of settlement and the population’s growing disobedience, open
protests, legal appeals, subversive construction, delays, and feigned ignorance
(Hosagrahar 2005). With the transfer of the capital from Calcutta to Delhi, the British
realized a need to restore to Delhi its lost ancient grandeur. Outside the old walled city
they started building a city called New Delhi, a symbol of imperial power and peaceful
domination. The non-democratic symbolic nature of the new capital of Delhi built by the
British has not gone unnoticed by scholars (Irvin 1981, Jain 1990, Volwahsen 2002).
Irvin (1981) compares Rajpath, then called King’s Way, with Grand Trunk Road (2600
Km) built by Sher Shah Suri in the 16th century, a major symbol of authority and
administration: “The mile-and –a-half King’s Way, too, embodied an image of
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disciplined action and achievement, recalling those straight roads that betokened
authority over India” (251).
Post-independent Delhi’s Master Plan follows the same interventionist
biopolitical rationality, western modernist vision, and politics of segregation through
arbitrary laws as well as semiotics that exclude the marginalized. Delhi Development
Authority (DDA) was constituted in 1957 to manage the space of Delhi and its major task
was to avoid any haphazard and unplanned growth. Baviskar (2003) notes that the Delhi
Master Plan “envisaged a modern city, prosperous, hygienic and orderly, but failed to
recognize that this construction could only be realized by the labors of large numbers of
the working class poor, for whom no provision had been made in the plan”(91). During
the 1970s, in the wake of the upcoming Asian games in 1981, a massive construction
project was taken up to build flyovers and luxury apartments, and in these projects DDA
violated many of its own regulations for creating symbols of national prestige. Delhi later
hosted the Commonwealth Games in October 2010, which gave the government a good
reason to push for and legitimize many infrastructure and urban-renewal projects (Dupont
2011) that could “finally put the city, and the country, on the world map” (Vinayak and
Ghosh, 2006, 24). Bhan (2009) has noted how a series of media campaigns--such as the
one by a leading newspaper Times of India called the transformation of Delhi from the
“Walled city to World city”-- justified a ban on street food hawkers and vendors from the
major areas of South Delhi.
Ironically, in one of the CCS research papers, Viniak and Ghosh (2006)
acknowledge that the facelift of the city, that is, the aestheticization of the streets of Delhi
has harsh consequences for the poor and marginalized. They explain how in an effort to
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rise to global standards “there are numerous steps being taken to transform the face of the
city, from better street lighting, to sleeker bus shelters to upgrading the airport. This
46

effort is resulting in over Rs. 100 Crore being spent on street furniture and landscaping
alone (Roy 2006). This will give the city a much needed facelift in terms of utilities like
bus shelters, dust bins, street lighting and park benches” (Viniak and Ghosh 2006, 26).
However, the authors question this and shows suspicion that such “developments may be
anti-poor, badly planned and ecologically unsound” (7).
With this let me direct attention to the unpublicness of specific public spaces that
CCS aspires to create. Scholarly research shows that the privately owned public spaces of
music halls, multiplexes, restaurants, clubs, tourist sites, shopping malls, gated residential
communities and, more importantly, privately owned streets, are spaces of consumption
that elevate leisure as a structural realm of everyday life ( Mansvelt 2005, Ritzer 1999,
Sorkin 1992, Zukin 1998). The coercive measures that regulate these semi-private public
spaces such as video surveillance and security guards generally work well to exclude
undesirable elements, but as Rose (1999) notes, “where consumption is the objective,
coercive security would be a reminder of the fragility and futility of attempts to consume
one’s way to pleasure. Hence control must be designed- embedded in the very structuring
of time, space and environment…artifacts such as flowerbeds, fountains, and street
sculpture are both aesthetic objects, designed to manifest and induce civility in those who
pass” (251-252).
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This amount converts to about $150 million.
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The landscape of Delhi epitomizes ‘India’s mall boom’47 with scores of shopping
malls being constructed every year. Detilleux (2007) describes these spaces as the ‘new
temples of India,’ dedicated to consumption and leisure where foreign retail chains,
cinemas, and restaurants invite only the exclusive customers for whom these shopping
delights are designed. “Window shopping and hanging out in the air-conditioned
postmodernist environment” promote leisure as a new activity that can only be afforded
and sustained by the upcoming middle class. Also, this kind of mall culture “promotes
‘foreign’ as superior to the ‘domestic’ and in turn, reflects and creates aspirations of
‘success’ as being embedded in global identities” (Dupont 2011, 543).

The Public Sphere: From Street Bazaars to No Hawking Zones
Indian streets defy the conception of streets as merely roads for commuters and
pedestrians. Indian streets have functioned as part of the public sphere since time
immemorial. A public sphere, according to Gulick (1998), is a place where citizens
gather and engage in rational critical discourse to outline a common good, and also,
where one experiences a sentiment of social solidarity. This third conception of public
space is influenced by Habermas’ and Arendt’s work on the public sphere. Both maintain
that the public sphere transcends the private realm where one is motivated by personal
benefits. The public sphere is thus a springboard where the issues for the common good
of society acquire public relevance (Calhoun 1992, 8). There is a deep relationship
between the public sphere and civil society, as the former is an important component of
the latter, a space where citizens can address each other openly. For Habermas, this

See Anuj Kumar’s and Sangeeta Barooah Pisharoty’s article ‘In the pursuit of
pleasure’, The Hindu,20 April 2008. (cited in Dupont 2011)
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manifestation of the public sphere occurs via rational critical discourses where the public,
or civil society, confronts the state, which before that had been an “impersonal locus of
authority” (Habermas 1989). For Arendt (1973), however, this transformation happens
48

when human beings act together in a space of appearance, the public realm, a field of
presentation and beginning, not necessarily discursive as in the case of Habermas (Curtis
2004). So for Arendt the space of appearance is like a public theater, a space of freedom
in which human beings disclose themselves (Curtis 2004). Influenced by Arendt’s ideas, I
critique Habermas’ notion of the ideal public sphere for privileging rational discourses in
the public space. First, this often implies that the bourgeois public spaces must be open
and orderly in order to facilitate rational discourse. Under this logic, in order to make an
ideal public sphere for rational discourse, anything disorderly in the space must be tamed.
I will discuss these disciplining techniques and their spatial implications in detail in the
section on hawking and no hawking zones. First I explore the problem with giving
primacy to rational discourse instead of alternate indigenous discourses that are based on
native knowledge, sometimes influenced by religious beliefs and ideas of kinship. I
believe that the traditional Indian bazaars, which served as spaces of openness (public
space) were more politically discursive than CCS’ closed and ordered public spaces such
as malls and shopping centers. Chakrabarty (2002) writes how the sacred spaces of the
inside were clean and secure as opposed to the outside spaces of the bazaar or ‘chowk’
which were dirty and ridden with ambiguity. The constant risk of a rebellion
48

For Arendt the spaces of appearance are the spaces of freedom in which human beings
are disclosed. (Curtis 2004)
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demonstrated the political nature of public space. Similarly, Guha (1983) highlights the
importance of rumors in the bazaar in the political mobilization of peasants during
colonial rule. Attention has also been drawn to the tradition of folklore in public space
that is not necessarily rational but is sympathetic to the logic of the culture
(Muthukumaraswamy & Kaushal 2004). These works lead to the second critique of
Habermas: he constructs a homogenous public sphere. Feminist theorists have recently
brought attention to something Habermas failed to identify-- the “mulitpulicity of
publics” or “counterpublics” and their role in democracy. For example, Franser (1992)
explains:
The point is that in stratified societies, subaltern counterpublics have dual
character. On the one hand, they function as spaces of withdrawal and
regroupment; on the other hand, they also function as bases and training grounds
for agitational activities directed towards wider publics. It is precisely in the
dialectic between these two functions that their emancipatory potential resides.
This dialectics enables subaltern counterpublics partially to offset, although not
wholly eradicate, the unjust participatory privileges enjoyed by members of
dominant social groups in stratified society (124).
Indian streets have acted as spaces of appearances where multiple public and
subaltern counterpublics exist at the same time. Hence, CCS’ ideal public spaces such as
shopping malls, entertainment parks and private streets lack the most essential character
that makes a space public – multiplicity of political discourse.

Hawking And No Hawking Zones
The rationale behind a pro-hawker’s NPSV is the contribution of street vendors to
the growth of the urban economy. It states:
Accordingly, the starting point for this policy is the recognition of the
positive role of street vendors in providing essential commodities to people at
affordable prices and at convenient places. It also recognizes the need for
regulation of street vending by way of designated ‘Restriction-free Vending’,
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‘Restricted vending’ and ‘No vending’ zones based on certain objective
principles. Such regulation is consistent with the imperative to ensure free flow of
traffic, smooth movement of pedestrians and maintenance of cleanliness and
public hygiene while facilitating vendors/hawkers to sell goods/services at
convenient locations frequented by the public (NPSV 2009, 2).
There are two key takeaways from the above statement. First, NPSV and its
creators acknowledge the primacy of the services provided by hawkers rather than
emphasizing the value of hawkers themselves. This rationale is ultimately anti-hawker
because if the service value of hawkers is diminished in the future, the supporters of
NPSV may withdraw their support for hawkers. Second, importance is given to fastmoving traffic, pedestrians, cleanliness and hygiene over hawkers.
Having highlighted how these inherent contradictions make NPSV’s pro-hawking
pursuits anti-hawking in nature, now I will problematize the idea of creating hawking and
non- hawking zones. For this, Timothy Mitchell’s (1988) concept of enframing, which he
used to describe colonial spatial “acts of confinement, regulation and supervision of the
population” (34) in 19th century Egypt, provides an excellent framework.

Containing Life in Abstract Space
Mitchell describes enframing as a “method of dividing up and containing, as in
the construction of barracks or the rebuilding of villages, which operates by conjuring up
a neutral surface or volume called space” (44). This kind of planning of the spacesegmenting it and putting definite dimensions, introduces it as “abstract and neutral, a
series of inert frames or containers” (45). Reading from Lefebvre (1991), I understand
this abstract and neutral space as a space of instrumental rationality, something that is
fragmented, commodified and homogenized by state planners, capitalists, and technocrats
for profit. Altering the indigenous “order without framework” arrangement and creating
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an abstract space makes space relate negatively to “that which perceives and underpins itnamely, the historical and religio- political sphere”(1991,50). These enframing practices
of the city are an attempt to eradicate concrete or lived space, replace spaces of
representation with the representations of space, and take away local space histories to
create a hollow container where subjects become more visible and productive. Drawing
on Foucault’s work, Mitchell indicates that such enframing techniques are the
panoptification of urban space. The new container space envisaged by the zoning
practices are easily represented in plans, thereby putting in place a specific kind of spatial
order. This kind of spatial order as Mitchell notes also produce and codify a “visible
hierarchy.”
So what is the Indian street culture and local history of urban street bazzaars that
NPSV’s zoning recommendations as an enframing practice encroach upon? Appadurai
declares that “streets and their culture lie at the heart of public life of contemporary life of
India … they encompass a huge range of activities from worship to business, from
political protests to funeral and marriage processions” (1987, 13). Modern street culture
has its origins in the pre-modern thoroughfares and small alleys. This rather cosmopolitan
street culture emerged in the historical context of pilgrimage and religious travel.
Traditional Indian bazaars in modern times include roadside shrines and trees as
sites of worship. A myriad of street actors such as barbers, ear cleaners, tea stall owners,
knife sharpeners, cobblers, ice candy sellers, and balloon sellers roam the streets at
different times of day. Streets are also stages of spectacle where various kinds of street
performers, fortune tellers, snake charmers often attract passerby. There are hawkers who
sell fruits, vegetables, cooked food, textiles, utensils, magazines, juices. Private acts,
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such as brushing teeth, taking a bath, and washing clothes spill over from crowded houses
onto the streets in densely packed neighborhoods. Also, Indian streets much like 19th
century Parisian arcades are site of a kind of flaneurie, or to be more precise, sites of
what Appadurai calls “organized idealness” (discussed later in the chapter). People,
wealthy or poor, who have some time to spare during any part of the day come to hang
out at the local paan and beedi49 corner simply gazing at the passersby. Encompassing
this variety of actors, the overarching characteristics of Indian street culture in the words
of Appadurai are that “there is something shared, which justifies the use of singular. Two
most important features of what is shared are the great range of activities that occur on
Indian streets and give them their ambiance and the way that which street culture blurs
the line between private and public life” (17). What he means is that the streets are
“spaces of common” where life unfolds and every subjective expression is acceptable.
This range of activates and multiplicity of subjective experiences form the basis of Indian
street culture and public culture in general that zoning practices desire to order and
segment.
Chandu, an itinerant vendor whose life biography I documented, let me follow
him during the days to document his time spent on the street. While selling vegetables on
the streets, Chandu manages to do all sorts of other activities. He practically lives on the
streets, although he has a small shack in the nearby slum that he built with the help of
loans taken from his wealthy customers, including my mother. While selling on the
streets, he eats from nearby food stalls, listens to news on the radio while taking an
afternoon nap on the pavement, plays cards and board games with fellow hawkers during
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non-peak times, and assists countless lost travelers and passersby with directions. During
these lazy hours of the afternoon, Chandu mingles with not just other vendors but also
with the nearby household help, plays street cricket with them and the rich kids, and
sometimes helps them fulfill certain household tasks. Sometimes, even the female heads
of household from the nearby residences call him to do work in their homes by changing
a light bulb, helping in an upcoming wedding celebration, or fetching a locally made
mortar and pestle from the nearby industrial district.
There is a specific kind of sociability associated with the streets, shared by lowerincome hawkers, street sweepers, gardeners and upper or middle income residents that
zoning practices of segmenting and abstraction erodes; in this way, the regulations are
more anti-hawker than pro hawker. As mentioned above, these spatial orders produce and
enforce a spatial hierarchy as the politics of zoning involves not just creation of abstract
space but also the politics of outlining such spaces. Deciding which neighborhoods or
roads should have a hawking zone and which should not, is not an a-political decision.
For example, Ashok Vihar, a wealthy neighborhood in northwest Delhi, has forty-six
Resident Welfare Associations (RWAs). In an interview with the treasurer of Ashok
Vihar’s main RWA that encompass all the smaller ones, I was told that members of
different RWAs constantly fight with each other on various issues. One such issue is
where to demarcate hawking zones. Each RWA wants a hawking zone in close proximity
but not within its own territory. Also, wealthy households try to get their streets to be
“hawker free.” The president of the same RWA mentioned that people want to buy
vegetables on the way home from the office. They don’t want hawkers to be squatting
near their own homes, but they don’t mind if the hawkers are in a residential area as long
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as they are near someone else’s home. The city of Mumbai saw similar disagreements in
1998 when Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC), the Municipal Corporation of
Greater Mumbai, started allotting hawking and non-hawking zones. Rajagopal (2001)
describes how residents of various neighborhoods revolted against hawking zones being
placed in their neighborhoods. Some were powerful enough to send petitions to the courts
requesting that the locations of hawking zones be moved. BMC reacted to these petitions
excluding hawking zones from those neighborhoods. In fact, Rajagopal notes that every
important hawking venue of the city of Mumbai was made into a non-hawking zone on
the pretext of protecting public thoroughfares, parks, gardens and other entertainment
attractions. Pertinent here is the discussion on the issue of the natural market that NPSV
seeks to preserve. Bhowmik (2010) complains how the model act ignores the concept of
natural markets. He writes:
These markets spring up in places where the consumers find them useful.
Hence there will be street vendors outside railway stations and bus depots. People
returning from a tiring day at work would rather purchase their necessities from
these vendors rather than make a detour and go to the market situated a few
kilometres away. Similarly, there will be fruit sellers, food vendors, etc, outside
public hospitals and fruit sellers and flower sellers outside temples. Hence natural
markets serve the interests of the people and they are convenient. The national
policy suggests that instead of forcibly removing such markets the municipalities
should try to regularize them by allotting space. Unfortunately the model law on
the other hand completely ignores the issue of natural markets (13).
Through support of NPSV, CCS accepts the importance of preservation of natural
markets. In an interview, Ram mentioned that CCS is demanding the creation of a
hawking zone in the natural markets--“We advocated the idea called the natural
market…so that’s why CCS has asked while demarcating hawking zones, the idea of the
natural market also be considered. Let’s say we have a temple, on a cross section. People
go to the temple and while there, they can buy their groceries. There are streets that are
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busy, where people while returning from work can buy the vegetables without taking a
detour.”
In this quote, Ram mentions the importance of natural markets and demands
creation of permanent hawking zones in the spaces of natural markets. But the above
discussion on the politics of enframing shows how the creation of hawking zones in the
natural markets can be controversial because of the presence of RWAs. CCS itself in
their publication Law Liberty and Livelihood describes the problems with the creation of
zones in the natural markets because of commonly ensuing corruption. Shah and
Mandava (2005) write that “invariably, some of the most profitable zones for hawking
will lie within the no-hawking zones. And the hawker will keep returning there and will
be willing to pay requisite amounts in the form of illegal payments to the regulatory
authorities to enable them to start or continue their trade” (78-9). Of course, the solution
that CCS gives to this problem is privatization of urban space and handing the Ward
Committee, which is comprised of wealthy residents, the authority to delineate hawking
zones. They argue that the residents or private interests will regulate the streets better
than the government because they will not permit unlawful encroachment. This move is
the most anti-hawker in the long term. I will discuss this further in the section on the
politics of RWAs in the next chapter.

Dividing Space to Bifurcate the Social
The second feature of street culture that Appadurai discusses is the blurred
boundary of public and private life. This very characteristic is eroded by the second
spatial strategy of enframing described by Mitchell. Enframing creates a fixed distinction
between the outside and inside, between the bourgeois interior and the public exterior.
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Mitchell describes how colonialism in Africa tried to create fixed boundaries between
inside and outside via domestic architecture and urban design, thereby codifying
community, family, and gender relations in a manner alien to the African system of
domestic order. In a similar vein Grover (2007) notes the development of public space as
a discourse during British colonial rule in India. The new public spaces, although visibly
not much different than the indigenous spaces of common, included some subtle and
invisible differences that were significant. “By naming certain urban properties and
spaces ‘public,’ drafting rules governing what activities could take place there, and
enforcing these rules through new urban institutions, the colonial government created
both a concept and a corporeal substance – public space - that had no prior history in
Indian cities” (Grover 2007, 212). Also, unlike the western outside that was subject to
control, surveillance and discipline, the indigenous outside is “not amenable to control.
The exterior is abandoned to an intrinsic disorderliness. No order, rules, restraints can be
expected there” (Kaviraj 1997, 99). Although the sensibilities of neoliberal India have
changed and private acts such as bathing or urinating or sleeping are deemed improper in
public space, these acts do not simply cease to happen. We can identify the creation of
zones and enforcement of the boundary of inside and outside as part of a new wave of
enframing practices, the first being the introduction of the concept of public space in
India.

Initiating a Tourist Gaze
The last spatial strategy of enframing is to provide a place from which the
individual can observe. The individual could survey the city, as a means of “abstracting
and objectifying the built environment” (Myers 2003). This strategy forwards the idea of
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the world as an exhibition and initiates a tourist gaze. This strategy through which the
character of Indian streets that has been marked by a “profusion of personal encounters”
(Ahuja 1997) is changed to not just cater to tourists and wealthy clientele but also turn an
ordinary customer into an observer who is both inside and outside at the same time. One
such hawking zone that I studied was Vidhyadhar Nagar mandi in Jaipur. The head of
CCS, Parth Shah, invited me to study CCS’s work for street hawkers, by spending time
with Ram, the national coordinator of their Livelihood Campaign. Ram at that time had
moved to Jaipur on request of the corporate funder for their project of street hawkers. The
corporate funder wanted CCS to partner with another NGO which had already been
working on street hawkers. Also, the state of Rajasthan, of which Jaipur is the capital,
was perceived to be somewhat receptive and open to implement NPSV. Ram through his
contacts with the other NGO learned of a model hawking zone which had been created
about 8 years prior in a fairly wealthy, newly developed colony called Vidhyadhar Nagar.
The hawkers of the mandi were resettled from a busy road near the city center which had
been declared a non-hawking zone. Along with a six by six meter spot in which to hawk,
the hawkers were given small subsidized residential plots just behind the mandi. They
were strictly asked not to hawk outside the hawking zones if they wanted to retain their
spots and residential plots. Although the mandi was not part of the street, it is important
to study it as a hawking zone because most of the proposals for hawking zones by NGOs
ask for spaces that could be constructed like a mandi, where hawkers squat in multiple
rows between which the customers can navigate. Generally mandis sell only fruits and
vegetables but occasionally one would find hawkers selling household supplies like
utensils. Ram took me to the mandi with him on the very first day of my fieldwork. He
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immediately assumed that I had come to him to help in his work for street hawkers and if
I needed information from him, it was only appropriate that I help him in his work.
Vidhyadhar Nagar mandi was indeed cleaner than any other mandi I had ever visited. I
was introduced to the head of the mandi’s hawkers association, a man called Ghyan
Shyam. Over the course of one month, I became friends with Ghyan Shyam, and had
many opportunities to study Ram’s interactions with Ghyan Shyam. Ram, when
introducing me to Ghyan Shyam, explained how was trying to help him and the mandi
conduct better sales. Ghyan Shyam mentioned that although the hawkers had proper
spaces to squat and had licenses, they were not making enough money. In fact their sales
had gone down in the previous 5 years and few customers came to the mandi.
Ghayn Shyam explained:
“When we moved here we were very happy as we had our own fixed
space to hawk. But looking back we regret it because we were doing much better
business before. When we moved here this area was still being developed. Now
there are so many posh colonies. A number of departmental stores have opened
here like Reliance Fresh, Sudiksha, Handloom, More and people prefer to get
their vegetables from there…within a few days of the opening of these stores, our
sales went down. Now we cannot go back to our previous spots because there is
no space to hawk there and even that place has all these departmental stores.
Another big problem is that even though we have fixed hawking spaces in
this mandi, we have a kind of secluded location. People cannot even see the
mandi from the street as the gate is located in the back street. They have to go out
of their way to make a visit to the mandi...and nowadays everyone is busy. They
don’t have time to make a special trip to the mandi…they would rather stop some
place on their way to work or way to home to buy groceries. So for us one good
solution is to relocate this mandi to a better location that has more accessibility
and lesser number of departmental stores. Also we need basic amenities in the
mandi like toilets. The government should provide help in keeping the mandi
clean. Right now we are doing it ourselves with very limited resources that we
have but if the government has made us settle here…than they should provide
some kind of amenities (2010).”
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Although Vidhyadhar Nagar was a fairly dense colony, wealthy residents didn’t
come to the mandi. Ghayn Shyam asked my help to understand the reason behind it.
Meanwhile Ram proposed that I conduct a survey of 40 upper-income households to find
out the reason they avoid the mandi. I was asked to prepare a questionnaire that would
ask questions about the cleanliness of the mandi, behaviors of hawkers, and the quality of
time spent in the mandi.
Before conducting the survey, I asked Ram what he thought the reasons were
behind the reduced clientele of the mandi and what his suggestions were for increasing it.
Over a month’s time Ram outlined the reasons he thought the mandi had low clientele
and discussed a number of suggestions that he thought of implementing in order to tackle
the problem. During his explanations, he constantly compared the mandi with the newly
opened department stores that were taking away the mandi’s clients.
The first problem identified by Ram was that the mandi is dirty. Although this
mandi was cleaner than others, he maintained that it cannot compete with the modern
department stores where great efforts are put into cleanliness, order and symmetry. Some
of the customers agreed that department stores were cleaner than the mandi and that was
the reason they liked to shop there. Ram suggested multiple solutions to revamp the
appearance of the mandi to attract middle income groups. He said that the mandi should
be cleaned twice a day. Sometimes the entrance is clogged by a herd of cows or group of
stray dogs who feed on the refuse from the mandi, so care should be taken to keep stray
animals out at all times. The items that are sold should be properly washed or cleaned if
possible. The pavement used to display the products should be covered with clean cloths
instead of old drab material. Measures should be taken to avoid dust blowing in the wind.
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For example, water can be sprinkled twice a day to settle the dust already in the air or
avoid further dust from accumulating. The vendors should make sure to bathe everyday
and wear clean clothes. Ram never acknowledged that these measures could be expensive
and laborious and never explained how the poor vendors would find funds to accomplish
these tasks. Many people surveyed mentioned that mandis are generally dirty but they did
not say that this deterred them from going. In fact some did not even know that there was
a mandi nearby, as it was hidden behind a temple and the mandi was no allowed to put
any sings on the busy main road. Also the entrance to the mandi was located on the side
street where the lower income neighborhood starts and hence none of the residents from
the wealthier areas were drawn there.
Another issue that Ram discussed was that very often people go to department
stores to eat. Some of the retail department stores in Jaipur, such as Handloom, have a
separate snack section where a variety of snacks such pav bhaji, chawmine, chaat, chole
bhature are available for hungry customers. Many people go to the departmental stores
for a quick meal or evening snack and end up buying their groceries in the same location.
In order to attract these customers to the mandi, Ram believed that the character of the
mandi should undergo massive change. It should function not as specialized vegetable
market, but more like a fair or carnival. Mandis should not only allow snack vendors to
put up stalls on their premises, they should also encourage people from their nearby
community to put out stalls for traditional Rajasthani food like dal bati churma, Sangar
sabzi and bajra roti, halwa and badaam milk. Also some games kiosks should be opened
to keep the children entertained. Again, mandis should be cleaned daily so that they have
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hygienic surroundings for people who want to enjoy a snack while they shop for their
groceries.
All the above suggestions made by Ram imply that the wholesale vegetable
mandis which have functioned as natural markets are no longer relevant in the age of
retail stores and malls. These mandis now have to function like tourist spots, where the
attraction does not end at buying. Spending time in the mandi should be a complete
experience to the customers, where they are not just buying produce but observing the
scene, and enjoying while observing. With this technique of enframing, Mitchell (1988)
describes how “the relation of a person to the world (is) changed from being ‘natural’ to a
‘careful and curious construction’. The subject (is) set up outside the facades, like the
visitor to an exhibition, and yet (is) surrounded and contained by them. It (is) a position at
once both of outside and inside…The world is set up before an observing subject as
though it were the picture of something”(60). This artificial enframing attempts to create
a space of representation dominated by commodity entertainment instead of other forms
of social practices and relations. The subject here also undergoes change. As I mentioned
before, the Indian street scene, maintains Appadurai (1987), is a site of organized idleness
where people just gather and simply watch the activities of the street or random
passersby. In fact, organized idleness or “hanging around is a highly cultivated aspect of
Indian street culture, and here certain settings like paan and cigarettes shops are the key
backdrops” (20). During the hours of hustle and bustle, “there is always a steady audience
of those who are in no hurry to go anywhere” and can simple sit and gaze on the streets
for hours while consuming numerous cups of tea and cigarettes from the local vendors.
Enframing as a technique attempts to change this organized idleness into Flânerie.
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In order to understand the difference between organized idleness and Flânerie, let
me first explain what a Flâneur or Flânerie signifies. Western literature on shopping malls
explains them as sites of collective dreaming, pleasure and diversion (Backes 1970).
Malls are often believed to be characterized by a certain kind of strolling by the Flâneur.
In his famous work on the 19th century Paris arcades in The Arcades Project, Walter
Benjamin (1999) theorizes the Flâneur as a cultural being who took pleasure in strolling
through the arcades where luxury goods and people were displayed for visual
consumption.
Benjamin highlights the functional nature of the Flâneur as the consumer of the
phantasmagoria, or the fantastic display of malls. I believe that the Flâneur is also a
producer, for without him there would be no need for the phantasmagoria. Flânerie, an
activity of the Flâneur, is strolling in the city, observing the landscape, people, their
behavior, noticing small ephemeral things, and reading the city as text. Flânerie for
Benjamin involved a dialectical image of the landscape: “We know that, in the course of
Flânerie, far–off times and places interpenetrate the landscape and the present moment”
(1999, M 2,4). It is possible to recognize a similar cultural identity as a near embodiment
of the Flâneur in modern times and in completely different landscapes. According to
Gluck (2003), the modern day Flâneur can assume diverse roles such as a privileged
bourgeois male with a destabilized masculinity (Wolff 1990) or a detective investigating
social space (Frisby 1994) or an urban consumer participating in mass culture (Schwartz
1998). However, in my opinion there is a subtle difference in the basic characteristics of
the Flâneur and any other kind of observer, as the identity of Flâneur is tied to a specific
kind of visual consumption that is only related to phantasmagoria and capitalistic
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commodity culture. The figure of the Flâneur is believed to have disappeared from the
streets of Paris. But Buck- Morris (1986) maintains that “if the Flâneur has disappeared
as a specific figure, it is because the perceptive attitude which he embodied saturates
modern existence, specifically, the society of mass consumption… and the Flâneur, thus,
becomes extinct only by exploding into myriads of forms, the phenomenological
character of which, no matter how new they may appear, continue to bear his traces”
(104- 105). What this enframing technique attempts to do is change the indigenous
observer, the one who participates in organized idleness, into a Flâneur who is active
observer of nothing else but commodity culture and capitalistic display.
Another issue brought up by Ram during our conversations was how essential it
was for the mandi vendors to trade their traditional scales for electronic machines. He
maintained that these antiquated scales are sometimes faulty and create mistrust among
the customers. Some vendors even use stones that they pick from the streets instead of
weights. Ram also mentioned that the vendors should put fixed price placards in front of
their produce in order to gain the trust of customers. According to him, customers get
frustrated with the invariable bickering on the rates of products at the mandi. This was
intriguing considering the fact that during the survey many of residents maintained that
sometimes the department stores are more expensive than the mandi. Also, hardly any
customers showed any concern about the weighting stones and scales and there was a
general feeling of trust towards the poor vendors in comparison to the big retail stores.
Two questions arise from this conversation. Why did Ram feel that changes in the
weighing techniques from traditional to modern were essential in making the mandi
successful, even though customers didn’t note this as a deterrent? Why did the customers
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prefer the big departmental stores in comparison to the traditional mandi, even though the
mandi was often cheaper?
To answer these questions let me point to an observation made by Rajagopal
(2001), who calls the hawker a contested figure in Indian modernity. This contestation is
evident in conversations with Ram, who though tasked with helping hawkers, believes
that the fact that the hawkers use pre-capitalist modes and technologies to sell their
products makes them ancient in the circuits of the modern global consumerist world.
Haggling, though not a big cause of concern in the eyes of the customers, appears
disruptive to Ram. He maintains that it is important to avoid haggling and instead
approximate more standard capitalistic exchange through fixed placards. This shift
thereby changes the sensory experience between the seller and the customer from an
auditory interaction to a fixed, visual, and disembodied mode of communication. Since
hawkers change their rates for different customers, especially by charging more money
for the same product when that are dealing with a wealthy customer, Ram argues that this
change of communication will ensure customers trust.
Ghayn Shyam, however, did not seem to agree with the Ram on the issue of
weights and scales. One day while explaining how the mandi is a better place to shop for
vegetables, he explained the benefit to customers of having traditional weights and scales
versus electronic ones:
“These malls have electronic balances but we have traditional balances. So
we end up giving 10-20 grams extra to the customers. You will ask how? Let me
explain it. Here in the mandi, we first weigh the produce, then put it in the bags,
but in the malls, they put things…like even 2-3 green chilies in the bag and then
weigh it. Since the price is all electronic, you can’t change it. Also, if the produce
is 1kg 10 grams, they will charge for that same quantity, but with us if the
produce is 1kg and 50 grams, we will only charge for 1 Kg. So we always round
off. The malls cannot round off as they have electronic scales. Also with us if the
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customer has purchased vegetables worth 105 rupees, they will only hand us a
100 rupee bill and tell us to forget about the rest...we are totally comfortable with
that. Can you do that in a mall? Absolutely not! (2010).”
This fact was confirmed during the customer survey. Many customers maintained
that the mandi had cheaper produce than the supermarkets. One customer said that “it
does not mean that they are poor so they will be thieves. In fact they have more morals
than the rich people in department stores. And let’s say they make a rupee or two more,
because of the weights…but they quickly adjust it. They’ll give us free cilantro, garlic
and green chili with other vegetables. What’s the harm in that?” There were a handful of
customers who did acknowledge the practice of differential rates and faulty scales used
by hawkers but they were quick to point that that it did not bother them much. According
to most customers a different kind of capitalist seduction is taking them away from the
mandi and to the retail stores.
Rajagopal (2001) discusses these seductions in an essay on the violence of
commodity aesthetics on the lives of hawkers. The department stores employ aesthetics
in display of products for consumer seduction and meticulously control the points of
purchase in order to increase the power of sellers. Systematic display of goods, proper
labeling and stamping of produce, and seemingly standardized pricing of the products on
placards build layers of meanings to the act of purchasing. In contrast, the pherewalas has
only himself and his limited produce as the mediating agent. And in this process he
reminds the modern customer of something pre-modern and pre-capatalist with no formal
display of pricing system and no formal contract.
Secondly, when a customer buys from a vendor, he or she makes auditory as well
as visionary interactions evoking “multiple registers of accent, cadency, pitch and tone”
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(Rajagopal 2001, 98). In contrast, in modern department stores, vision is the only sensory
interaction allowed and the customer makes a decision based in what he or she sees is on
display. Thus the power of the seller increases as the customers are only allowed to
employ their gaze to make decisions on what to purchase. In an odd way this order makes
the customers falsely believe in their own power as subjects. Here again the world is set
up as a picture of something. This enframing technique, according to Mitchell (1988),
creates a picture where “its order occurs as the relationship between observer and picture,
appearing and experienced in terms of the relationship between the picture and the plan
or meaning it represents. It follows that the appearance of order is at the same time an
order of appearance, a hierarchy. The world appears to the observer as a relationship
between picture and reality, the one present but secondary, a mere representation, the
other only represented, but prior, more original, more real” (60). Ram wants this kind of
relationship between seller and customer in the mandis too. He suggests that the vendors
of the mandi should be given an etiquette tutorial where they are taught not to haggle, and
be extremely polite with the customers. “Speak only when you are required. Don’t go on
to telling your life story…my mother is sick and my children are hungry.” As the
customers become tourists, vendors are asked to become absent negotiators who like
department stores should only using display or an appearance of order to communicate.
But is this transformation actually possible? During the survey, a customer eloquently
proclaimed “mandis can never become malls!” In Chapter 7, I will discuss the politics of
department stores and malls and the stance taken by CCS to deal with the conflict
between mandis and department stores.
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Conclusion
In this chapter I have discussed how CCS and NPSV aim to transform the rich
social spaces of the Indian street into the compartmentalized and segmented space of
capitalist production and consumption. I have discussed this phenomenon using three
connotations of public space in the context of India. First, public space is a public
property owned by the state, second it is a democratic semiotic landscape, and third it is a
sphere of rational critical discourse where citizens “experience sentiments of social
solidarity in public sphere.” I showed how CCS’s recommendations on managing public
space dissolve the public character of each of these three connotations. In the second half
of the chapter, with the help of the concept of enframing developed by Timothy Mitchell
(1988) I problematized NPSV’s proposal to divide the Indian city into hawking and nonhawking zones. Mitchell developed the concept of enframing to describe the 19th century
imperial practice of colonizing Egypt through dividing, segmenting and
compartmentalizing social space. Through my ethnographic fieldwork I show how NPSV
and NGOs and think tanks such as CCS practice enframing techniques to colonize the
social space of Indian cities for the global capitalist economy.
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Chapter 6: Analyzing NPSV as Passive Revolution: Problems with
Participation

Introduction
Gramsci referred to the adjustments made in the historical process to reproduce
capitalism as passive revolution. This technique of statecraft involves two discrete but
interrelated processes both working towards the same goal (Gray 2010)--the survival of
the capitalist state. The first process involves the “historical fact of absence of popular
initiative” and refers to “a revolution without mass participation, or a ‘revolution from
above’, involving elite-engineered social and political reform that draws on foreign
capital and associated ideas while lacking a national popular base” (Morton 2007, 41).
The second process, is related to the reproduction of hegemony by “seeking to both
forestall and at the same time adopt subaltern demands, yet without bringing those
subaltern groups into the ruling historical bloc” (Gray 2010, 454).
NPSV represents both of these processes. On the macro level, the formation of
NPSV represents a historical necessity that has been created with the advent of neoliberal
policies that have brought foreign and corporate funded NGOs and think tanks to the
forefront. The aim of this “third sector” is to take up the role of governance while seeking
to reorganize the state, society and space. But this reorganization is accomplished in the
face of mass deprivation of the poor due to growing disparities of income and access to
basic amenities. At the same time, poor are attaining class consciousness which has been
brought about by the voting rights associated with the democratic process and the
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promise of citizenship. Hence, NPSV’s true purpose is also to sedate the growing
demands of street hawkers.
NPSV is touted by its proponents as a participatory development strategy through
which street vendors would become empowered. It asks for the creation of Town
Vending Committees or Ward Vending Committees with active participation of hawkers
to take care of the issues associated with street vending. NPSV as passive revolution
represents “a type of politics in historical moments that are full of possibility for radical
change, but that ultimately takes the initiative away from radical social forces” (Gray
2010, 43). I believe that this participatory discourse is a kind of passive revolution that
fortifies the existing systems of marginalization and exploitation and actively creates new
ones that intensify stratification of society. The discourse of participation in NPSV hides
“donor-driven, predetermined categories of people and activities that do not allow much
flexibility for changing existing power imbalances” (O’Reilly 2006, 1082). Just as Nash
(2013) has shown in the case of municipal participation in South Africa, in this chapter I
will show how the current model of participation envisaged by NPSV speaks to
Gramsci’s passive revolution theory because it allows only forms of participation which
elite NGOs and the capitalist state deem acceptable. NPSV falls short of ensuring that
hawkers have the opportunity to fundamentally shape their own politics. In the following
pages, I will analyze the nature and role of the TVC or WVC that is laid out in NPSV and
while doing so, I will describe how this kind of “invited space” in effect is anti-hawker
and anti-hawking. The second part of the chapter is dedicated to Resident Welfare
Associations that form a part of the TVC. I will discuss how their modernist and elite
urban imaginations have created an environment of distress for hawkers and so including
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them in the participatory process to achieve hawking solutions for vendors can actually
attain the reverse result. Lastly, I will discuss the entangled space of informality that
hawkers confront every day in order to prove that reforms like NPSV will do little to
solve anything on the ground.

Structural problems with Town/Ward Vending Committee
NPSV describes the nature, constitution and role of Town Vending Committees:
Box 6.1: NPSV directive of Town/ Ward Vending Committee.
a) Designation or demarcation of ‘Restriction-free Vending Zones’/’Restricted
Vending Zones’/No Vending Zones’ and Vending Markets should be carried out in a
participatory manner by the Town Vending Committee, to be established at town/city
level. A TVC should consist of the Municipal commissioner. Executive Officer of the
urban local body as Chairperson and such member of members as may be prescribed by
the appropriate Government, representing firstly, local authorities; planning authority and
police and such other interests as it deems proper; secondly, associations of street
vendors; thirdly, resident welfare associations and Community Based Organizations
(CBOs) (rwa and cbos don’t include lower income residents); and fourthly, other civil
society organizations such as NGOs, representatives of professional groups (such as
lawyers, doctors, town planners, architects etc, representatives of trade and commerce,
representatives of scheduled banks and eminent citizens.
This Policy suggests that the representatives of street vendors’ associations may
constitute forty percent of the number of the members of the TVC and the other three
categories may be represented in equal proportion of twenty per cent each. At least one
third of the representatives of categories of street vendors, resident welfare associations
and other civil society organizations should be women to provide a gender focus in the
TVC. Adequate/reasonable representation should also be provided to the physically
challenged in TVC. The process for selection of street vendors’ representatives should be
based on the following criteria:
- Participation in membership- based organization; and
- Demonstration of financial accountability and civic discipline.

As mentioned in NPSV, Town Vending Committees (TVC) need to be constituted
at the City/Town level. NPSV further states that the TVCs may constitute, in such a
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manner, and for such purposes as it deems fit, Ward Vending Committees (WVC), if
required. Let me take a moment to describe wards as administrative units. Often called
the third tier of democratization, electoral wards are the smallest unit of government,
represented by locally elected councillors, brought together by the city council. After the
1991 economic liberalization, in an effort to decentralize urban governance, the 74th
Constitutional Amendment laid down a list of activities that different state governments
could delineate for ward committees. In my opinion, NPSV’s demand to create TVCs and
WVCs based on the administrative unit of wards poses many problems. To begin with,
the very provision for creation of TVCs is ambiguous and unspecified. What is supposed
to be the size of the TVC in a big town with no wards? Or for that matter, how many
TVCs or WVCs can exist in a big city with multiple wards? For example, Delhi has 134
wards. Will each ward have its own WVC? If yes, who will arbitrate disputes between
different WVCs? How much authority does each WVC or TVC have within the larger
Ward Committees? If WVCs and TVCs are supposed to function as a component of the
larger ward committee, shouldn’t the level of success or failure of the ward committees in
general be evaluated first? Further, even though CCS supports the creation of TVCs and
WVCs through its support for NPSV in front of the larger NGO community, it does not
mention vending committees at all in its publication Law, Liberty and Livelihood and
maintains that the larger ward committees alone should manage hawkers. To quote: “In
advocating ward-based ownership of public space, we build on the Draft National Policy
on Street Vendors’ recommendations of regulating hawkers by Ward committee” (85).
Also on their Jeeevika webpage in an essay called Livelihood Freedom Campaign, CCS
writes:
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Centralized decision-making can never accommodate preference of all
members of a community. In this context, it is important that the locus of
decision-making regarding the use of public space be changed from a single
municipal body to multiple wards. The ward committees are a good example of
decentralized, local, participatory government. Comprising of elected members
representative of a hawkers union, RWAs, MTAs, Housing/Cooperatives etc. and
citizens of that ward who elect the members of Ward Committee, they enable
people of a specific ward to know its problems, to identity its need and priorities
them and take decisions on subjects which can best be handled at that level. The
ward committee can collectively take decisions, among other things on where and
how many hawkers and rickshaw pullers they want in their area. This is a much
better option that decisions based on bureaucratic whims that arbitrarily decide
50
which market comprises encroachers who need to be evicted.
Various studies and research undertakings, including one conducted by CCS, have
concluded that the functioning of the Ward committee is ridden with many problems. The
fact is that the provision in the 74th Constitutional Amendment (CAA) to set up ward
committees across all states of India has had limited acceptance and enactment.
According to Kundu (2011), there are many cities in India where ward committees don’t
even exist. Moreover, in some cities where they do exist, committees are non-functional
or structurally flawed. This is perhaps because of the fact that CAA never clearly laid out
the specifications of the scope and functions or compositions of the ward committees, and
every ward committee is different. Scholars have also noted that the sizes of the wards in
some cities are too large to manage (Tava Lama-Rewal 2007, Ghertner 2010, Kundu
2011). Often several wards are included together to create one ward committee. Tava
Lama-Rewal (2007) maintains that ward committees often operate on a scale defying the
very notion of proximity. When several wards are grouped together, the size and
population become difficult to manage. For example, in the case of Delhi, only 12 ward
committees have been created to manage 134 wards. The average population represented
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by each ward committee is slightly more than a million (Mathur et al 2006), a number too
big to handle. Mathur et al, participants in the CCS held workshop Ward Power: Reforms
in Urban Governance and contributing authors in a CCS publication of the same name
write “barring WCs in Kerala and West Bengal, urban decentralization has not actually
meant devaluation- the transfer of responsibilities as well as power and finance- but
mostly it has been deconcentration: the half-hearted creation of new bodies which are
more like field offices controlled by the central city. They have very limited tasks,
powers and funds, hence little autonomy, and are dependent on and accountable to central
city corporations” (Wit 2005,12-14 cited in Mathur et al 2006, 20). The inability of ward
committees to start the decentralization process is further aggravated by the growth of
middle class activities through Resident Welfare Associations (RWAs). In the case of
Bangalore, Smitha (2010) has noted how RWAs tend to undermine “conventional
democratic channels” by playing in opposition to local leaders such as incorporators,
members of wards. Gherthner (2011) found that in Delhi some RWAs in the Bhagidari
system tend to get as much money as the elected councillors of particular wards through a
fund called “My Delhi, I Care.” In this way, RWAs have increasingly started functioning
as “de facto representatives of wards and neighborhoods and bestow official sanctions on
middle-class urban development norms” (525).
When the successful creation and functioning of WCs is a halted process, why
does CCS ask ward level management of street hawkers for the solution to the problem of
hawking? In a similar vein I question the assumption by proponents of NPSV that the
creation of TVCs and WVCs will be an easy, quick and efficient process when the larger
Ward Committees have failed to materialize in many cities.
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Another problem with NPSV is that it seems to limit the democratic process in
many ways. For example, the head or the Chief Executive Officer of each TVC/WVC is a
commissioner and not a councillor. While a councillor is a locally elected representative,
a commissioner is a senior IAS officer who is nominated by the state (or the center, in the
case of Delhi) and is in charge of framing policies and drafting budgets. This kind of
internal structuring of TVCs and WVCs mimics the organization of the larger Municipal
Corporations in most Indian cities with the exception of Kolkata. To explain this further,
the Municipal Corporation of Delhi has two wings. The “deliberative wing” is headed by
the Mayor, who is selected by the elected councillor and has limited financial controls,
and mainly performs a consultative role that frames thematic committees. The
Commissioner is the head of the executive wing, and is actually in charge of framing
policy and drafting the budget. In Delhi, because of the presence of a strong central
government, the Government of India controls most important decisions through the
Ministry of Urban Development and elected councillor do not have direct input towards
urban planning. Since the local population elects councillor, they are suited to represent
people’s needs and demands Commissioners, on the other hand, are extremely educated
individuals who have earned their entry into administrative services through highly
competitive Civil Services exams designed along the lines of the British Civil Services
exam. The commissioners in most cases have a modernist vision emanating from the
western centric model of modern education that views urban poor such as hawkers and
rickshaw pullers as deviant from the modernist urban utopia. Locally elected
representatives or Member of Legislative Assembly, however, have to heed the demands
of residents including the urban poor--even if they do so solely for electoral gains. This
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imbalance of power between the elected members and selected executive members within
MCD is apparent when we look at the numbers. A Municipal councillor has an annual
budget of approximately 7.5 million (USD 150.00) and each MLA about 20 million
rupees (USD 400.00) to spend on development projects in their area. However, these
projects must be approved not only by the executive wings of MCD, but also by the
Government of Delhi constituted by the commissioner and deputy commissioners and
other state and center appointed executives. For this reason, much of the funds go unused
before the end of the fiscal year (Ghertner 2010). Hence building TVCs or WVCs on the
model of the MCD, with an elected commissioner at the helm, undermines the
democratic participation of thousands of poor who vote to elect the councillors to
represent their interest in urban planning. Now NPSV also states that: “other participants
of TVC include local authorities; planning authority and police and such other interests as
it deems proper.” As one can see, this group of highly educated and accomplished people
is also mostly constituted of non-elected members of the urban elite. In the next section, I
will explain how the elite politics of the new middle class is a growing threat to the
livelihood of hawkers and other marginalized groups and how the structure of TVCs
limits democratic potential.

Politics of RWAs: The New Middle Class and the Bhagidari System
One significant group involved in TVCs is supposed to be the elite Residential
Welfare Associations. Scholars have started to give increased attention to the politics of
the Bhagidari scheme that calls for citizen participation in governance in Delhi, the
growing power of RWAs, and the fact that slum dwellers and urban poor have been
adversely affected by such changes. The next level of scholarship should demand an
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inquiry of how these new developments and policy changes are getting translated into
secondary policies on the use of urban space. It is especially important to analyze these
connections with regards to secondary policies that are created for the advancement of
the very people who have been marginalized by the first set of policy changes. And in
these cases, scholarship should attempt to identify connections between these two levels
of policy spaces and investigate if and how the former predetermines and dictates the
terms of the latter. I start my analysis with a brief discussion on the evolution of new
middle class and then move on show how the Bhagidari scheme and the rise in the power
of RWAs are representations of the new middle class. I will then explain how the
Bhagidari scheme is attempting to transform Delhi into an entrepreneurial city.

Evolution of New-Middle Class
The rise of new middle class, its politics and practices, is a subject that is
increasing being dealt with by scholars who study urban India. Fernandes (2004, 2006) in
her brilliant analysis of Mumbai discusses the spatial politics associated with the rise of
the new middle class and how changes in the cultural practices of consumption and
lifestyle are associated with the restructuring of urban space. The “politics of forgetting”
refers to “a political-discursive process in which specific marginalized social groups are
rendered invisible and forgotten within the dominant national political culture” (2416).
The new middle class, maintains Fernandes, arose with the economic policies
associated with liberalization. This social class is identified more for its culture of
consumerism than on the basis of its income. An income-based definition would include
additional groups in the middle class, such as rural farmers, shopkeepers, and small
traders. However, the members of this new middle class work for foreign banks,
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multinational companies, speak English, and consume modern day commodities such as
cars, televisions, and cell phones. This does not mean that the social groups within the
broader middle class are excluded. In fact, the new middle class serving as an ideal social
class with fluid boundaries tempts other groups to adapt in terms of lifestyle and cultural
practices in order to get access to this new category.
Fernandes maintains that this new middle class has distinctive cultural practices
and lifestyles and hence they are involved in an urban politics that demands spatial
restructuring according to their desires. For example, the urban landscape has come to be
dominated by a) service-sector-related industries and b) entertainment industries such as
malls, clubs and bars, bowling alleys, games parlors, and ice-skating rinks. This kind of
landscape is also actively guarded by the state to keep the poor and unwanted out.
The state’s role involves not only maintenance of the space that is being
constructed by the desire of the middle class. In fact, the desire, attitudes and preferences
of the middle class are related to the wider global restructuring that has been unfolded
through economic liberalization. This state-led liberalization has rendered many laborers
from organized sectors and previous manufacturing industries jobless and marginalized
from the economic benefits of the new structural changes. So the miserable condition of
the marginalized in many cases owes its existence to state-led reforms. Hence, the state is
actively involved in the politics of visibility and forgetting.
In the next few pages, I will explain the emergence and politics of RWAs in
Delhi through the evolution of the new middle class. While I concentrate my analysis on
51

Delhi, the rise of RWAs is a nationwide phenomenon through which the new middle
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class organizes itself and attains class consciousness. Although NPSV requires RWAs to
be only a small percentage of TWAs, I will make apparent that the presence of RWAs
and other non-elected members of the new middle class will undermine the participation
of street hawkers in the committee by swaying the general tone of the conversation
towards the interest of the urban middle class.
As in its publications, CCS demands that RWAs should take a greater and more
active role in not only vending committees, but also over all urban planning. Through my
ethnographic fieldwork and interviews, I will demonstrate how this move is going to be
anti-hawking since the politics of RWAs affects hawkers adversely, both directly as well
as indirectly.

The rise of RWAs can be traced back to the introduction of the Bhagidari system
in Delhi. The conception and hatching of Bhagidari took place in an environment of
economic liberalization that actively produced and enlisted vigorous debates on good
governance, citizens’ participation, deepening democracy and most important of all civil
society initiatives. Literally meaning “partnership”, Bhagidari signifies “citizensgovernment partnership” and was introduced by Delhi’s Chief Minister Sheila Dikshit in
2000. The initiative was created under the guidance of the Asian Centre for Organization
Research and Development (ACORD), a for-profit consulting organization with expertise
in “change management, strategic planning and the human development” (ACORD 2006,
cited in Ghertner 2011). Three main participants of Bhagidari are the Resident Welfare
Associations, Markets and Traders, as well as Industrial Associations and Municipal,
State and Central government bureaucrats. Only associations of authorized colonies are
granted affiliation to the Bhagidari scheme. According to Dikshit, by 2007 the scheme
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included around 1,600 elite citizens groups representing about three million of Delhi’s
population (Ghertner 2010). Through a series of workshops organized according to
administrative zones, the scheme attempts to create a space where participating citizens
interact with state bureaucrats from different government departments. Under the good
governance rhetoric, the citizens discuss and come up with demands surrounding water,
sanitation, electricity, environment and security. As we can see, association and
participation to Bhagidari is only granted to propertied citizens, while the unauthorized
colonies or slums are given no space in this partnership. In this way Bhagidari is creating
its own spaces of legality/illegality through inclusion and exclusion. It is easy to draw
parallels here with the anti-corruption movement led by Anna Hazari that I discussed in
Chapter 2. Relying too heavily on the associational characteristic of civil society, both the
movement downplay democracy and social inclusion. Also, both movements are
undemocratic and hegemonic. Srivastava (2009) maintains that “bhagidari produces its
own version of urban citizenship and space” (343). Like many other civil society
movements, this movement is hegemonic as it too drives the project of neoliberalism in
urban space. In fact, I believe that Bhagidari and RWAs epitomize civil society
movements that have very serious implications for how urban state and space are
accessed by the poor. In the next few pages, I will discuss this while drawing on
geographical scholarship on the neoliberal city.
Bhagidari can be seen as assisting what Brenner and Theodore (2002) call
weakening of the “taken for granted primacy of national scale” and increasing the
importance of urban scale so that cities instead of the nation are producing social
identities (20). According to Leitner et al (2007) a neoliberal city is conceptualized in

175

terms of three characteristics. First, it is an entrepreneurial city, competing with other
cities for foreign investment, innovations and the “creative class” (Florida, 2002; Leitner
1990). Second, the municipal bureaucracies involved in the mission of social progress are
being replaced by quasi-public agencies that incite inter-city competition and promote
economic development instead of social wellbeing. (Brenner & Theodore, 2002, Leitner
& Sheppard 2002, Smith 2002). Third, its citizens are neo-liberal subjects, an
“entrepreneur of himself or herself” (Gordon 1991, Ong 2006, Isin 1998, Keil 2002,
Larner 1997). In next few pages, I will show how Bhagidari and the rise of RWAs are a
product as well as enforcer of these changes.
Before I begin my analysis, I want to describe the sentiment of RWAs towards
street hawkers in their own words. Vignette A will provide a background to various
discussions in this entire chapter. In an interview, the head of Ashok Vihar’s main
federation of Resident Welfare Associations, described his views of street hawkers:

Box 6.2: Vignette A
Obviously, hawkers pose a lot of problems for the residents and they are in fact
involved in all sorts of crimes. Big crimes, small crimes- you name it, all types of crimes!
They roam around here and they know who is present in the house, what time he goes
and what time he comes back and so they commit theft. Actually they should be banned,
government should take very strong steps and say there should be no hawkers and
vendors. If at all they have to come, there should be some kind of authenticity with the
RWA, and they should be verified by the police for their credentials. The police should
give a certificate that this hawker is identified as such and such person, and this is his
home address. So at our end what we have done is that we have fixed times when they
can enter our neighborhoods. We try that these times are such that there are male
members in the houses...so that the hawkers cannot indulge in any kind of criminal
activities. We have also filed public litigations against the slums that surround our
neighborhoods. We won the case in high court some years back and we constructed a
wall separating us from the slums. These slum people try to break the wall and enter our
neighborhoods. A few years back, an entire family of 4 people was murdered one night of
Diwali. Fortunately for us, we have won the case again and contempt has been admitted,
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the departments have been taken to task, and something will be done very soon about the
slums.
The problem with giving license to hawkers is that suppose there are 100 hawkers
and you give license to 20 and you are not able to give license to the other 80 because
you are not able to find out where they live, what will happen then is… because of the
limited competition, those 20 hawkers will sell potatoes for Rs 30 instead of the earlier
price of Rs 20.
Let’s talk about the sweepers and gardeners. All the street sweepers and
gardeners are employees of MCD. Earlier they used to come and go on their own will.
Now government has introduced a biometric system. Sweepers and gardeners have to
come and put their thumb imprint or sign in the morning and at the time they leave in the
evening. But what has happened is that they sleep in the park even with they are on duty.
Now what we are telling the government is that we have so many senior citizens in our
RWAs. These people are retired and are at home all the time. Why not give the
accountability of the street sweepers and gardeners to us. These people should be
accountable to the citizens and not MCD because we can do a better job of making them
work. In this way the whole of Delhi is going to be neat and clean. This is what we are
asking and our demands have come in the newspapers many times...in Hindustan Times,
Times of India etc.
Secondly, MCD should let us set the priorities of the money that is supposed to be
spent... let’s say Ashok Vihar. Right now they don’t do a good job in allocating money for
different projects. Like recently MCD people stated ripping out the signs from the road
dividers and putting new ones in. No one does that in the US. I’ve traveled in the US for
2-3 months and no one does that. It only happens in India. If we are in charge, we won’t
let it happen. The third issue is that the payment to any government contractor can only
be made by the government once RWA has given a certificate of satisfactory execution of
their work.

The Competitive City: The Making of a World Class City
The entrepreneurial city is a city which is involved in urban competition to attract
the flow of people and capital and hence embarks on the route to liberalization,
privatization and “demunicipalization and recommodification of social and economic
life”( Harvey 1989, Leitner 1990, Macleod 2002, Prytherch 2002). Also, in order to
promote growth, the city must be sellable and so “marketing and urban imaginary are
fused with the economic and cultural dynamics of urban entrepreneurship” (Zukin 1998
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as sited in Prytherch 2002, 117). This urban imaginary is actively propagated through
terms like world class city and global city, which according to Birkinshaw and Harris
(2009) “further manufactures and normalizes the idea that the neoliberal urban
development model is replicable and sustainable” (cited in Ellis 2012, 4).
In a study conducted by the Confederation of Indian Industries, Delhi was ranked
the most favored business destination in India (Ahmed 2011). Since 2000, the National
Capital Region, which includes Delhi and its satellite towns acts as a “strategic node to
the global economy” by attracting as much as USD 35.66 billion (19% of total) of
52

Foreign Direct Investment, second only to Maharashtra. In light of these developments,
scholars have started to document the transformation of Delhi from “walled city to the
world-class city” (Baviskar 2006, Bhan 2009, Ghertner 2010, 2011, Dupont 2008, 2011,
Ahmed 2011). Lately in anticipation of the Commonwealth Games, this transformation
has been very rapid with major newspapers and city government taking part in active
media campaigns built on this rhetoric. These narratives are predominant in Bhagidari
workshops where all of the members - elite citizens, government officers, and executives
participate amidst the language of the world class city. Ghertner (2011) quotes a speech
made by a director of a Bhagidari cell during a workshop that was inaugurated by Chief
minister Sheila Dikshit.

It is time to showcase the city, to showcase the country in the city. The
Beijing Games are coming before the Commonwealth Games in Delhi, and you
can count on China showcasing its economic and military power. This is what
countries do. The 1986 Asiad Games [hosted in Delhi, in 1982 not 1986] did this
for Delhi. The city’s first two flyovers came then. Color TV first came to India
then. Now, we will construct 24 new flyovers before the Commonwealth Games .
52

Times of India, 17th February, 2003 “NCR, Maharashtra got half of total FDI inflows
in last 12 yrs”
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. . Sports offer a stimulus to get any upgradation done: wider roads, the Metro,
new stadiums — improving the city. We are here today to make sure this happens,
to help make Delhi the best city, a world-class city (Director of Bhagidari cell
2006 quoted in Ghertner 2011, 184).”

The competitive edge of the city, according to Harvey (1989), involves creation of
an attractive urban imaginary. Bhagidari advocates urban entrepreneurialism that is
premised upon the marketing of a green and clean Delhi. Its workshops often begin with
the ‘bhagidari song’: Hawa sudhar gayi, sadak sudhar gayi…har mushkil ki hal mikali,
Bhagidari se bhagidari nikali..Meri Dilli main hi sanwaroo…officer aye, etc (“the air is
cleaner, the streets are better…a solution has been found for every problem, Bhagidari
has led to sharing…I will nurture my Delhi….Officers visited, etc”). Srivastava (2009)
mentions that this folk song is based upon a village folk tune, encouraging the urban
citizenry to imitate close bonds of rural community in order to improve their city. Indeed
this song is very telling of the urban “citizens movement”, labeled by scholars as
“middle-class environmentalism” that Delhi has witnessed with the introduction of
neoliberal policies. As scholars have noted elsewhere, long standing forms of
socialization in the city have faced assaults from neoliberalism, however Gough (2002)
debates that socialization has not been completely erased but reconfigured by
neoliberalism. In fact, “new forms of socialization in production and reproduction” have
emerged which are stamped by neoliberal logic (59). Bhagidari is a new form of
communitarianism that seeks to create its own version of urban space and environment,
where the poor like street hawkers and slum dwellers have no say.
This has happened through a series of environmental disputes that position the
urban middle class as victims. In the last 15 years, in response to various Public Interest
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Litigations the Supreme Court of India has given judicial orders that have changed
Delhi’s urban landscape for the urban poor (Bavaskar, 2002, Dembowski 2000, Gadgil
2001, Mawdsley 2004, Bhan 2009). Some of these measures are 1) the Industries
Relocation Case of 1996, which meant closure of all polluting and non-conforming
industries in the city, and in that process displacing about two million workers from their
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daily jobs in and around 98,000 industrial units (Bavaskar 2002, Ramanathan 2006); 2)
conversion of all public transport and private commercial transport from diesel to the use
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of less polluting compressed natural gas (CNG); 3) measures taken to manage solid
55

waste disposal; 4) and sealing all unauthorized commercial properties in the residential
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neighborhoods in order to avoid congestion (Bhan 2009). Since these changes happen in
entangled spaces of informality, they affect many groups of informals, some of them in
less obvious fashions than others. In the next few pages, I will explain these how these
changes affect marginalized groups such as hawkers using the story of Asha that forms
Vignette B. While describing her everyday life, Asha touches upon various issues that
affect her and her family. I will come back to her story in different discussions of this
chapter.

Box 6.3: Vignette B
At a T intersection of two main roads in Ashok Vihar, Asha has been selling tea
for the last 20 years. In the center of the T junction, there is a large board that says: Let’s
make our Delhi a World Class City. The roads next to Asha’s enclosure are always busy
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as it is the main junction from where people enter Ashok Vihar. She and her husband
Sriram came to Delhi from a village near Gorahkpur in UP because there was no work for
them. Their ancestral land was not very productive and was too small, as it had been
divided among 4 brothers. The first 5 years of their life in Delhi was miserable. They
were often very lonely and missed their extend family, neighbors and village kinship.
Sriram initially worked in a factory but life was tough at work, he would get injuries and
cuts from working with machines and sharp tools. Also, the pay was not enough to
sustain a big family. He later started work as a rickshaw puller, which he continues to do
even today but makes a meager earning. At some point they were able to make a small
jhuggi in the nearby slum but that was demolished. They lost all their belongings and
papers including proofs of identity and ration cards that were important to secure any
future benefits or resettlement housing from the state. Now they both have 6 children and
a small open space on the footpath by the boundary wall of middle-income apartment to
live. In order to shield her family from sun and rain, they have tried to cover some part of
it using long tree branches, a cloth and a torn plastic sheet. But Asha says that it does not
help: “When it rains we are always drenched.” The family sleeps in the open, on the
broken pavement along the road. Asha obtains water illegally from Delhi Jalboard that is
located on the opposite side of the street. Although their family is below the poverty line,
new ration cards have not been issued to them as their older ones were lost during
demolition. They do not get even subsidized food meant for people below the poverty
line. Instead of paying Rs 5 for one kilogram of Rice they pay Rs 25. They don’t have
any electricity and sometimes use the light from the cooking stove at night. Only one of
their children goes to school. When anyone falls sick, they go to the government
dispensary for free treatment. But these are often so crowded and many times out of
medicine. As she greeted me, she made me sit on a couple of large stones that she uses as
benches for her customers. At the time we started talking, Asha was cooking food for her
children. I asked her about how much money is she able to make from selling tea. She
complained “hardly any.” In the last few years, her sales have gone down and there are
hardly any people who come for tea. I asked her what was the reason. She explained that
her main clients had been the workers from the nearby factory who were thrown out of
jobs as the factories were closed or relocated. Some people from the nearby slums used to
come too, but since they too have been demolished, there are no clients. I asked her then
why she was still there. “We don’t have money, we don’t have any flats and that’s why
we sit in this small corner and sleep on the foot path.” I asked her if she had ever been
asked to move from there. To this she replied, “yes, the people (MCD) are coming with
bulldozers to remove my family.” When? I asked. Taking a moment while chopping
onions, Asha scanned the adjoining main roads and casually replied “in an hour or so”.
“In one hour!” I exclaimed. She said yes and explained that she will find another footpath
like this one for some time. I asked if this has happened before. She said “not really”. I
wanted to understand why this was happening the same day I had come to interview her.
But instead, Sriram started explaining that they did not get the flats like the other people:
“We did not have proof like our very old ration card, and other identity card and we did
not even have money to apply. Also, now we don’t have an address. Footpath does not
have any address. But it does not matter, even the people who got flats keep coming back
here as there is no means of livelihood where they were relocated. Of course, if we had
received a flat, we could use it in times like these when the MCD van can come anytime
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to demolish our little shack. We have lived our entire lives on the pavement. These kids
were born on the pavement too.” At this point a few other people started gathering around
our group. They empathized with the family and started waiting for the MCD van to
arrive. Somehow, the word had gotten out. I later found out from one of the people that
the reason for demolition that particular day was that the Commonwealth Games were
soon to be held in Delhi. Along with many of the slums, these kind of individual
makeshift footpath shacks were being demolished. A man who had come to have tea,
explained how creating a Ration card or Below Poverty Line card (BPL cards) is tough
for people like Sriram. Since private companies have been given the contract of creating
cards, the work is seldom done properly. A private company in Ashok Vihar itself got the
contract to make BPL cards for many people around Delhi. They have done a miserable
job as only 10% of the people have received their cards.

Slum Demolition and the Role of the Middle Class
At the time I met Asha and her family, the biggest problem they faced was being
displaced from the temporary shack that they had built on a footpath. Asha had
mentioned that earlier her family was forced to move when their jhuggi was demolished
by MCD. In the earlier conversation, the Head of Federations of RWAs of Ashok Vihar
had proudly described how his federation of RWAs was responsible for the removal of
the slums where Asha and Sriram used to live. A brief history of slum politics in Delhi is
pertinent here to show how RWA’s middle-class politics, elite aestheticization of space
and neoliberal speculation and privatization of land is affecting poor slums dwellers and
hawkers like Asha in the post-liberal decades.
According to the Economic Survey of Delhi of 2002-03, the city can broadly be
divided into four types of settlements. There are planned colonies that account for 23.7%
of Delhi’s population. Then there are unplanned but legal colonies designated as “slums”
under the Slum Areas Act of 1956 (also ratified in 1973), where about 19% of the lower
income and poverty stricken population resides. According to the act, “slums” or Jhuggi
Jhopdi, are those areas where buildings are unfit for human habitation because of
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dilapidation, overcrowding, and lack of ventilation, light and proper sanitary facilities.
However, these slums are legal and are eligible for improvement in basic amenities such
as water, electricity and sanitation. Also, they do not face the threat of eviction without
resettlement. There is about 5.3% and 17.75 of the non-poor population that resides in the
unauthorized colonies and regularized unauthorized colonies respectively. Of the
remaining, 14.8 % percent live in unauthorized Jhuggi Jhopdi or JJ clusters, which mean
a makeshift shack for the poor, and 12.7% live in JJ resettlement colonies.
Despite the Delhi Development Authority’s earlier objectives to “integrate urban
poor into the fabric of the city,” its lackluster attempts did little to resolve the problem of
housing in Delhi (DDA 1957, 1962 cited in Dupont 2008, Bhan 2007). This
“implementation backlog,” acknowledged by DDA’s own study, led to a rapid increase in
slums in the city (Dupont 2008, Ramanathan 2006, Bhan 2006, Ghertnther 2012). While
the entire population of Delhi rose six fold during 1951–92, the slum population
increased more than 20 times and in 1992, 259,000 Delhi households lived in slums (Jha
et al 2007). As the Delhi master plan since its conception allowed the urban poor 25% of
the residential land in the city, state officials and politicians let lower-income people
squat informally in the undeveloped lands acquired by DDA to house low-income
housing (Gherthner 2012). According to a report by the Delhi Urban Environment and
Infrastructure Improvement Project (DUEIIP) about 84.7 % of the land occupied by the
slums is owned by DDA. While slum dwellers have always been at the mercy of the
authorities, prior to the1990s, through different tactics like “patronage and protection in
exchange of votes by the local politicians, negotiations with local administrations,
temporary stay orders from the courts” (Bavaskar 2006) and even bribes, many slums
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avoided demolition. Slums, even the ones that were not notified by the Slum Area Act for
resettlement, when demolished were compensated and resettled in colonies that are now
called JJ resettlement colonies. Of course this very exercise in itself has been a
“technique of dividing poor” for those who are eligible to gain a plot under resettlement
policy do not want to jeopardize their chances to that by resisting eviction (Baviskar
2006). The ones who get relocation plots are driven to resettlement colonies in peripheral
areas, where difficulty in finding jobs and long commutes to older workplaces create their
own set of problems. It is a common practice for the resettled slum dwellers to sell or rent
their quarters, even when it’s illegal and move back to the empty lands from which they
were earlier evicted, often to be evicted again. While studies have conducted benefit-cost
analysis to prove that the option of relocation in not economically viable (Khosla and Jha
2005 cited in Dupont 2008), at least some of the evicted slum dwellers find temporary
shelter and could use the property rights of the resettled house to gain entry into the urban
property market. Another advantage of a strong resettlement policy was that many slums
could avert demolitions till the authorities had found a suitable resettlement site for them.

As the slum population is rising, the importance of improving current slums and
relocating evicted slum dwellers continues to find space in slum policies and the goals of
both MCD and DDA. For example Dupont (2008, 80) points out that in the slum policy
of 1990-91, the government of Delhi and DDA both approved a “three-pronged strategy”
for dealing with squatter settlements:
-in situ upgradation for the clusters whose “encroached land pockets are not
required by the concerned landowning agencies for another 15 to 20 years for any project
implementation’;
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-relocation of jhuggi-jhopri cluster that are located on land required to implement
projects in the “larger public interest”
- environmental improvement of urban slums, based on the provision of basic
amenities for community use, in other clusters irrespective of status of the encroached
land. (MCD 2000 cited in Dupont 2008, pg 80)
Then in 2000, the cut-off date and eligibility criterion for resettlement was
extended from January 1990 to December 1998, which needed ration cards as proof”
(Dupont 2008).
However, the fate of slum dwellers and hawkers who live and squat on public
space has changed dramatically with the advent of neoliberal reforms and cultural
changes that followed. In the 1990s, changes in the Judiciary enabled the Supreme Court
and regional high courts to add their own layer of sovereignty over the policies regarding
slums and hawking. It started with a landmark case, S P Gupta vs. Union of India (1985)
in which Justice Bhagwati in the hope of letting the poor and marginalized gain access to
the justice of the court, started accepting Public Interest Litigation from the common
man, the public. This ushered in an era of Public Interest Litigation (PIL) that started
flooding into the courts from the late 1980s. Soon, instead of the poor, RWAs represented
by educated elites and wealthy middle-class that had attained a kind of class
consciousness under the Bhagidari scheme started finding ways to use the PILs against
the very people it was created for. It is here the nuisance laws that I mentioned briefly in
chapter 4, were summoned. Gherthner (2008) very brilliantly sketches how the nuisance
laws were employed against MCD and such authorities at the beginning, and then later
flipped over and mutated to form an anti-poor discourse in a period of 10-15 years. Initial
RWAs’ PILs did not go directly after the poor and instead blamed MCD for not fulfilling
its role in providing housing and sanitation to slums, which made the poor come into
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public space and create filth. The Judiciary backed such PILs and asked MCD to improve
sanitation and find resettlements for the slums. These discourses created the poor as dirty
and fitly but not as the “party responsible to the nuisance.” For example, in KK
Manchanda vs the Union of India, the RWA of Ashok Vihar that appeared before the
court regularly until 2002, complained that they were distressed because of the squalid
condition of the empty plot in front of their colony. The people residing in the nearby
Jhuggi Jhopri had made this space that was supposed to be a beautiful green-belt into an
“open public lavatory.” The petition further explained that this had “transgressed their
right to very living” as “thousands of people easing themselves pose such uncultured
scene, besides no young girl can dare to come to their own balcony throughout the day,
[because] obnoxious smells pollute the atmosphere [,thus] the entire environment is
unconducive to public health and morality” (cited in Ghertner 2008).
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As Baviskar (2003) has noted elsewhere, this particular jhuggi jhopri outside
Ashok Vihar at that time had more than 10,000 households and effectively one toilet per
2083 persons. The slum residents were mentioned in the petitions but authorities were
blamed both by the PIL and Judiciary for not being able to prevent nuisance, and in 1992
the court disposed the petition asking the respondents to prevent the slum residents from
defecating in the park. Instead of the upgrade of sanitary conditions in the slums,
authorities were simply asked to prevent the act of defecation in the public park. This
case was followed by an extremely violent backlash by the residents in later years. In
January 1995, a young man from the nearby jhuggi was beaten to death by angry
residents and two police constables in the same empty lot for attempting to defecate.
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CWP No 531 of 1990 in the Delhi High Court.
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It was in the famous case, Almrita Patel vs the Union of India that the judiciary
started equating slums with nuisance. The wording of the court ruling was particularly
interesting as it is here, for the first time, we see certain kinds of imagination of the city
building up in the minds of the elite. The ruling maintained that Delhi being the capital
“should be the “…show piece of the country” but “instead of ‘slum clearance’ there is
‘slum creation’ in Delhi”:
“This in turn gives rise to domestic waste being strewn on open land in
and around the slums. This can best be controlled at least, in the first instance, by
preventing the growth of slums. The authorities must realise that there is a limit to
which the population of a city can be increased, without enlarging its size. In
other words the density of population per square kilometre cannot be allowed to
increase beyond the sustainable limit. Creation of slums resulting in increase in
density has to be prevented… It is the garbage and solid waste generated by these
slums which require to be dealt with most expeditiously and on the basis of
priority”58

Ghrenter (2008) maintains that this was the first time when the nuisance was
blamed on over-population and slums instead of the authorities. Also, instead of equating
nuisance to an activity, here it is related to a group of people. Slums represented “large
areas of public land….usurped for private use free of cost.” The provision of resettlement
was also attacked here when the court declared that the “promise of free land, at the
taxpayers’ cost, in place of a jhuggi” is “a proposal which attracts more land grabbers.
Rewarding an encroacher on public land with an alternative free site is like giving a
reward to a pickpocket” (Ramanathan 2006). Hence in this judgment we witness for the
first time the criminalization of the poor.
The Almirita case set the grounds for various RWAs of Delhi to file PILs with a
general feeling of that they were the victims of slum related nuisance. In 1999, the court
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lumped about 63 petitions filed by various RWAs under the lead petitions of Pitiampura
Sudhar Samiti and KK Manchanda, to deal with the “larger issue of removal of
unauthorized JJ clusters from public land which were in the vicinity of various residential
colonies” (cited in Ghretner 2008). Ghertner identifies an unusual uncoupling that the
judgment did in this case “one is the removal of JJ clusters and the other is their
rehabilitation.” Since the latter issue was being dealt with on a different bench of the high
court, in these proceedings the focus was put only on the former. Now since the question
of entitlement was bracketed off, the poor who are in theory entitled to 25% of the urban
land suddenly become encroachers on public land who come from other states. Blaming
JJ clusters for
The welfare of the residents of these [RWAs’] colonies is also in the
realm of public interest which cannot be overlooked. After all, these residential
colonies were developed first. The slums have been created afterwards which is
the cause of nuisance and brooding ground of so many ills. The welfare, health,
maintenance of law and order, safety and sanitation of these residents cannot be
sacrificed and their right under Article 21 is violated in the name of social justice
to the slum dwellers. Even if the government and civic authorities move at snails
pace and take time at their own leisure for the rehabilitation of these clusters, this
is no excuse for continuing them at the given places (ibid.).
Here we see how RWA’s right to clean the environment outweighs the poor’s
right to shelter and livelihood because these neighborhoods existed before slums. Also,
the poor are treated as abject aliens that pose a threat to the decent living of the true
citizens of the city. This petition and the others that followed mainly used the nuisance
discourse instead of illegality to target slums. In fact, in some of the petitions, the slums
were not even mentioned. Citizens’ deprivation to a clean environment and civic
amenities are created as the violation of the right to live. In almost all of the judgments,
neighborhood slums were found the culprit and demolished with no guarantee of
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rehabilitation. As Bhan (2009) notes, while around 50,000 houses in the slums were
demolished between 1990-2003, about 45,000 more have been demolished in just the
three years that followed without any hope of rehabilitation. So one might wonder why is
nuisance discourse more successful in the demolition of slums than the discourse of
illegality? I believe that the idea of nuisance only takes form when there is an aggrieved
party involved. Here the aggrieved parties are the RWAs which have grand visions of
living in a world class city.
The somewhat quasi pro-poor element in slum evection and relocation too
changed in 1993, when in Lawyers’ Corporation Group Housing Society vs Union of
India, Justice B N Kirpal declared: “It appears that the public exchequer has to be
burdened with crores of rupees for providing alternative accommodations to juggi
59

dwellers who are trespassers on public land” (B N Kirpal quoted in Ramanathan 2006)
This was followed by the direction to change the property rights of resettlement sites
from lease to license.

Box 6.4: Draft annual plan of the Slum and JJ development of Delhi
The draft annual plan of the Slum and JJ development of Delhi now say
- “(4) The licensee shall have no ownership rights. They shall not be allowed to
sell Or rent the plot. If it is sold/rented, the plot will be taken back.
-(5) No one other than the licensee and her/his family may stay in the
house/allotted plots…
-(8) If an adequate house is not constructed within six months of allotment, the
license shall be terminated…
- (12) If the licensee has taken a loan from HUDCO (for construction of the
house), and has not been able to pay back the loan installments for a period of six
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months, the license will be automatically cancelled, and the license will be evicted from
the plot.
- (13) Warning: selling or buying the plot against the law. In accordance with the
direction of the Delhi high Court in CMP No 267 and 464 of 1993, the licensee does not
have ownership rights. If anyone other than the licensee or his/her family is staying on
the plot, license will be cancelled and the person will be evicted without notices or
without assigning any reason”

Source: Ramanthan 2006(3194)

Criminalization Of The Poor
In order to promote growth, entrepreneurial cities often engage in a massive
makeover after the roll-back of neoliberalism and take the shape of what Soja (2000, 299)
calls “splintering post-metropolitan”, where gated communities, high rent seeking malls
and other protected areas from real and imagined dangers have proliferated (MacLeod
2002). According to Bernner and Theodore (2002), the architectural and institutional
practices are aimed to discipline the entrepreneurial city. This involves management of
poor and marginalized in such a way that they are not visible and do not pose any kind of
symbolic or material threat to order. The entrepreneurial city is hence closely related to
the “revanchist city”, where “revench” is a French translation of English word revenge. A
revanchist city is the one that is hard on the people who defy law and order. Smith (1998,
2002) explains how the infrastructural changes related to roll-out neoliberalism in New
York were also marked by “zero tolerance” for groups that posed a threat to the city. In
such cases the city gets divided between wealth and poverty. The “victors” become
increasingly defensive of their property while the other half are not only neglected but
also criminalized. As mentioned before, scholars have shown how New York style
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neoliberal urban polices travel around the globe and wreak devastations of much greater
magnitude in countries with already existing deep inequalities (Smith 2001, Swanson
2007, Wacquant 2003). Local governments fuse these neoliberal polices containing
modernist undertones with regional prejudices and provincial discriminatory discourse to
sanctify public space for unfettered capitalist consumption. Such is the case of Delhi and
other large cities in India. The Bhagidari scheme, which appears to be a participatory
civil society endeavor, in reality is extremely class biased and is one such local discourse
that integrates revanchist city ideas with its goals. The Head of Ashok Vihar federations
of RWAs equate hawkers to thieves who commit “all sorts of crimes.” At one point he
takes an extreme stance of demanding the ban on street hawkers. But understanding that
it’s impossible to do so at present circumstances, he goes on to say that if there have to be
hawkers, they should be properly verified by the government. These sentiments resonate
across various RWAs that participate in Bhagidari schemes and hence fear of the poor
and equating them with criminals has shaped some of the agendas of Bhagidari. A list of
issues discussed in workshops of Bhagidari are “(1) Police and RWA cooperation; (2)
servant verication; (3) RWAs informing police about those houses where both husband
and wife went out to work (i.e, where houses are vacant during the day), and “inspection”
of all unoccupied houses; (4) drawing up lists of maid, hawkers, plumbers, etc, in order to
only allow “authorized” people and (5) surprise checks (by the police) on the private
security personnel employed by the RWAs” (Srivastave, 2009, 335).

Quasi-Public Agencies
The second element of an entrepreneurial city involves replacement of municipal
bureaucracies that have the mission of social progress with quasi-public agencies that
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promote economic development instead of social wellbeing and incite inter-city
competition (Brenner & Theodore, 2002, Leitner & Sheppard, 2002, Smith 2003). These
changes are achieved by an increase in public-private partnership (PPP) or mass
privatization of the municipal public sector and collective infrastructure. But Larner
(2003) has called for a more nuanced analysis of specific neo-liberal projects: “we need a
more careful tracing of the intellectual, policy, and practitioner networks that underpin
the global expansion of neoliberal ideas, and their subsequent manifestation in
government policies and programmers” (Larner 2003). Geographers and others have
attended to this by studying the development of neo-liberal trajectories through localized
practices in different parts of the world (Walker et al 2008, Brenner & Theodore 2002,
Barnett 2004, Harvey 2005, Massey 2007, Peck 2004). For example, Brenner and
Theodore (2002), contrast their approach to that of neo-liberal ideology, in which market
forces are assumed to operate universally as fixed and rigid laws. They emphasize
studying contextual embeddedness of “actually existing neoliberalism” and seek to
explore “the path-dependent, contextually specific interactions between inherited
regulatory landscapes and emergent neo-liberal, market-oriented restructuring projects at
the broad range of geographical scale” (2).
As mentioned before, the neoliberal reforms in India, especially in urban
infrastructure, have been gradual. For example, in 2002, Delhi Jal Board (DJB), the
agency responsible for supplying water in Delhi, commissioned the “Delhi Water Supply
and Sewerage Project Preparation Study” to Price Waterhouse Cooper (PWC) with the
assistance of the World Bank. However, rigorous opposition and strong campaign from
various citizens groups exposed the hand of World Bank behind the granting of the
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contract to PWC and found flaws in the design and cost of the project proposed by PWC.
In addition, they uncovered a proposal to hire private management consultants to improve
service delivery efﬁciency, which would have simultaneously increased water tariffs
across the city. Finally, in 2005, DJB had to shelve the project.
But that does not mean that privatization of services is not taking place. It is
important to identify specific forms of public/private partnership that are muted and
hybridized versions of the ideal model. Even though PPP is gradually being introduced
into the public distribution system and urban infrastructure, I see Bhagidari scheme as a
hybridized form of PPP where elite of the city are encouraged to form networks and
direct associations with government agencies that are responsible for the provision of
basic infrastructure. Instead of national and multinational private corporations, it is the
citizens owning private property in the city who are encouraged to seek partnerships with
the government. Mr Kholi, the treasurer of Federation of RWAs in Ashok Vihar,
explained the tactics RWAs used to get their neighborhood demands fulfilled:
“Oh yes! We meet these executives during the Bhagidari workshops and remain
in touch with them. We also keep writing to various departments and have
meetings with them regularly. Most of the time, they listen to us and do their
work. For example we had a meeting with Delhi Jal board about two months
back. We asked them to do something because the water pressure was very low in
our neighborhood. They did complete that work. One of the very respectable
residents of Ashok Vihar has a relative who is very high up in Delhi Jal board...so
it was very easy. Sometimes NDPL (North Delhi Power Limited) invites us and
asks us to report our issues. Many times, these agencies listen to what we say and
do our work but sometimes when they don’t, we use other ways. For example,
right now we are trying to talk to the MCD about the construction of roads. They
dig up the good roads and don’t take care of the ones that are already broken.
Then Delhi police does not do their job in removing the vendors from the
pavement. Last year two kids from our neighborhood were killed by a bus while
they were going to school because they were walking on the road. Of course,
there was no walking space for them on the pavement since the hawkers were
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illegally squatting there. After the accident all hawkers ran away otherwise they
would be arrested. Now look at the irony, just 2 months after this tragic incident I
got a call from a higher up police officer asking me to let the hawkers come back
to their previous spots. See these hawkers have such connections. It is very much
possible that one of the hawkers has a wife who works in the police officer’s
house as maid and she asked him to call me and make this request. He said, sir
now the kids who died cannot come back but the hawkers are dying out of
hunger…think about their families. It’s like this, someday a minister will call
saying please let the hawkers sit where they used to. But we are very strict…we
don’t cater to these people who are involved in vote bank politics. We did not let
the hawkers in for one year but now they are back and police is not doing their
job in removing them even after the accident. But we don’t give up. We have a
large interview set up with Sahara TV tomorrow at our green belt (public park).
You should also come to attend it. There will be some 40 people from the Ashok
Vihar RWAs to discuss the issues such as these and how we are not being heard
by various government agencies like MCD, Delhi Jal board, Delhi police. Sahara
TV is going to air our interview on their national broadcast. That is going to put
more pressure on these departments to do the work that we are asking for.
Sometimes if the departments don’t listen to us we also ask our local MLAs to talk
to the departments. We are apolitical, i.e we don’t support any political parties
but we won’t spare anyone who does not do our work”.

When Mr Kholi mentions “but we are very strict…we don’t cater to these people
who are involved in vote bank politics”, not only is he showing his disenchantment with
the democratic process that lets marginalized participate in decision-making politics but
he is also confirming the successful privatization of the state by the RWAs. As explained
before, the Bhagidari system is destroying the “feet of vernacular clay” and creating a
form of parallel governance that is only accessible to the rich of the city. Ghertner (2011)
calls this phenomenon “gentrification of the state” where the spaces held formerly by
lower-class people such as hawkers and slum dwellers through electoral politics is
usurped by the upper class. The RWAs are able to achieve this through various methods.
From the above dialogue with Mr Kholi, it is easy to comprehend the intensity of the
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media’s support for this project. Another way of privatization of state is by finding
“institutional access routes.” According to Fox (1993), institutional access routes are
“structurally selective filters in the state apparatus that make some institutions especially
vulnerable to the concerns of particular societal actors” (39). Mr Kholi describes how it
was easy to make Delhi Jal board attend to their problems because of their internal
connections. It is important here to also understand that when a non-democratically
selected elite holds a position within state, his or her elitist ideas, visions and connections
get imprinted in the decision making process. As Fox explains, the state actors in reality
“have their own views on how to respond to challenges from both inside and outside the
state, and their control over state organization often gives them the capacity to put these
ideas into practice” (15). As the middle class matures and the presence of marginalized
erodes, this phenomenon of privatization of the state by citizen groups such as RWAs
will enable further corporatization of state.

Entangled Spaces of Informality
The earlier dialogue with Asha captures the everyday life of one street hawker.
The problems and struggles of Asha’s family are multiple and have numerous reasons
that are entangled with one another. The entirety of her sufferings can only be understood
when we recognize entangled spaces of informality. For example, Asha’s story adds
another dimension to how neoliberal changes such as industrial restructuring and the
adoption of a middle-class urban imaginary are adversely affecting the poor. The reason
behind her declined income as a hawker is closely related to the closure of industries to
create Clean Delhi.
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In an interview with Raghu, a food hawker in a Jahangir Puri, a low-income
neighborhood, I found out how neoliberal industrial changes have made his daily income
decrease as well. Raghu sells Chaat, Indian snacks, on the side of a dirty road. His clients
included factory workers who worked at the nearby industrial plants. At first, I assumed
that his clients stopped coming as the industries were closed down as per the Clean Delhi
rhetoric but he told me that since Jahangir Puri is a low income neighborhood, the
factories were not touched. Instead, I found out that there were other post-liberalization
changes in industrial labor laws and policies that adversely affected his clients, the
factory workers. To explain this let me give a small background of industrial laws in
India. Since independence, several liberal economists and developmentalist global
financial institutions had been criticizing India’s strong and rigid labor laws for muting
the growth rate and repelling private investments. Kanwal Rekhi, an Indian-American
businessman who is a former chairman of CCS, wrote in a commentary for CCS:
“draconian labor laws have provided extreme protection to the organized labor sector at
the expense of everybody else. These laws have been a huge disincentive for businesses
60

to hire people.” After the 1991 reforms, voices such as Rekhi’s have become
vociferous, and in 2005, the Prime Minister’s office proposed to introduce amendments
to Chapter VB of the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) of 1947 and the Contract Labor Act
of 1970. Although these amendments have not formally been adopted, they have started
being practiced widely. They aim to give greater freedom to the employers to lay off
permanent workers and let employers seek contractual or casual labor in larger numbers
for regular work. In a study, Sunanda Sen et al (2006) have shown that the ratio of non-
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permanent workers to the total number of workers for most of the manufacturing sectors
at the three-digit level have gone up during the 1990s. Also, the proportion of contractual
workers to total number of workers in all the sectors taken together has gone up from
9.89% in 1992-93 to 23% in 2000-01. These policy changes have also shifted the
responsibility of managing workers’ welfare from the state to the individual employers.
Since there is no provision of equal pay for equal work, these changes in the increase of
labor flexibility and casualization of the labor market have reduced pay and increased job
insecurity of the work force. As the paying capacity of labor goes down, they stop buying
or spending. Hence, we have cases like that of Asha, who is affected by industrial
restructuring in urban space, and that of Raghu, who is affected by labor restructuring in
industrial space.
Another topic of conversation with Asha and Sriram was the inflated food prices
and their inability to obtain subsidized food, grains, and other products. Considering the
fact that the government of India’s largest welfare scheme is the Public Distribution
System (TPDS) that aims to provide food to both rural and urban poor households, these
complaints seem surprising. However, statistics show that the average purchase of grains
in urban areas is almost half of the average purchase in rural areas. Although the inability
of the urban poor to access PDS like their rural counterpart needs further research, the
case of Asha demonstrates one of the reasons that urbanization affects the ability to
access subsidized goods-- the lack of a proper residence or house address for the urban
poor. Many urban poor live in slums or are homeless who are often evicted from the
places where they have been settled for some time when a need arises. Since the ration
card is only valid for the shop that is specified on the card, evicted poor are unable to
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access their grains. And then there are few like Asha, who tell the horrors of losing their
belongings, including all their documents and cards, during demolition drives. Another
reason for the inability of the urban poor to access subsidized goods is the lack of proper
identification cards. For example, there are thousands of undocumented immigrants from
neighboring Bangladesh who have been living in many parts of the country as de facto
citizens. Ramachandran (2003) notes that since 1991-92, the attitude of the government
towards them has been rather hostile; for example, in 1992 Operation Pushback was
launched to remove many undocumented immigrants from New Delhi. Rather than
associating the hostility towards undocumented Muslim immigrants from Bangladesh
with the rise of Hindu nationalism, I find that it is related to the neoliberal urban
restructuring reforms. As mentioned earlier, the general tone of the Supreme Court and
Delhi government towards slums changed during 1991-92 and it is easy to imagine that
the undocumented immigrants would be the first ones to take a blow. Recent factors such
as those identified above are responsible for the decreased reliance on PDI. Bhan (2009)
shows that the access of essential food grains by the people in Delhi has drastically
decreased since the advent of neoliberal changes.
Box 6:5: Access of public distribution food grains by people in Delhi
Item

1999-2000

2004-2005

Rice

32.8

3.5

Wheat

25.4

2.7

Sugar

15.2

3.6
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Kerosene Oil

46.9

29

Source: Government of India (2006), Employment and Unemployment Situation
among Social Groups in India, 61st Round, Department of Statistics, New Delhi. Cited in
Bhan 2009
On a lucky day, Asha obtains water illegally from Delhi Jal Board, the agency
responsible for supplying water across Delhi. The main headquarters for Ashok Vihar
and a few other surrounding neighborhoods fortunately is located right in front of her
small make-shift shack. Some days her luck does not work and there is a guard in front of
the water tank. But things may be about to change for her. As mentioned before,
privatization of water has been a highly controversial issue for the past decade.
Ironically, the people against privatization are not the poor from the slums who had been
promised some basic water supply through various government programs but have
received none. According to Pande and Agarwal (2013) the eleventh five year plan had
proposed an inadequate sum of Rs 73 crore towards the supply of drinking water to
approximately 32 lacking slum populations through implementation of two plan schemes“Grant-in-Aid for Augmentation of water supply in Jhuggi-Jhopri (JJ) Clusters” and
“Water Supply in Resettlement Colonies”. But even from this meager amount, about 20
crores still remain unutilized. Slum residents however are able to obtain water through
illegal connections somehow. The section against privatization in last few years have
been the elite citizens groups who fear that their water tariffs would go up after
privatization. But Delhi Jal Board in last two years has been promising low prices of
water through developing a public-private partnership that will attempt to eradicate the
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supply of illegal and free water. There were already hawkers that I spoke to who
complained how they will have to pay money for the water that they had been getting for
free. According to Knoonan and Sampat (2013), the PPPs are designed in such a way that
they reduce the non-revenue water in Delhi from the current 65% to 15% in ﬁve to eight
years.
Finally, just as the geographies of slums and the sub-urban are connected (Roy
2003); the geographies of the urban and rural are also linked. Asha mourns her lack of
community and family support in the city. Then what was the reason behind Asha’s
migration to city with her husband? Ahmed (2011) answers this by describing how “the
declining state investments in rural development has manifested itself as falling economic
growth in agriculture all over India” (167). We can see in the case of Asha and other
street hawkers that this has acted as a push factor in rural areas where poor farmers with
lack of state’s support migrate to urban areas and, in turn, settle down slums. Still ruralurban migration have recently started manifesting a declining trend (Binswanger-Mkhize
2013, Kundu and Sarawati 2012). Kundu and Sarawati (2012) explain that one of the
reasons behind this declining trend is that the urban areas have been far less
accommodating to their poor rural migrants. This is very well depicted in the case of
Asha and her family, where spatial changes in the city related to the process of
liberalization are making them look out-of-place.

Conclusion
In this chapter I have discussed the internal problems with the structure of the
proposed TVC and WTC, and have shown how these problems will undermine the
democratic participation of hawkers in problem resolutions. Also, since the creation of
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ward committees has been a mismanaged and halted process, framing TVCs and WVCs
on similar lines proves to be an unsuccessful endeavor. A majority of decision makers in
the TVCs are supposed to be elite intellectuals with modernist visions of space. For
example, Chief Executive Officer of the TVC/WVC is supposed to be a state or central
government selected Commissioner and not a democratically selected councillor. The
other participants of TVC/WVC are RWAs, who as I discuss in detail have already
threatened the existence of hawkers through their environmental politics. I have tried to
shed light on the internal conflicts within various groups of TVC/WVC by using Delhi as
a case study. The introduction of the Bhagidari system and the rise in the power of
RWAs has already affected poor slum dwellers and hawkers in multiple ways, and to
believe that these groups will accommodate hawkers in their neighborhood is unrealistic.
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Chapter 7: Neoliberal Subjects – Entrepreneurs of Themselves

Basically what we need is a change of perception, so that businesses and planners
see vendors as entrepreneurs and vending as legitimate employment.
Ela Bhatt, founder of SEWA

61

Introduction
In this chapter, I problematize the model of participation of hawkers in
TVC/WVC. NPSV demands organization of street hawkers, who constitute 40% on the
committee, and their representation by a head of the hawkers’ union. While
deconstructing the tone of NPSV, CCS and other NGOs who create hawkers as
entrepreneurial subjects, I show various internal contradictions in the entrepreneurial
discourse espoused by these organizations by using dialogues from an executive
conference organized by CCS and NASVI regarding the implementation of NPSV. I
highlight numerous locational discords in NPSV using various conversations between
NGOs and state planners and the head of the hawkers’ union during the Jaipur executive
conference. Lastly, I will show how the entry of national and multinational corporate
retail is affecting even the street hawkers who are most well-off—those who are not
harassed by the authorities and have been delineated spaces in hawking zones.
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Ela R. Bhatt Interview with Mirai Chatterjee, SEWA General Secretary, as recorded in
Seminar No. 491 July 2000
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Fake or Forced Entrepreneurs?
Neoliberal governmentality and “technologies of self” aim to create an ‘enterprise
subject’ who while acting as an independent political subject is also prepared to manage
his or her own risks and vulnerability by taking responsibility for his or her own wellbeing (O’Malley 1996). Burchell (1993) explains these as “contractual implications” that
modern neoliberal technologies call for (276). This implies that in order for individuals to
exercise freedom of action and decision that hitherto were managed by the state, the
individual assumes absolute responsibility for not only their actions but also the
outcomes. The role of instilling these new forms of ‘responsibilization’ and the related
‘contractual implication’ is filled by the organic intellectuals of neoliberalism represented
by the think tanks and NGOs. NPSV complies with this neoliberal strategy when it
argues that “Street vendors, being the micro-entrepreneurs, should be provided with
vocational education and training and entrepreneur developmental skills to upgrade their
technical and business potentials so as to increase their income levels as well as to look
for more remunerative alternatives”(15). During my field work, Ram rang me up one
morning to inform me that NASVI was organizing a women street entrepreneur work
shop in Delhi. He said that if I really wanted to see how NGOs and think tank people like
himself help hawkers, I should attend the workshop.
About 60-75 women vendors attended the workshop, which was held in a central
location in New Delhi. I was introduced to Sheela, a lecturer in Business Studies in a
private college who was hired to conduct the workshop by NASVI. Sheela told me that
she often conducts workshops in which she teaches MBA students how to communicate
and hence she was the right person to give her expertise to the women vendors. At the
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beginning of the class, she asked all women to make a big circle and “at the count of one
two three start walking in any direction.” Chaos ensued. After about 30 seconds she
asked them to stop and make pairs with the closest women vendors next to them. She said
that no one should pair up with someone they already knew. Once everyone was in a pair,
they were asked to introduce themselves by name and their type of trade. The second
exercise was that everyone should move and start giving high fives with the people they
passed until Sheela asked them to stop. At that time, they were asked to pair up with the
nearest person and share with her the experience of a past happy event. Sheela asked
these women to do these ‘walking and talking’ exercise several times to narrate their
pleasant or unpleasant experiences, discuss business ideas, tell positive and negative
character traits, describe problems faced by women in general, and lastly simply shout at
the tops of their voices to show how happy they were to be present in this workshop.
After this, Sheela assembled them in a close circle and started telling them stories with
some moral teaching. “When you meet someone you know, you greet them with namaste
(hello). It feels good, right? Now why don’t you do that to the customers who come to
buy from you? Would they not like it too?” Sheela then narrated a story:
There was a man who used to sell hats. One day while crossing a small
forest, he decided to take a nap under a tree. When he woke up, the monkeys who
lived in the trees had stolen all his hats, and refused to come down and give them
back. Then the man remembered that monkeys are known to imitate human, so he
quickly threw his own hat on the ground. Seeing this, all the monkeys threw their
hats on the ground to copy him. The man simply picked all his hats and set off to
his work. The story does not end here! Now after many years, the man dies and
his grandson takes over his businesses of selling hats. One day he finds himself on
the same spot as his grandfather, doses off for few minutes only to wake up and
see his hats are stolen by the monkeys in the trees. He remembers his
grandfather’s story and takes off his hat and throws it on the ground. But this
time, the monkeys don’t imitate him and instead make fun of him. The grandson
asks the monkeys why did they not copy him like they typically do. The monkeys
reply, that just like your grandfather told you his story, our grandfathers too told
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us the same story! So the moral of the story is-- learn from your mistakes but the
solutions of the problems that were valid few years ago may not work in present
times. As the times are changing, we have to change ourselves and find new
solutions.
Next story told by Sheela was that of an elephant:
When a baby elephant is born, its masters tie it with a strong iron ring and
a pole. Since the elephant is young, it does not have the strength to break the iron
ring. But as the baby becomes a full grown elephant, it gets used to being tied to
the ring and even if it can break free now since it is much stronger, it does not
even think of doing it because it still believes that it cannot break the iron ring.
All you women are like the elephant, you were told that a woman’s life is in the
kitchen when you were young. Now you make all sorts of excuses to go out and
work. Let your husband and in-laws be upset, they will be okay with you going
out to work after some time. All your problems are self-created.
All the discussions and stories told by Sheela constructed women vendors as
ignorant subjects who were poor because they lacked communication skills, or were
unable to adapt to the new and changing urban life. This workshop was designed to teach
them some basic techniques like how to talk to their customers and how to politely deal
with police retribution. As Ong (2006) notes in countries such as Malaysia, radical Islam,
which opposes the presence of women in the public sphere, is perceived as something
that operates as a political opposition to the economic transformation of the country. Here
too we see how the patriarchal system is deemed as something that stifles the creation of
neoliberal entrepreneurs and productive subjects. And so, this workshop was also
designed to teach women vendors some subversive tactics to deal with everyday
problems of abusive husbands and demanding in-laws. It was assumed that just like MBA
students are taught to manage business, these women could be taught how to sell
vegetables professionally. All of their problems were reduced to issues with self. Most
women vendors whom I talked to in other venues generally attributed all their problems
to the system of inequitable distribution of wealth, the underlying economic structure
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where one who is born poor stays poor, the second class status of women, and lack of
government support. However during these discussions at Sheela’s meeting, none of the
vendors ever spoke of one such issue. After a while I started becoming suspicious as most
of the women vendors also looked like they came from slightly more affluent
backgrounds than the women vendors I had interviewed previously. After talking to each
participant, it became apparent why that was the case. This is how some of the women
described themselves to me:
Woman 1: I’m associated with the Integrated Child Development Services in
Kolkata and I am the chief of Mahila Congress Presided of Kolkata, Barabazar and I’m
also associated with the women vendors association. I help them often and I’m very
proud to be here. I’ve only been to Delhi as a kid.
Woman 2: I am not a hawker, I’m a housewife but I want their betterment. So I
thought that I should come here if that could do any good to them. The former Mayor of
Kolkata, Subroto Mukharjee, told me about this conference and said that I could go if I
want. Sometimes when a women hawker is not well, I go and help her! I’m always ready
to help.
Woman 3: I’m not a hawker but I realize that if I don’t think about the poor who
else will. I want both rich and poor to be happy. No one takes care of the poor, so I want
that in India everyone should be happy and live in harmony.
Woman 4: I’m a social worker and associated with Hind Mahila Sanghatan of
Kanpur. I want to help every woman to achieve success in life. The chief of my
association came in touch with NASVI and she asked me to go to Bhubneshwar for a
similar conference last year. I really liked it and so I decided to come here as well.
62
Arbind ji, the head of NASVI is very nice and I told him that since he has given me the
opportunity to be here I’ll work very hard to organize the hawkers. Now, almost 10,000
hawkers are organized in Kanpur. If I share the grief of the poor, I’m very happy.
Woman 5: I have a cloth shop. My husband left me and my kids. I’m very
unhappy. I need help (started crying).
Woman 6: I have worked for SEWA for the past 25 years. I’m from Indore, MP.
It’s our duty to come forward and help hawkers. (Asking an actual hawker) Does anyone
from SEWA come to help you?
Woman 8: I’m from Hoogli, West Bengal and work for the vendors of south
Kolkata. So many of them get evicted, I want to help them.
62

Ji is used as an honorific suffix in Hindi.
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To my astonishment, most of these women hawkers were in fact not hawkers. For
most, their relationship with hawking was ancillary: these women were social workers,
associated with different NGOs and had helped hawkers at some point. There were only 3
women hawkers in the group. One had a textile shop which she was forced to take over
after her husband left her for a younger woman. The other had successfully expanded her
businesses to leave their vending business in the hands of other hired help and become
head of the area’s hawking association. There was only one woman who sold vegetables
on the streets and she had come from the state of Bihar.
The fact that barely 5-7 percent of the women attendees were actually hawkers
when the conference was meant for hawkers tells us something about this NGOs led
hawkers’ movement in India. In Spivak’s vein, I would describe most of the discussions
in these “walking and talking exercises” as rich women talking to each other about poor
women. Such concerns have also been raised by Fraser, who while studying the
professionalism of the movement to aid battered women, criticizes “the tendency for the
politics of need interpretation to devolve into administration of need satisfaction” (Fraser
1989, 177), and believes that professional administration destroys political expression
and hence genuine feminist politics. Most of the women here were entrepreneurs. But I
would not describe them as business entrepreneurs. They are in fact a new breed of lower
to lower- middle class women entrepreneurs who worked part-time for NGOs and other
“aid-poor-women” NGOs. They are a kind of social entrepreneurs, who had dedicated
their life to the families and at some point come out of their traditional houses to join
NGOs where they were happy to represent a social cause for lower salary. These social
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entrepreneurs are in fact getting trained by bigger NGOs to be the lower wing of organic
intellectuals.
The purported entrepreneurs or women street vendors for whom these kinds of
workshops are designed would hardly use the word entrepreneur to describe themselves.
They are women who have no option but to go out and work every day to survive. The
day they skip work to attend workshops or any other political demonstrations, their
children will go to bed hungry. “Who will feed my children if I don’t work and come to
these meetings instead?” said an angry women vendor in Jaipur while she waited outside
the governor’s office to demand implementation of NPSV with a big group of hawkers
assembled by the head of their hawkers’ union on Ram’s request.
Secondly, one might even question if hawkers are perceived to be “entrepreneurs”
at all by the NGOs. It is important to investigate what kind of eminence these NGOs
prescribe to hawking as an entrepreneurial activity. On closer look, the “hawkers as street
entrepreneurs” discourse pursued by NGOs appears to be ridden with contradiction; this
contradiction is in turn translated into NPSV, which states:
Stationary vendors should be allowed space/stalls, whether open or
covered, on license basis after photo census/survey and due enquiry in this regard,
initially for a period of 10 years with the provision that only one extension of ten
years shall be provided thereafter. After 20 years, the vendors will be required to
exit the stationary stall as it is reasonably expected that the licensee would have
suitably enhanced his/her income, thereby making the said stall available for
being licensed to a person belonging to the weaker sections of society (NPSV
2009, 16).
This issue was raised and severely debated during an executive conference in
Jaipur convened by CCS and NASVI, at which the government’s urban planners and top
executives were invited to discuss NPSV. Unfortunately, the discussions were not as
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friendly as the NGOs had hoped, and many of the executives reported their concerns with
certain provisions of NPSV. The executives unanimously agreed that the 20 year cap on
the street vending spot license in NPSV did not make sense. However, various NGO
representatives from NASVI, SEWA, CCS, and Nidan made early attempts to justify this
provision. Several heads of Hawkers’ Associations from various districts of Rajasthan
were also present in the conference but none of them were given a chance to speak on
this topic. Below I include a brief dialogue between different participants as they discuss
the 20 year cap.
Box 7.1: Excerpts from Jaipur executive conference
Chief Engineer of Jaipur Municipal Corporation: You are leading to the birth of a
new kind of conflict here. If you ask someone to leave after 20 years why will they leave
their spots?
Chief District manager of Rajasthan Housing Board: That is tactically not
possible.
Arbind from NASVI: Actually the reason why the government of India put that in
the policy…we strongly believe that a vendor should also graduate…you can’t keep
having something… you have had a secured place for 20 years and so you should be able
to graduate to some other profession …to a more settled profession instead of vending.
That is why this policy is there. We (meaning hawkers) have asked for it.
Shikha from SEWA: Now if I talk about Ahemdabad...there is an Urban
Economic Welfare Board and first we included vendors in that… if their kids get free
education even they want to study. But these vendors don’t have a steady income so they
come into vending. For example a woman will sit in the main place and she will make her
kid sit next to her with a small basket. But if you see…down the line after 20 years they
really don’t want their kid to come into vending. Therefore the steady income is must... if
they get steady income then the kid will go to study.
Ram from CCS: And in fact here we have some representatives of street vendors
and you can ask direct questions from them. Here I see an example…Babulal ji is a street
vendor but he does not want his kids to be street vendors.. and all his kids are into
different businesses and he is not going to remain a street vendor.
Secretary of Jaipur Development Board: so tell me something...first, let’s say a
vendor is sitting on a space for 20 years…how will you convince him to only sit in that
space for 2 hours...listen to me! The second thing is what kind of mechanism will
determine that one vendor will sit in a place for 2 hours and then some other vendor will
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come in his place. The third thing is...the main conflict happens for the prime
location…like I’ll give you an example…that in front of top road and in front of SMS
hospital and Nehru Garden…every day you read in the newspapers that people will
remove the vendors and they will come and sit there again…why do they come
back…it’s obvious that their livelihood is very good there. So if you make vending zones
in these prime locations and you give it only to people for 20 years for...you will only be
able to give it to a few people for few hours…about 3-4% people. So now you are giving
prime locations to 4% people for 20 years, and you are asking that they will not seat their
children there…so maybe after 20 years their vending zone can be so successful that not
just their children but even their grandchildren would want to sit there…so this is all a
market game. And which profession will these people take up after practicing vending for
20 years…they simply cannot stop eating after 20 years.
Ram: I’ll add 3 things… so the first concern is that the vendors continue to be
vendors…so what we have found in our project called Law Liberty and Livelihood, that
because they are insecure they remain poor and they cannot expand their business…as
Arbind from NASVI say that they have to run with their carts once the police comes, they
never expand their business. So they continue to be poor but as their business expands
they don’t want their kids to continue hawking. They want their kids to be software
engineers or doctors or some other things. That’s one thing.
The second thing is a response to your question (directed towards Chief Engineer
of Jaipur Municipal Corporation): I think we require customized solution to each of these
problems. These challenges will come but that should not discourage us to not work. I
think with this regulation (NPSV), 80% of the problems will get resolved but some of
these problems will appear and there will be disputes. They will get resolved gradually…
like hawkers will think that here “I’m insecure and if I go elsewhere where I have
permanent space I’ll be better”… they would probably like to go. So when we get into
the field probably the problem will not be as big as it seems to be.
The third thing is that I say ..there is a recent study that I was exposed to…was
about extinct business.. That there are kind of business that are not prevalent. So we had
seen a lot of business in Delhi ..there were people called Laltope walla...
Audience : yes yes, we know who they are.
Ram: but now they are very few of these people. So there are lot of businesses
that are extinct and street vendors will also, we think down the line in 20 years, probably
become extinct. So the question is that…the vendors will keep coming into the city and
there will be an influx of vendors, probably that will not be as big of a problem.
Chief Engineer of Jaipur Municipal Corporation: Now you said (to Ram) that as
their social status improves they feel like moving out of that place. They usually don’t.
They understand that the electricity is free…the place is not rented...all their savings they
don’t want to waste...I mean they don’t want to sit in the big prime locality and just leave.
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Ram briefly describes the fate of “laltope walla” or “men with red hats” in Delhi.
In an earlier conversation he had explained: “these people were professional ear cleaners
and used to roam around on the streets of Delhi, cleaning ears of unknown strangers and
making money in return. In fact there was a time when they were very popular -- used to
go from one home to another to clean ears and made a lot of money. But now this
profession is almost gone…you tell me, have you ever seen an ear cleaner? Now people
use ear buds instead.” Similarly, he justified the opening up of organized retail in India
by citing the inevitable death of hawkers-- “hawkers are the future ear-cleaners of India.
They will cease to exist in the future because there will be no demand.” So perhaps these
NGOs would best describe hawkers as moribund entrepreneurs who are being helped to
exit this celebrated yet dying profession.
Here we are able to see the contradiction at work. On the one hand this profession
is assumed to be dying and “will soon go extinct” and on the other, spots are only given
to hawkers for 20 years. In this time, it is assumed that they will make enough money to
either retire or graduate to some other profession so that new hawkers can take up their
prime spots. If the profession is really dying, then it is absurd for Ram and other
proponents of NPSV to believe that 20 years is enough to make a poor hawkers wealthy
and hence their spots be given to weaker section of the population. Also, if the profession
is really making poor hawkers wealthy, one should ask Ram why they would want to
switch their profession after 20 years. As stated before, NPSV explicitly states that
hawkers should be trained to improve their technical and business potential so that they
can find some other profession. I spoke to many hawkers with or without licenses who
have been hawking on the street for more than 15 years. None of them had accumulated
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enough money to retire or had any skills to change their profession. Dhan Prakesh, a food
hawker in the Safdar jung area of Delhi, has been hawking for 25 years and now he is
getting old. He cannot see from one eye and worries about what will happen to him when
he is not able to hawk due to blindness and old age. He will not be able to pay rent for the
small room in the nearby slums where he lives, and with no flow of income, will not have
access to food, medicine or healthcare. His only resort will be begging, he maintained.
He thought that he would probably go back to the village he came from many years back
to draw his last breath. At least people in the village will cremate him even if he does not
have any money when he dies to pay for it himself. Ramwati, a women hawker who used
to sell vegetables in my neighborhood in Ashok Vihar before Chandu, described that
although she used to make enough money at one time, she has no savings because she
spent all her money to get a one room house to live in a slum. Her son-in-law gives her
200 rupees ($4) a month with which she has to take care of food, electricity and
medicine. She even asked that all the residents of Ashok Vihar whom she had served for
20 years should give her some kind of retirement allowance for the excellent service she
had provided then. The point here is that most hawkers I spoke to were only making
enough money to sustain themselves for few days, if they were lucky. Then, one might
ask how CCS and NGOs could suggest that hawkers would be able to graduate and retire
after 20 years. These NGOs are choosing flawed prototypes to make speculative
statements about the future of hawkers. During the above discussion Ram pointed out
Babulal, a former hawker, as an example of a successful hawker who has graduated into a
profession other than hawking. After the conference, I spoke with Babulal for about an
hour, during which he told me his life story in English. He was fairly well educated and
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even had an undergraduate degree. A few years back, he owned a booming textile
business and had a shop in a posh neighborhood of Jaipur. Then he met with an accident
while traveling in a car with a friend. He was bed ridden for 2 years and could not even
walk. He took heavy losses in his business and had to shut it down. That’s when he
decided to enter into the fruit business. He invested a lot of money and started selling
fruit in a shop. He became successful and now he is no longer a vendor, he has turned to
politics and has formed his own party along with Ghayn Shaym, the head of Vidhyadhar
Nagar mandi union. He has a daughter who is married and lives in the US. Clearly,
Babulal does not represent a typical poor vendor and success stories like his are used to
make policies for the entire 2% of the population. This is a classic example of causal
inference that neoliberal proponents often engage in. Wade (1992) maintains, in reference
to the East Asian countries, that the proponents of neo-liberalism pioneered a new
principle of causal inference (283) where the strong economic success was attributed to
free market changes. Anything that was not in line with the neo-liberal prescription was
either ignored or blamed for impeding the alternative’s faster progress. For example, the
developmental and interventionist state in East Asia was falsely presented as a minimalist
state to promote neoliberal strategies in other countries. Here too, the entrepreneurship
discourse regarding hawkers is bolstered using incorrect examples and inaccurate
specimens. In the end, I view the street entrepreneur discourse pursued by CCS and other
think tanks as an act of disciplining the urban poor rather than supporting their struggle
over basic rights to livelihood.
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Locational Discords in NPSV
In the above dialogue, Ram, while responding to criticism of NPSV, says that
80% the problems of creating hawking zones will be resolved with the implementation of
NPSV but the other 20% will need site-specific intervention. He simply refuses to look at
many studies that have been done so far to show that when hawkers were relocated to far
off places and given permanent spots, many times they returned to their previous sites
because they failed to sustain their livelihood in the new ones. As mentioned before, CCS
itself has mentioned this fact in their publication Law, Liberty and Livelihood several
times. Kumar and Bhowmik (2010) have also noted such concerns in their study of
evicted vendors of the Sunday market near Red Fort in Delhi. The Sunday market had
been functioning for many centuries, and was a kind of flea market that attracted a crowd
from all over Delhi. However, in August 2001, all 4000 vendors of the area were
removed because they were suddenly thought of as a threat to the historic monument. The
government initially provided no alternative spots for the vendors but three prominent
vendors’ unions and several NGOs became involved actively to get alternative sites for
the displaced people. Over the course of 5 years, the government deliberated over five
different sites to house the displaced vendors but for each one either some urban planning
authority like DDA or Sports Authority of India or some religious association or local
RWAs objected. Finally the hawkers were placed in an area called Raj Ghat, where only
1200 spots were provided. However, within weeks the hawkers realized that the business
in this area was going to be very low and many returned to their previous spot near Red
Fort. As a result, the remaining hawkers faced further reduction of income because of
their inferior hawking spots as compared to the ones in Red Fort. Babulal narrated a
similar case in Jaipur, where the congressional government “made some 10,000 kiosks to
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house the vendors and invested scores of Rupees. But now these kiosks are useless…no
one uses them. If I live in Malvyanagar and my kiosk is in Murlidhara…it’s 15 km travel
one way and 20 rupee bus ride back and forth. If I earn 40 Rupees and pay 20 on the bus,
what’s the point?”
Secondly, CCS targets License Raj or the system of issuing licenses in India as
the reason for all the troubles faced by the hawkers. Ram maintains that hawkers are
forced to pay bribes to Police and MCD authorities as a majority of them do not carry
licenses and practice illegally. For that reason they are often harassed even after paying
heavy bribes and hence are not able to expand their business or accumulate enough
money to graduate to more successful professions. To solve this licensing problem, he
maintains, it’s important to implement NPSV. Bhowmik (2003), one of the main
architects of NPSV, explains how the rent- seeking activities that harass unlicensed
hawkers would be curbed within NPSV through a registration process: “The policy
(therefore) recommends that instead of licenses, there should be a simple registration of
street vendors and non-discretionary regulation of access to public spaces in accordance
with planning standards and nature of trade/service. Registration of street vendors will be
done by the ward committees as these are best suited to assess the situation at the ground
level and vendors will be provided identity cards” (1545). NPSV states that “this policy
adopts the considered opinion that there should not be any cut off data or limit imposed
on the number of vendors who should be permitted to vend in any city/town, subject to
registration of such”(3). But, on closer inspection, it appears that NPSV barely changes
anything other than giving the TVCs direct control of street hawkers. The license system
that has been considered the root cause of all the troubles of street hawkers by NGOs is
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left intact. The permit to hawk even by registered vendors is still given by TVC and that
too on a time-share model. NPSV explains how TVC can regulate hawkers:
Vendor markets/outlets should be developed in which space could be
made available to hawkers/vendors on a time sharing model on the bases of a
roster. Let us say there are about 500 such vending places in about a 100 new
vendor’s market/push cart markets/motorized vending outlets. Let us also assume
there are 5,000 who want to apply for a vending site on a time sharing basis. Then
by a simple process of mathematical analysis, a certain number of days or hours
on particular days could be fixed for each vendors in a vending place on a roster
basis through the concerned TVC (3).
It is apparent here that even if hawkers are registered, a majority of them may not
be able to hawk because of the time constraints imposed by TVC, which will have to
accommodate a large number of vendors on limited vending spots. Although this may
seem a small compromise to the architects of NPSV who are eager to regularize street
hawkers, and thereby curb the state’s rent-seeking activities, it may present serious losses
to street hawkers. Let me explain this by giving an example. Chandu, the itinerant vendor
in Ashok Vihar, explained that the RWAs of the neighborhoods had imposed a restriction
on hawkers from entering the colonies between 1 and 5 PM. The afternoon hours, as the
president of Ashok Vihar federations of RWAs had explained, are the most dangerous as
all the male members of the family are outside and women are taking a nap. At this time
an unknown person can enter the house and commit theft. Chandu further maintained that
since he cannot sell during the afternoons, he has to compensate for the loss of sales by
working on Sundays, which had previously been his day off. He explained: “Now there is
no holiday for us, it is tiring but we don’t have any option, we need to earn enough to
take care of our family, and 4 hours loss everyday has to be compensated on a Sunday.”
There is one more problem with this registration system under TVC. The
Commissioner of Jaipur development Association raised this in the conference:
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Actually what this law wants to do…is create a separate power group…the
ward committee that is going to issue licenses and MC will get revenue about 100
Rs per license...but we don’t realize these prime locations will be sold for a huge
sum…you are actually empowering these dadas (the corrupt local leaders who
can become head of the vendor’s union) and other local power groups (RWAs)
that will also be as corrupt as the Municipal corporations and police (anti- policy).
She is correct to mention that corruption will still seep in, albeit through different
channels. Also, it’s not that vendors will hawk on the spaces for free, something that they
do right now. NPSV states that, “Street vendors would be charged a monthly fee towards
the space they use and the civic services they receive. There should be a direct linkage
between the municipal authorities and the street vendors for the collection of a)
Registration fee, b) monthly maintenance charges—differentiated according to the
location/type of business, and c) Fines and other charges if any”(13). It is assumed here
that street vendors would be willing to pay money to the Municipal Corporation because
they willingly pay bribes to corrupt state officials. But through many conversations with
vendors, it is clear that they don’t pay bribes willingly. After shelling out money to the
corrupt authorities, they hardly have any to save for even the next day’s food. Another
problem with registration is how to differentiate between a genuine vendor and someone
who is there just to get a vending spot that can be leased out. During the conference a lot
of executives raised the issue that vendors who are well connected in politics or know
members of TVC will get not just one but multiple spots easily, but the ones with no
connections will not even get registered. A vendor from Jodhpur raised this issue during
the conference and infuriated Arbind from NASVI. He shouted at the vendor saying:
“does this happen with vendors only? If three lakhs people fill interview forms for India
63

Administrative Services (IAS), will you make all three lakhs of them IAS officers? Is
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Three lakh is three hundred thousand.
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this the way to select an IAS officer?” This statement created lot of murmurs in the
conference room. He continued saying “no no no! the problem is that we have to select
the genuine from the fake IAS. If you want genuine then you have to take preliminary
exams of 3 lack students and then select 2000 for the main exams. And then only 100
candidates are selected as genuine IAS.” At this point the Chief Engineer of Jaipur
Municipal Corporation said “the issue is not that you are selecting 80 people…but that
you are selecting only 80 people to sit inside out of thousands who are eligible…where
will the rest go even if they are genuine. And who do you think has time to do a
background check of 2% of the urban population with the same rigor as the IAS officers.”
Arbind replied “ok, if you want to regulate the city…you have to work hard for it. But if
you want the city to be free for all then you don’t have to do anything…whoever wants to
vend wherever they can vend.”
In the end, during the conference, the secretary of Jaipur Development Board
smartly did the actual math and pointed out that only 4 percent of the entire vendor
population will get spaces where they will be able to make enough money. Thus the
change of power in disseminating licenses from MCD to TVC will not solve the problem
of limited spaces. When he told Ram that more vendors will flood in once the existing
ones had been provided spaces, Ram replied, “you will have to put a stop somewhere,
you cannot keep allowing everyone to become a vendors, you have to say no! There has
to be a boundary…so see it’s all about enforcement at some point”.
Even though Ram often maintained that hawkers have a right to practice
livelihood in public space, when he was made to discuss its nitty-gritties, his tone quickly
changed to mimic elite middle class citizens. From the above two dialogues, it is apparent
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here that Arbind and Ram are trying hard to find a spatial solution to the problems of
street hawking rather than finding solutions to the problems of the hawkers. These
viewpoints are translated into NPSV and are making their way into Indian cities.

Problems With Participation Of Hawkers
The purpose behind NPSV is that the multi-stakeholder town vending committee
will solve the problem of vending in urban space while empowering the vendors in the
same process. In previous sections I have discussed how different stake-holders that form
the TVC will actually undermine the participation of hawkers because of their conflicting
imaginaries of urban space. In this section, I will discuss the problems with the
participation of vendors themselves. NPSV states that:

(T)o enable the street vendors to access the benefits of social security
schemas and other promotional measures in an effective manner, it is essential
that street vendors are assisted to form their own organizations. The TVC should
take steps to facilitate the formation and smooth functioning of such organizations
of street vendors. Trade unions and voluntary organizations should play an active
role and help the street vendors to organize themselves by providing counseling
and guidance service when required (16-17).
To facilitate this process, NPSV suggests that “The representatives of street
vendors’ associations may constitute forty per cent of the number of the members of the
TVC...The process of selection for the street vendors’ representatives should be based on
the following criteria: participation in the membership based organization and
demonstration of financial accountability” (10).
There are a number of problems with this model of participation for street
hawkers. First, this model does not recognize the internal hierarchies within the hawkers’
union. As I have described in the last two chapters, the head of the hawkers’ union does
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not necessarily represent a typical hawker. In fact, both Ghayn Shyam and Babulal don’t
even practice hawking at all times and have become involved in politics by forming their
own political parties. Also, this model of participation ignores the fact that a majority of
hawkers are unorganized and will not be able to participate in the process. For this
reason, Bandyopadhyay (2012) maintains that NPSV seeks to institutionalize certain
forms of participatory exclusion. Thirdly, many of the key hawking areas have a large
number of associations. The Secretary of the Jaipur Development Board pointed that in
some places there are 3 or 4 unions and all of them can show that they are formally
registered with the government. In fact, she maintained that she happened to know an
area where there were as many as 10 unions. There are internal rivalries between multiple
unions; this creates unnecessary confusion and delays the outcomes. Kumar and
Bhawmik (2010) in their study of Sunday market at Red Fort have noted how three rival
unions did more damage than help in getting the vending spots for the evicted hawkers.
Many of these associations are connected with political parties or are based on religious
or regional groups. In the case of the Sunday market, one association was connected to
the larger National Congress Party and the other one was a Muslim Association. One
cannot assume that these associations will not favor their members when it is time to allot
spaces. As Kishwar (2011) in her online blog notes, “each union will try to marginalize
the other and seek hegemonic status by getting patronage of the bureaucracy, police or
powerful politicians”. Another problem with the registration process is that there can
only be one registered hawker per family. In the system of joint family where two or
more brothers live in the same household or large families like Asha’s have six children,
this limitation can mean a meager earning per family. This requirement of joining an
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organization to seek employment also makes this profession, which is easy to enter,
rather closed.
Here I wanted to point out CCS’s actual stance on the unionization of street
hawkers. In their publication Law Liberty and Livelihood CCS states:
If the government continues to ignore their (hakwers) problems, it would
obviously result in large-scale unionization. Nothing wrong in that. Only, once
this happens, this powerful lobby could well attract political interests as a
potential vote-bank. The hawkers could begin to extract privileges from the
political class through various benefits and possible distortionary funneling of tax
payers’ money. And hence the state will end-up creating one more political lobby
(Shah and Mandava 2005, 78).

From Mandis To Malls
During my field work in Jaipur, one day after conducting interviews with hawkers
of the mandi, I decided to take Ram and Ghayn Shyam for an early dinner while we
chatted about some key topics related to street vending. Ram told me that the department
store cum mini-mall called Handloom had a wide selection of food that was delicious as
well as hygienic and also had a good seating arrangement. So we both headed out
towards Handloom in his motor bike after texting Ghayn Shyam to join us there. Ram
and I ordered food for all three of us and got ourselves comfortable seated. Ghayn Shyam
joined us there and we started devouring our snacks. Ghayn Shaym is the head of Jaipur
Hawkers Associations and has ties with local politicians. He also appeared to be
wealthier than other hawkers, as both of his kids go to private schools. He completed 8th
grade and can understand conversational English. He also dresses in shirts and trousers,
carries a mobile phone, and wears stylish sunglasses. Perhaps that was the reason why he
appeared to be more confident than the average street hawker and seemed to feel pretty
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comfortable among the middle and higher- class crowds that were present in the
department store. I would imagine an average hawker to look and feel a little awkward in
such places. Within a few minutes, however, he started looking around anxiously. I asked
him if there was a problem. He replied with a smile that if the manager of this store
happen to see him there, he would probably become very uncomfortable. I asked if he
had gotten into any trouble with the store, or there was some other reason.
Ghayn Shyam replied:
No! You see, in Jaipur, all these retail store people know me as someone
who can create havoc. Last year I organized anti-malls drives and participated in
so many demonstrations and strikes to force the government to close these malls.
Since Reliance fresh and other big companies have started coming in the field of
retail… small hawkers like us have faced lots of problem. They can even bear loss
for some time and still function. But people like us have to dig a new well every
day to drink water…meaning that we have to earn every day to eat our daily roti
(bread). This fact affected us badly and that is why we stand up against it. We
have asked the government to safeguard small professions like us. If big giants
like Ambani, Tata and Birla, Walmart all get into the business that poor people
like us relay on, than where will we go? The government should control the retail
sector and only poor people like us should be allowed to do business in this
sector. But no one listened. The only benefit that happened was that before these
stores could sell without any tax but now the government had put 4 % of retail tax
on their sales. Earlier the government had about 365 laghy udyog (small
industries/business) that barred big corporations …for example the matchstick
industries…only small people could make matchsticks. But now everything is
getting privatized (or corporatized).
Ghayn Shyam is referring to a change in the retail sector that is affecting the
traditional industry, which has been largely community based and poor man’s bread.
Traditional food and groceries constitute about 70% of retail sales in India, which
employs about 40 million people and has primarily been a community based setup
dominated by small-privately owned shops and hawkers. About 0 .8% of this 70% is
organized, and the rest is largely unorganized, contributing about 10% to the GDP
(Kalhan 2007, Khalan and Franz 2009, Kearney 2007). Even the organized large-scale
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retail in metropolitan cities has been community based, and all the wholesale markets
such as mandis and grocery stores have been managed and regulated by policy that
ensures benefits to both farmers and consumers (Khalan and Franz 2009). Also, the
public distribution system that functioned primarily through retail outlets called “ration
shops” have been active in distributing subsided food grains and groceries to the poor.
However, since liberal changes in 1991, the retail industry has become the site of
major changes. It is, in fact, emerging as one of the country’s largest industries with a
total market zone of $320 billon and growing at a compound annual growth rate of 5%.
Seeing the potential for expansion, several local and national actors such as Reliance,
Tata, Birla, Pantaloon Retail, Subhiksha, and Spencer’s Retail have successfully entered
into supermarkets and hyper-markets (Khalan and Franz 2009). According to Kearney
(2007), India was ranked top among the other most attractive markets for the big global
retails to enter by K T Kearney’s Global Retail Development Index (cited in Khalan and
Franz 2009). Under pressure from neoliberal advocates and global retailers, the Indian
government agreed to allow Foreign Direct Investment up to 51% in single brand in 2006
and multi brand in 2011 and this saw the entry of Walmart, Carrefour and Tesco and
other global retail joints in the past couple of years.
Various scholars have conducted work that shows the negative effects of
organized retail on not just small-scale private shops but also 2% of hawkers (Anjaria
2006, Kalhan 2007, Rajgopal 2002, Voyce 2007). Kalhan (2007) in a survey of Mumbai
city show that 71% of the hawkers in the two main areas where shopping malls with
department stores have opened show not just a decrease in sales but also an increase in
the evection drives where agents of the mall actively worked side by side and helped the
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government evictions agents in the process. According to Anjoria (2006), in Mumbai it is
widely believed that the new hyper-markets regularly pay huge bribes to the police and
the BMC to evict unlicensed hawkers from the nearby areas. In South Asian countries,
the state has started taking measures to slow down the penetration of global multinational retail stores after realizing the harm that they do to the local economy (Coe and
Wrigley 2007). But India and China are two countries in the emerging market that are
actively seeking changes in the retail sector, so much so that as Kalhan (2007) notes,
analysts are often heard saying that “India is attempting to do in 10 years what took 20-30
years in other major global markets” (2063).
The above fact is acknowledged by both Ram and Ghayn Shyam who discussed
how the sales of the mandi have gone down in past 8 years. It was further confirmed
during my survey of the middle-to high income residents of the nearby neighborhood.
Instead of 40, I was only able to interview 25 households. Out of 25 households, 13
purchased all their vegetables from the department stores, 8 purchased from both the
stores and the mandi and 2 went to the bigger wholesale mandi and only 2 to the
Vidhyadhar Nagar. This is a considerable change in the pattern of shopping as about 10
years ago, there were practically no department stores which sold fruits and vegetables.
The residents cited numerous reasons for choosing stores over mandi, all of which I’ve
discussed in chapter 5; however, a larger and organized sample study is needed to
confirm how much the effect of organized corporate retail on small scale vendors is.
At this point of the conversation with Ghayn Shyam, I looked at Ram who was
also present and had been participating very actively in all the previous conversations. He
gave me a blank look and started eating his food. I asked Ram what he thought about this
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situation, but he simply nodded and resumed eating. Ghayn Shyam left in about an hour
and I eagerly asked Ram again if he had any thoughts on what Ghayn Shyam and other
hawkers demand. It is then he started talking in an agitated tone.
If these people want freedom from the government, they should expect the
same for others too. How can the government give only a small section of people
freedom to carry on their livelihood? If there has to be just society, there has to be
competition in the market, otherwise it’ll become an unjust society. People from
the mandi will simply stop innovating, they will become lazy and bad sellers. Did
you see how much effort they are making right now to compete with the
department stores? And people like us are there to help them, it’s not like they
have to do everything on their own. We conduct workshops and organize
seminars to educate the vendors so that can improve their ways and perform better
business. And look around you (pointing to the cashier), after all these employees
make their livelihood through these stores and hawkers in future will get absorbed
in all these new kinds of professions. In the future, there will be no hawkers, it is a
dying profession, I’m just here to make this transition easy for them, get them
organized and educated so that their children don’t have to do this lowly job. And
believe me, if you ask them, they want this too!
These shocking conversations and differing perspectives were only visible
because, as discussed before, I was able to pay attention to two things. To untangle the
speech of the one who is represented from the one who is representing to understand the
politics of representation of the subaltern. And for this, attention should not just be given
to what is said but also to what is not being said. Like other neoliberal proponents who
write commentaries for CCS, Ram too believes that the retail stores in the future will
have the capacity to provide employment to 2% of urban population that is represented
by hawkers. This further highlights a typical characteristic of an advocacy think tank. The
staff of these organizations often lack the basic understanding of the key issues that they
work on and are primarily hired for their ideological and political affiliations. It is a
statistical fact that in neoliberal period, the growth in the rate of employment is 0.34
percent lower than in the pre-liberalization period. Also, it is about 3.6 times lower than
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the growth rate of employment in the informal sector (Kalhan 2007). As Franz (2010)
explains, big retail stores affect most people adversely. Not only do small-shop owners
and hawkers fear for their loss of livelihood, but also the middle-men face their role
becoming obsolete as the efficiency in the supply chain increases and the companies have
started approaching farmers directly. The farmers are also scared of being exploited by
pricing control imposed by corporate buyers, something that has already been
documented as having disastrous consequences in many countries. Hence, only an
employee of an advocacy think-tank can make such a contradictory statement to what is
going on in reality.
Secondly, Ram claimed that the competition between the retail stores and hawkers
is fair. The advantage of huge economies of scale in retail trade, access to cheap capital,
progressive and efficient sales forecasting techniques, access to large storage and
handling facilities, transportation and replenishment systems, are just to name a few
leverages that retail stores have over street vendors (Gereffi 1994, Arnold and Fischer
1994, Kalhan and Franz 2009). But Ram seems to acknowledge only the effects of
capitalist seductions of display, symmetry and order and air- conditioned stores that make
it easy to attract customers. Also, Ram ignores the unfair practices of big retail stores that
mold the political and economic climate in their favor, often with the help of lobbying
through think tanks like CCS. Let me briefly discuss the unfair advantages that organized
retail enjoys over small vendors.
There are multiple regulatory authorities that regulate business and retail and
ensure that the big retail stores do not engage in monopolistic and predatory practices to
harm the middle and small scale traders. First are a set of laws that oversee retail
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competition called “competition laws.” Competition laws (also known as anti-trust laws)
prohibit and regulate behaviors by market participants that might have an adverse effect
on competition (Bhattacharjea 2010). But the newly formed Competition Act of 2009 is
arbitrarily defined when it comes to retail and clearly biased towards big businesses. For
example, the Act allows the regulatory body to discount anti-competition practices of a
firm if it contributes to the economic development of the country. But when the meaning
of development itself is ambiguous and controversial, any practice that threatens smallbusiness can easily be labeled as development. Second, the Competition Act ignores
mergers in which foreign firms with no current Indian business enter the Indian market
by merging with local firms, instead of competing through exports or foreign direct
investment. Since the restrictions on FDI in retail is highly controversial and fiercely
debated in India, this loophole lets foreign brands have a presence in the Indian market
very easily. While competition laws aim to regulate fair competition, it takes no actions
to promote the same. For example, to date no measures have been taken to connect small
traders and hawkers with the back end of the supply chain which can reduce their
procurement price, something that the big retail stores enjoy. In fact, many state
governments (eg Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Punjab) have enacted amendments
that allow big retail companies to bypass the strict Agricultural Produce Marketing
Committee that earlier restrained their development of integrated supply networks. As a
result these companies are now allowed to buy directly from farmers and even start their
own contract farming (Franz 2010).
Still, competition laws somewhat regulate the unfair practices even if they do not
do so efficiently or in a way that is friendly to the poor. But Parth Shah, the head of CCS,
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labels even these lax competition laws as unfair and impediments to growth. In an article
for a popular financial newspaper he wrote that “The competition law is no friend of
competition, of businesses or of consumers. Better competition requires simply removal
of all entry and exit barriers that government has created through its various acts and
laws” (2001).
Changes in urban land laws in recent times have also contributed to the easy
penetration of retail stores. As Kalhan and Franz (2009) note, state level planners have
barely assessed the issues concerning large retail stores such as “their desired number per
unit of population and their effect on the scarce urban space and energy” and how these
stores are going to impact local communities and traffic and congestion (60).
Additionally, there have been rapid changes in how urban land is regulated. Land in
Indian cities was managed and regulated by multiple authorities through the Land ceiling
Act that was passed in 1976. The aim of this act was to put a cap on the amount of land
that could be owned by a single person and the overall objective was to acquire surplus
land from private holders and use it to develop housing for the poor. Though the
objective of developing low-income housing was never achieved (discussed in detail in
next Chapter 6)-- either the state government which confiscated excessive land
successfully let it stay undeveloped, allowing slums and hawking hubs appear over time,
or in many other cases the loopholes in the act let the private owners seek exemption
(Singh 2006). But, as India embarked on the neoliberal route, land liberalization to attract
foreign investment became more important than providing housing and livelihood space
to the poor. In 1998, the government of India repealed the Urban Land Ceiling Act and
asked different state governments to implement the repeal as they were the ones who had
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the authority to do so. In 2005, the government of India launched an ambitious urban
renewal mission for improving and modernizing urban infrastructure and give a face-lift
to the cosmetic look in 65 cities nation-wide. It was called Jawaharlal Nehru Urban
Renewal Mission (JNNURM) and was designed to release funds to different cities on
competitive bases conditioned on the success of the state government in implementing
the 74th Amendment Act that promoted decentralization. One of the conditions for
discharging funds from the central government for the renewal was that the state
governments repeal the Land Ceiling act of 1976, which many had not done yet. The
repeal of the act was pushed on the basis that the true purpose of the law was never
achieved and it resulted in artificial scarcity of land. This, according to the union
government, resulted in sky-rocketing land prices and in fact adversely affected the poor,
for whom the Act was originally designed. So instead of seeking better implementation
and amending the loopholes, the government decided to give it up all together. This has
allowed private investors to amass large chunks of unused land not just from the market
but also from state governments. Also the requirement for the proof of “public good” has
been altered so much that now the local governments acquire land at below market prices
and sell it to private developers at cheaper rates. In Delhi, this was done in a series of
policies and program initiatives, in which the government and DDA actively seek publicprivate participation not just in developing land but also in land acquisition (Granthar
2010). Finally in 2005, the real estate and construction sector was opened to 100%
foreign direct investment, when earlier it had been capped at 40%. McKinsey Global
Institute, the economic research arm of the management consulting firm McKinsey and
Company, released a study that compared India with China, which showed better growth
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in GDP. Land regulation was declared as the major culprit and privatization of land was
proclaimed to be more important than privatization of government industries. The
example given by McKinsey was in the retail sector: “allowing FDI and removing land
market barriers will allow retail supermarkets to increase productivity more than fourfold from the current 20 per cent to almost 90 per cent of US levels in 10 years” (MGI
2001, 69 cited in Grethner 2010). Kalhan notes, many local and national retail giants-Reliance Retail, Croma, Aditya Birla group, S Kumars, Shoopers’ Stop, Westside,
Subhiksha, Trinethra--along with realty, brand and market shares are already in the
process of consolidating their real estate in big cities. Now with the opening of FDI in
real estate, foreign multinational brands can acquire land that was originally meant for
poor such as slum dwellers and hawkers, for their own setup.
I asked Ghayn Shyam about what he thought when people such as Ram come to
help hawkers but believe that retail should be open to corporate and multi-national
chains. He replied, “see we don’t need any help from anyone. All we need is that the
government should control the retail sector in favor of the poor hawkers and traders like
us. I don’t mind listening to people who come to help…they can give us some good
suggestions but our problems are generally bigger. After all a big fish always swallow the
small fish.”

Conclusion
In this chapter, I deconstructed the entrepreneurial discourse that is popularized
by CCS and NGOs. Not only does entrepreneurial discourse romanticize hawking as a
profession, it also allows CCS and NGOs to recommend policy changes that can have
damaging effects on hawkers. For instance, I have shown that the controversial NPSV
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proposal to have a 20 year cap on space available to registered hawkers is bolstered by
the entrepreneurial discourse. Also, internal contradictions in NPSV on one hand frame
hawkers as entrepreneurs and on the other hand propagate hawking as an archaic and
dying profession. NPSV is rife with such contradictions and I have discussed this further
in the section on locational discords. For instance, even though according to NPSV every
hawker will be registered and will get a space to hawk, the time of the space allotted will
be so limited, hawkers will barely earn anything.
In the second part of the chapter, I discussed problems with the model of
participation of hawkers in NPSV. First, the model of participation institutionalizes
exclusion by only inviting organized hawkers to participate in TVC/WVC, while the
unorganized remain outside any decision- making process. Further, through my
fieldwork, I also highlighted the heterogeneity and internal hierarchies prevalent within
hawkers’ organizations that will forestall their meaningful participation. In the last
section, I discussed how the growing presence of corporate retail is adversely affecting
hawkers, something that NPSV does not address. CCS, on the other hand, acknowledges
the competition yet considers it healthy. I have shown through my fieldwork of
Vidhyadhar Nagar mandi in Jaipur that even when hawkers are provided with fixed spots
in the hawking zones, competition with newly established retail stores and super markets
make them bear heavy losses. To counter CCS’s claims, I presented a case to make
readers aware that this competition is not only unhealthy, but also unfair.
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Chapter 8: Conclusion

In this chapter, I give my concluding remarks, provide a summary for the
dissertation, and discuss potential areas for future research. I have discussed how the
processes of neoliberalism-are spreading in urban areas, coopting different global and
local discourses, and mutating to find their ways into polices regarding the urban
marginalized that appear poor-friendly. Street hawkers are a group of poor informal
workers who often attract attention because of the conspicuous nature of their work,
which revolves around their presence in public space. This dissertation analyzes the
National Policy of Street Vending, 2009, that was created by a large “alliance” of NGOs,
think tanks, social activists and scholars who had been fighting state agents for the rights
of street hawkers for the past decade. This policy was subsequently passed by the Union
Cabinet of the Government of India as the Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of
Street Vending Bill on 1 May, 2013. As the alliance of pro-hawker policy begin to
celebrate and start claiming their contribution or organizations in different elements of
the policy in the media, it becomes even more important to analyze this so called prohawking policy before it is implemented on the ground with big media support. I selected
the Center for Civil society, a free market think tank, as my site of inquiry to delve into
the analysis because CCS is more open about its free market approach and is foreign and
corporate funded. It also has access to many policy networks and has been successfully
able to garner the attention of media and the public through various tactics.
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On April 1st, 2013, I received an e-mail sent out by a CCS member in my inbox
that was meant for a mass audience. It said “(T)his is to share an update on the report
from the Standing Committee on Urban Development which had reviewed the Street
Vendor Bill 2012. Many of the changes are in line with the recommendations that
CCS had made in a memo to the Committee”. A list of six recommendations followed.
This information was shared to convince readers that CCS had done its job well and was
indeed active and working, among other things, for the betterment of street hawkers. In
this dissertation, I have attempted to question these claims by analyzing CCS as a think
tanks, the discourse it uses to gain entry into not only policy networks and NGOs but also
the trust of the marginalized such as street hawkers. In the first chapter, I analyze the
concept, discourse and practice of civil society that is actively employed by CCS. I show
that the concept of civil society that is currently used by CCS is the one that separates the
state from civil society and depoliticize social struggles. I also show how the discourse of
civil society is aiding in the deployment of global hegemonic discourses of neoliberalism
and neoliberal governmentality. The discussions of civil society are further elaborated in
chapter 3, where by problematizing imaginations of state and civil society and replacing
their relationship from vertical national to a horizontal global plain, I show how the third
sector or the NGOs and think tanks are able to attain entry into this horizontal level of
state and civil society and work as transnational apparatus of governmentality. I analyze
CCS is as a think tank in the remainder of the chapter to help readers understand the
process of internationalization of ideas, the politics of donor agencies, the local
environment that contextualizes a specific model, and the tactics used by these
organizations to affect the climate of opinion. Both chapter two and three are framed on
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the premise that it is important to situate an organization in the global political economy
in order to investigate their local politics on the ground. This move helps me identify the
limitations in the discourses and understandings of CCS regarding informals and street
hawkers, something that I discuss in Chapter 4. Here I discuss various interpretations of
informality, including the ones espoused by CCS and NGOs only to show how they
romanticize street hawking as an entrepreneurial activity and create hawkers simply as
economic and homogenous object of inquiry. Here hawkers are inscribed with single and
ahistoric consciousness, which downplays the role of gender, caste, family and kinship.
In order to avoid this trap, I develop my approach to look at hawkers as heterogeneous
subjects who form a part of the broader political economy. They are considered not only
economic but also political, social and cultural actors who confront the world at multiple
sites that include their home in the slums or pavements, urban streets as spaces of
livelihood, government hospitals, schools, and their rural villages. With the help of these
dialogues, I progress to analyze CCS’s conception of space and the place of hawkers in it
in Chapter 5. I show how CCS treats space as a capitalist commodity through discussions
on public space. To provide a nuanced inquiry, I discuss different connotations of public
space and critically analyze the recommendations of CCS regarding public space to show
how it challenges it’s indigenous and open character. These recommendations become
derivatives in NPSV’s design to divide the city into hawking and no- hawking zones. I
use Timothy Mitchell’s idea of enframing that he developed to analyze colonial spatial
reorganization of space in 19th century Egypt to show how NPSV and CCS are
attempting to convert the rich communal space of Indian streets into abstract space that
facilitates capitalist production and consumption; divide space to bifurcate rich social life
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into public and private, exterior and interior; and construct a space that initiates and
invites a tourist gaze that drives consumption as the sole social practice. I explain how
this transformation of space will be achieved by NPSV through calling for creation of
Town/ Ward Vending Committees in every administrative ward. Not only is the
conception and materialization of such a committee shown to be farfetched, but I argue
that its organization and internal structure are flawed and undemocratic. Also it demands
only models of participation that will undermine pro-hawking principles. In order to
show that, I make reference to the rise of the new middle class in the form of Resident
Welfare Associations and the contribution of the governmental led Bhagidari initiative in
Delhi that is transforming urban space with an elite imaginary. By using Delhi as a case
study to talk about the rise of the elite middle class, I show how hawkers and slum
dwellers who navigate through entangled spaces of informality have been affected by
elite politics in the last decade, only to prove that the presence of RWAs in TVCs and
WVCs will undermine the participation of hawkers. The participation of hawkers who
constitute 40% of the TVCs and WVCs is questioned in chapter seven. NPSV demands
organization of street hawkers and their representation by a head of hawkers’ union. I
show using interviews, and participant observations, how this kind of participation is
ridden with complexities. This sort of arrangement not only institutionalizes participatory
exclusions where unorganized hawkers get no representation, but also treats hawkers’
organizations as homogenous entities and does not pay attentions to the internal
hierarches of the union. I also deconstruct the tone of NPSV that creates hawkers as
entrepreneurial subjects to show various internal contradictions by using data from an
executive conference regarding the implementation of NPSV organized by CCS and
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NASVI. Some locational discords in NPSV are discussed to show that the main problems
of hawkers will not only continue to exist but also be exacerbated with the
implementation of NPSV.
This dissertation will hopefully pave way for future scholarship to investigate the
role of think tanks and NGOs in the policies regarding urban poor such as street vendors.
More site- specific study will extend my analysis and open visibility to further
complexities arising from management and reorganization of street hawkers. Further
research on formalization of street vendors can provide excellent insights to the politics
through which they are mobilized in neoliberal discourse. For example, the creation of a
hawker identity cards and biometric surveys can be analyzed using Foucault’s insights on
classification, biopower and governmentality. Additionally, studies are needed to show
the internal hierarchies within hawkers’ and hawking unions.
I started this project with intent to critically question the aggressive political
negotiations and agendas of hawker's organizations and to demonstrate inherent
contradictions and regressive political repercussions. Beyond the academic significance
of this dissertation, I hope that the social implications of this project invite new scrutiny
to the role of think tanks and NGOs in the politics of the poor, marginalized, and
informals. Unfortunately, people (like me) who are committed to social justice
unknowingly make think tanks and NGOs the site of their modus operendi without
critically evaluating the agendas of these organizations. I hope this work makes not just
scholars but also general public, state officials, and most importantly the marginalized
more vigilant of the goals and agendas of the organizations they form alliance with.
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Hawkers form 2% of the total urban India population and any measure to change
the status quo should be analyzed. On the ground, the implications of this project will be
reflected in new debates and intense probing of NPSV for its purported pro-hawking
stance. I’m hoping that this research will introduce policy debates that are truly inclusive,
reflect on the true characteristics of indigenous spaces and acknowledge the growing
presence of organized retail as a threat to millions of poor hawkers. Finally, this project
has the potential to successfully change the course of hawker’s movement in urban India
towards goals of more genuine participatory solutions than the ones proposed by NPSV.
The central message of this research is a call to question the presence,
commitment and practice of the so called ‘civil society’ organizations or the ‘third sector’
in democratic political engagements. As I have shown in the case of street hawkers, these
think tanks and NGOs instead of initiating meaningful participatory political discourse,
attempt to depoliticize social struggles. Rather than galvanizing politics from below for
progressive social change, these organizations imprint on the polities, their own model of
solutions that are strongly indented of corporate capitalist interests. The lessons from this
research, I hope, will ensure more scrutiny to these organizations and make their current
practices hard to carry on.
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Appendices

Ego Hawking by Naveen Mandava, Researcher at CCS
Ego Hawking
Do we need a license for advocating a social cause?
The stretch of unlicensed hawkers in front of the crowded Safdarjung Hospital in
South Delhi offer a variety of fast foods among which pav bhaji forms one of the most
favourite. A couple of years back , the local pradhan Bhagwan Dada who controls entry
of hawkers onto the pavement and also incidentally runs a pav bhaji shop passed an order
declining the setting up of any other pav bhaji shops except of his own. Most relented.
However one hawker Bharat was adept at providing good pav bhaji and proceeded to set
up the stall. Soon customers began flocking to his stall. This enraged Bhagwan Dada.
What does he do now? Since he cannot drag customers to his stall, he uses the lowly tools
of accusing his competitor of spurious wares. How does Bharat feel like? Just like us.
Madhu Kishwar has been regarded as a grassroots organization on the hawkers’ front for
long. The Centre for Civil Society has long been acknowledged for its public policy ideas
and research. Among other areas of research like education, environment and
governance, the Centre for Civil Society has been working against the existence of
licence permit raj (entry barriers for business) since that hampers the street entrepreneurs
of India more than the rich. Where Madhu Kishwar has succeeded in bringing to notice
the plight of street vendors and cycle rickshaw pullers, CCS has made valuable inroads in
providing workable solutions to this end. CCS is bothered not only about the street
vendor but also the middle class citizen who values a clean sidewalk in front of his home.
Our publication Law, Liberty and Livelihood: Making a Living on the Street is an
outcome of this motivation to find public policy solutions that will benefit both the
harassed street vendor and the urban middle class citizen who values his quality of life.
Our policy solutions fall within the framework of individual rights and the rule of law. So
when Tavleen Singh writes in support of Madhu Kishwar and rants bitterly against the
Centre for Civil Society and its founder Dr Parth J Shah, it makes us sit up and take
notice. We have high regard for Tavleen Singh’s fiery pen and hence had chosen her for
penning the preface of our book given her claimed understanding of free and competitive
markets. It is apparent that we were wrong.
Tavleen Singh’s article is a textbook example of a journalist using her pen to
slander without indulging even in a pretense of analyzing facts. Even our Research
Internship Program designed for undergraduate students has seen better examples of
factual writing. She writes that “ Madhu rang me last week to tell me…Parth J Shah had
plagiarized huge chunks of research and documentation done by Manushi, to write his
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book, and not bothered to slip in the smallest acknowledgement.” This claim needs to be
analyzed on two parameters. First, is it a case of a direct copy from Manushi literature
without citation OR two, is it a broad charge of having taken the ideas of Madhu
Kishwar?
Let us consider one. CCS is open to Madhu Kishwar pointing out the material
which she claims has been plagiarized from Manushi literature. Madhu Kishwar is in
possession of more than one copy of the book. Manushi literature has been cited on four
pages: page 80, page 232, page 234 and page 235 of the book where the content had been
sourced. Not to mention the preface where she has been highlighted well. That takes the
total count of her mentions in the book to 8. In contrast Dr. Parth J Shah, Coeditor of
Law, Liberty and Livelihood: Making a Living on the Street is mentioned only in 5
places through the book. Are we so dumb as to plagiarize her material and then have an
ode to her in the Preface and then have her release the book! Credit us with some
intelligence. And as is clear from my recent email exchange with Madhu Kishwar, there
is no case of plagiarization of her research material or documentation.
On the second issue of borrowing ideas comes across the pathetic plight of Madhu
Kishwar. Since when did people need to get a licence to fight for a particular cause? Does
this mean that henceforth every research done on street hawking and cycle rickshaws in
any corner of India has to begin with an ode to Madhu Kishwar? She wants abolish
license raj when others are in charge but create one where she will be the authority? I
have yet to come across an ego greater than this. This comes across in her statement that
“Not one street-vendor or rickshaw puller or small shop owner in India would endorse
CCS’s claim to be a champion of their rights.” She needn’t have asked them. We
ourselves would have said the same. We find no purpose in convincing street vendors of
economic freedom. They know it better than we do. Our purpose is to convince the
people who make and change the policies that impact street hawkers. The purpose of our
research is to bring facts regarding them to light of policy-makers. If in course of that we
have not acknowledged a particular individual’s contribution to the study it is because
that person’s contribution was not relevant to the research study. Madhu Kishwar’s
documentaries may have helped us to see the issue in a better light but that is it. Neither
she, nor her documentary and neither Manushi had any direct bearing on the research
study Law, Liberty and Livelihood: Making a Living on the Street.
Our way of acknowledging her contribution to the cause (since she did not have
any direct contribution to the book) was to make her release the book and allow Tavleen
Singh write a near-ode to her in the preface.If she is under the impression that the tools of
analysis were borrowed from her, then even in that case her concerns are misplaced. This
study is probably ideologically indebted to Hernando de Soto, Murray N Rothbard and
David Friedman than anybody else. For they have provided me with the intellectual
thoughtwork to think of street space as private property that could revolutionise street
entrepreneurship in India. But I have not acknowledged them because they had no direct
bearing to the research study. If anything else, Madhu Kishwar’s encounters with street
vendors in Delhi proved that she does not understand the principles of street markets. Her
initiative to organize vendors in a static market complex and Tavleen Singh’s suggestion
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“that every street in every city can accommodate a certain number of vendors, at half
kilometer distances” betray a misunderstanding of street vendors’ requirements. Street
vending is influenced by customer demand. You cannot plan street vending space like
you would plan a an airport. If anything this demonstrates that they have not given up the
idea of central planning of vendor spaces. It is this very centralized urban planning by
bureaucrats that we have panned in the book. Nevertheless it is important to have people
like Madhu Kishwar who highlight the issue though they themselves may lack an
understanding of the principles of markets. Our role as a public policy research and
advocacy think tank is to delve on solutions and shift the quality of debate. In the
marketplace of ideas, it is necessary to havecompeting ideas to arrive at better solutions
for the problems challenging us today. There can never be enough ideas! So today you
have the Law, Liberty and Livelihood study, a first in India that talks of privatizing
governance and bringing an end to centralized urban planning. Radical ideas that Madhu
Kishwar and Tavleen Singh have not even thought about and would be ready to disown if
only they knew these were part of the book as well. Incidentally Voluntary City is the
only other study that had the intellectual courage to think on these lines. We did NOT
indebt it because it had no bearing on the research study. The rest of Tavleen Singh’s
article sounds like a personal tirade against the Centre for Civil Society. Analyze
statements like “…his phony center has just won the Templeton Freedom Award, 2005”
and “many instances of misguided international funding, for NGOs as spurious as the
Centre for Civil Society.” In an article whose headline is supposed to dwell on NGO
corruption, 45% of the sentences are devoted to Parth J Shah and the Centre for Civil
Society and not a single other NGO is mentioned. From this single point of the Centre for
Civil Society, she goes on to paint a corrupt picture of the NGO sector without providing
any facts other than stylized generalities. Even amateurs do not make mistakes like these.
If Tavleen Singh had only bothered to Google for us, she would have found that this
“phony” Centre was well acclaimed for its previous research publication State of
Governance: Delhi Citizen Handbook 2003. As T N Ninan, editor of Business Standard
put it “If one small NGO can put all this together, think of what our mass circulation
newspapers could do if they chose to be newspapers instead of advertising gazettes.”
Incidentally, this “phony” Centre also has individuals like me who have left lucrative
careers in software for a fulfilling role in public policy formulation for a better India.
Given my talent at research, I could go on to dig allegations that some street
hawkers had made of Madhu Kishwar taking money from them without providing
receipts on pretext of providing hawking space. But as these issues did not deem to be
pertinent to the objectives of the research study Law, Liberty and Livelihood, we did not
pursue them. I could also rake up Tavleen Singh’s previous incidents of slander through
her column as in the Teesta Setalvad case. But frankly these detract from the prime
purpose of my work. The way I see it is this. Tavleen Singh is past her prime whose
knowledge of licence permit raj for the poor is relegated to only Madhu Kishwar and her
work. Neither has she updated herself on the current scenario nor has she made an effort
to understand the difference between the work of activists and the work of researchers.
My conscience as an honest researcher tells me that I shall not bow to the demands of
whimsical activists and senile journalists to acknowledge their ego. I am not here to write
their history but to dig facts and facts it is that I shall go after. Question is whether
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Madhu Kishwar is threatened that here has come a book that may put them out of the
spectrum of public limelight that is perhaps oxygen for them. History is replete with
people like Mao Tse Tsung who fell in love with their causes and finally became a
hindrance to the very cause they promoted. Maybe Madhu Kishwar’s time has come!
Researching Reality
Naveen Mandava
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